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Introduction 
War, people, and labour:  
The establishment of colonial rule  
in Zambia, 1890-1920 
In 1918, Theodore Williams, a young man with six years of service in the 
employ of the British South Africa Company in colonial Zambia, wrote to his 
mother. A dedicated and loving son, Williams corresponded diligently with his 
parents, sisters, and brothers in England or on their family estate in Jamaica. 
Bright, observant, and astute, his diaries, field notes, and letters are among the 
richest historical sources for Zambia in the early twentieth century. In contrast to 
many of his generation, Williams survived the Great War. In the dying months of 
that war, when it was becoming ever more probable that Germany would 
surrender, Williams wrote to his mother to discuss what was in store for Northern 
Rhodesia in the aftermath of the war: 
Solwezi, August 5th 1918, My dear Mother, …The only local product is native labour 
[transport has been crossed out and replaced with labour] and that is chiefly useful to the 
mines 100 miles away in the Congo. In other words the place is not worth spending money 
on. It is no use introducing cultivation or industries because of the distance to markets and 
the difficulties of transport. And so it is over most of N.R. [Northern Rhodesia]. In the 
Barotse it is different, where the natives are immensely rich in cattle.1 
In a nutshell Williams summed up the importance of Colonial Zambia for 
Imperial Britain, at best it was a source for labour, specifically labour for 
transport. In 1918 the fabulously rich copper deposits of the Copperbelt still lay 
hidden, whilst the copper deposits of the Congo had conveniently fallen into the 
hands of Belgium’s King Leopold. Northern Rhodesia was the Cinderella of the 
Empire, at the furthest reaches of the Empire, penniless and untidy, and hidden 
deep within it, not a heart of gold, but of copper, which would be instrumental in 
bringing about the greatest social transformation in Central Africa since the 
coming of the Iron Age a thousand years earlier. 
                                                 
1  Rhodes House, Oxford, MSS. Afr. S. 776-781.Williams (Theodore R.) Administrative Officer, 
Northern Rhodesia: Diaries, 1912-21. 3 Volumes; letters home, 1912-24. 3 Volumes. 
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In 1891, the territories of what would later become Northern Rhodesia and 
later still the Republic of Zambia, became subject to the British Crown and part 
of the Empire. Henceforth the peoples of Zambia found themselves subject to the 
authority of the British Crown. Although by dint of International Law it was 
undeniably true that from one day to the next the peoples of Zambia had become 
subject to the authority of Queen Victoria, this did not in any way equate with an 
on-the-ground presence of her office bearers, let alone that any British official 
was able to exercise any administrative authority in Zambia. Yet, thirty years 
later Northern Rhodesia was unquestionably part and parcel of the British 
Empire, and its kings, chiefs, headmen, and people recognised (if not necessarily 
accepted) the authority of approximately 300 officials who taxed and 
administered the land in the name of King George V.  
Since 2005, there has been an upsurge in publications dealing with Zambia’s 
past, yet none of these publications deals explicitly with the manner in which the 
colonial state came to be established in Zambia, let alone the central role and 
importance of World War One in the establishment of colonial rule in Zambia. In 
essence, this book seeks to discover and describe how British colonial authority 
came to be imposed in colonial Zambia between 1890 and 1920, and argues that 
the unique circumstances associated with the prosecution of World War One in 
Central Africa facilitated and enabled the establishment of the colonial state in 
Zambia.  
Three points underscore this work: 
• The establishment of colonial rule in Zambia took place along lines that 
differ substantially from the manner in which colonial rule came to be 
established in Zimbabwe or South Africa.2  
• On account of the specific conditions that exist in Zambia, there is a 
complex dialectical relationship between labour and transport in the 
territory.3 
• British Colonial rule only came to be effectively established in Zambia in 
the course of, and on account of, World War One.4 
                                                 
2  Jan-Bart Gewald, ‘Researching and Writing in the Twilight of an Imagined Conquest: Anthropology 
in Northern Rhodesia, 1930-1960’, History and Anthropology, 18, 4 (2007), pp. 459-487. 
3  Jan-Bart Gewald, ‘People, Mines and Cars: Towards a Revision of Zambian History, 1890-1930’. In: 
K. van Walraven, S. Luning, and J.B. Gewald (editors), The Speed of Change : Motor vehicles and 
People in Africa, 1890-2000 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 21-47 
4  This in contrast to Edmund Yorke, who argues that World War One undermined the colonial state 
being established. Edmund James Yorke, Britain, Northern Rhodesia and the First World War: 
Forgotten Colonial Crisis (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) & ‘A Crisis of Colonial Control: 
War and Authority in Northern Rhodesia, 1914-1919’, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1983. 
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Zambia is not South Africa 
The rich corpus of material produced by the anthropologists of the Rhodes 
Livingstone Institute (RLI) has come to dominate our understanding of Zambian 
societies and Zambia's past.5 George Shepperson, the author of Independent 
African, one of the seminal works of Central African history, was well aware of 
the great advantage that exists for historians in the ‘vast weight of 
anthropological material’, which could be profitably mined by historians.6 
Nonetheless, the current historiography dealing with the colonisation of Zambia 
between 1890 and 1920 is seriously flawed and needs to be revised. 
Although history is not the object of professional inquiry by anthropologists, 
they do have ideas about the past, and in the Zambian context anthropology has 
to a large extent come to determine the country’s historiography.7 At the basis of 
all of this anthropological research lies the work of Audrey Richards, Godfrey 
and Monica Wilson, Max Gluckman, and the anthropologists who made up the 
Rhodes Livingstone Institute.8 It is to the credit of the RLI, that Zambia has a 
unique and richly detailed corpus of anthropological research that can be delved 
into for historical purposes. Indeed, so rich is the anthropological tradition in 
Zambia that when historical research has been conducted and historical debates 
have erupted, the products of the RLI’s anthropological research have often 
formed the basis for historical research and historical debates.9 In other words, 
even the historical debates in Zambia are anthropological in origin.10  
                                                 
5  This point is made in a review article by David Gordon, ‘Rites of Rebellion: Recent Anthropology 
from Zambia’. In: African Studies, 62, 1, 2003, pp. 125-139. 
6  George Shepperson, ‘The Literature of British Central Africa: A review article’. In: Human 
Problems in British Central Africa, The Rhodes Livingstone Journal, 23, 1958, p. 12. George 
Shepperson & Thomas Price, Independent African, John Chilembwe and the Origins, Setting and 
Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1958). 
7  Nowhere was this more so than in the case of Barnes and the Ngoni, whereby the Ngoni have come 
to form the stereotypical image of violent conquest in Zambia that came to be applied to the rest of 
the territory. John Barnes, Politics in a changing society: A Political History of the Fort Jameson 
Ngoni (London: Oxford University Press, 1954). 
8  Those interested in an introduction to the history of the RLI are advised to read, L. Schumaker, 
Africanising Anthropology: Fieldwork, Networks, and the Making of Cultural Knowledge in Central 
Africa (London: Duke University Press 2001). 
9  Recently Miles Larmer has gone so far as to suggest that the differing legacies of socio-
anthropological research carried out in Northern Rhodesia and Belgian Congo have determined the 
manner in which contemporary politics are carried out. (Paper presented at International workshop: 
Wage labour, capital and precaritiy in global history and Africa, Leiden 13-14 March, 2015) 
10  Examples would include the material published by Megan Vaughan & Henrietta Moore that re-
examined the work of Audrey Richards, Lyn Schumaker’s historical study of the RLI, and the 
rumbustious debate that developed between James Ferguson & Hugh Macmillan in the Journal of 
Southern African Studies. Megan Vaughan & Henriette Moore, Cutting Down Trees: Gender, 
Nutrition and Change in the Northern Province of Zambia, 1890-1990 (London: James Currey, 
1994); Schumaker, Africanizing Anthropology & James Ferguson, ‘Mobile Workers, Modernist 
Narratives: A Critique of the Historiography of Transition on the Zambian Copperbelt, part I’, 
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The anthropologists of the RLI worked from within a paradigm dominated by 
the experience of colonial conquest in South Africa.11 This had as a consequence 
that the anthropologists who dominate Zambian historiography did not consider 
how colonial rule came to be established in Zambia.12 Unintentionally, the RLI 
anthropologists transferred their understanding of colonial conquest in South 
Africa to the Northern Rhodesian situation. Given that they were primarily 
concerned with the sociocultural effects of migrant labour, and conditions 
existent within Northern Rhodesia in the 1950s, it is understandable that they 
should have unwittingly operated within a historical paradigm that did not apply 
to Northern Rhodesia. Concerned as they were with the present, there was no 
need for them to ever truly analyse the manner in which colonial rule came to be 
established in Northern Rhodesia.  
As James Ferguson has eloquently shown, Zambia is known in the 
anthropological literature for its urbanisation and labour migration to the cities of 
the Copperbelt.13 Leaving aside the merits of the many and varied debates 
dealing with the sociocultural effects of migrant labour in Zambia, it is of interest 
to note that the root cause of what drove Zambian men to engage in migrant 
labour was never seriously investigated. Instead of researching what had initiated 
the involvement of Zambian men in migrant labour, this migrancy was taken as a 
given by the RLI anthropologists, as well as those who later examined the work 
of the RLI. Researchers, commentators, and academics have unquestioningly 
assumed that young men became migrant labourers for the reasons given by a 
meta-narrative which had its origins, not in the empirical data of Zambia’s past, 
but in a South African past which had been transferred to Northern Rhodesia and 
which argued that colonial conquest had impoverished the rural areas, resulting 
in the movement of people to the mines.  
In arguing that a paradigm that was applicable to South Africa came to be 
applied to Zambia, this book contributes to a discussion that was initiated by 
Gordon, Widlok, and Sunseri – each of whom, in their separate fields, have 
drawn attention to the manner in which the South African experience continues 
                                                 
Journal of Southern African Studies 1990, 16, no. 3, pp. 385-412; ‘Mobile Workers, Modernist 
Narratives: A Critique of the Historiography of Transition on the Zambian Copperbelt, part II’, 
Journal of Southern African Studies 1990, 16, no. 4, pp. 603-621; ‘Modernist Narratives, 
Conventional Wisdoms, and Colonial Liberalism: Reply to a Straw Man’, Journal of Southern 
African Studies 1994, 20, no. 4, pp. 633-640; ‘Urban Trends on the Zambian Copperbelt: A Short 
Bibliographic Note’, Journal of Southern African Studies 1996, 22, no. 2, p. 313. 
11  Gewald, ‘Researching and Writing’.  
12  Where they did consider it, as in the case of the work of Barnes on the Ngoni in eastern Zambia, it 
was primarily because the ethnographic detail so clearly brought the aspect of violent conquest to the 
fore. Barnes, Politics in a changing society. Notably this book has as its frontispiece a photograph of 
‘man points upwards and sings that, because they conquered the Ngoni, the Whites must have come 
from heaven’.  
13  James Ferguson, Expectations of modernity: myths and meanings of urban life on the Zambian 
Copperbelt, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999). 
5 
 
to inform and obscure the dominant view of both anthropology and history about 
southern Africa as a whole.14 In other words, the South African experience has 
effectively placed terms and concepts out of bounds, and thereby appropriated 
them and robbed them of all meaning other than that dictated by the South 
African experience.15 Similarly Thomas Spear, in discussing the work of 
Mahmood Mamdani, has drawn attention to the danger of assuming that the 
‘experiences of settler colonialism reflected those of all Africa’.16 In the same 
way, historians working on Mozambique and Namibia have indicated that the 
overwhelming reliance on South African models has shaped the writing of 
history in ways, which do not bear relation to the observed data.17 This reliance 
has, as Sunseri correctly concludes: 
… led Africanists elsewhere to adopt one of the major weaknesses of this literature, the 
inability to show how peasants and labour migrants, men and women, contributed to the 
shaping of colonial political economies.18 
Informed by these perspectives, this book seeks to free Zambia’s past from the 
South African paradigm.  
Zambia’s neglected history 
Since the beginning of the new millennium, and above all following 2005, there 
has been an upsurge in historical research and literature in Zambia,19 an upsurge 
that has heralded a new post-colonial and post-nationalist historiography. Prior to 
2000, Zambian historiography had, to all intents and purposes, consistently been 
                                                 
14  Thaddeus Sunseri, ‘Labour Migration in Colonial Tanzania and the Hegemony of South African 
Historiography’. In: African Affairs (1996), 95, pp. 581-598. Robert Gordon, The Bushman Myth: 
The Making of a Namibian Underclass (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992),  p. 6. Thanks to Thomas 
Widlok for making this point. Thomas Widlok, Living on Mangetti: ‘Bushman’ Autonomy and 
Namibian Independence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). See in particular Chapter 1, 
‘Cultural Diversity’, pp. 15-41. 
15  Mark Gevisser, Lost and Found in Johannesburg (Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball 
Publishers, 2014). Deals with the lasting impact that South Africa’s unique legislation and past has 
had on all aspects of life in South Africa, be they sexual, gender, race, ethnic, religion, spatial or 
otherwise. 
16  Thomas Spear, ‘Neo-traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa’. In: 
Journal of African History, 44 (2003), p. 9, fn. 23. With thanks to Thaddeus Sunseri. 
17  Patricia Hayes, et al., eds, Namibia under South African Rule: Mobility and Containment, 1915-46 
(Oxford: James Currey, 1998) & Patrick Harries, Work, Culture, and Identity: Migrant Labourers in 
Mozambique and South Africa, c. 1860-1910 (London: James Currey, 1994). 
18  Sunseri, ‘Labour Migration’, p. 585. 
19  David M. Gordon, Nachituti’s Gift: Economy, Society, and Environment in Central Africa (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); David M. Gordon, Invisible Agents: Spirits in a Central 
African History (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012); Miles Larmer, Mineworkers in Zambia: 
Labour and Political Change in Post-Colonial Africa (London, I.B. Taurus, 2007); Giacomo 
Macola, The Kingdom of Kazembe: History and Politics in North-Eastern Zambia and Katanga to 
1950 (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 2002) & Giacomo Macola, Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A 
Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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made subject to the domination of the nationalist project and, associated with this 
project, the overriding interest of Development. Histories of Zambia, in particular 
those completed in the post-colonial period, were primarily concerned with 
showing up the inequities of colonial rule and the seemingly linear development 
of all strands of society towards the nation state: Zambia. That is, history, in and 
of itself, did not exist in Zambia; instead it was consistently interpreted and 
viewed from within the paradigms of the Zambian nation-state and development 
theory.  
Throughout the more than 50 years of independence Zambia’s elite has sought 
to emphasise and maintain the idea and ideal of ‘One Zambia One Nation’, and 
this has been reflected in the historiography.20 Indeed, it is the idea of One 
Zambia One Nation that appears to be the lasting legacy of UNIP (United 
National Independence Party), a legacy that remains and provides continued 
stability in an otherwise turbulent region. Yet since 2000 a new historiography 
has developed unfettered by the constraints of UNIP Nationalist 
Historiography.21 A historiography, which is not only post-colonial but also post-
nationalist. No longer does research conducted on aspects of Zambia’s history 
need to be constrained by the demands of the nationalist paradigm; instead 
Zambian history is literally at a new frontier. Effectively for the first time since 
independence it has become possible for historians to conduct research on 
aspects of Zambia’s past that, to all intents and purposes, had been considered 
somehow improper and out of bounds. In the present, research into the history of 
motor-vehicles, UPP, Mushala, birds, or any other controversial aspect of 
Zambia’s past no longer carries the implicit baggage of being inappropriate, or 
topics of research that by definition demanded a specific approach and the taking 
up of a specific politically acceptable position. The effective liberalisation, for 
want of a better term, of Zambian history has heralded a new dawn. 
As with so much academic endeavour in Zambia, professional history writing 
can be said to have begun with the Rhodes Livingstone Institute, in particular 
with the work of Lewis Henry Gann.22 Generally dismissed as an apologist for 
                                                 
20  In itself, this is hardly surprising given the example of what happened in Congo DRC, where 
dissension and strife literally tore the country asunder and triggered a series of civil wars. 
21  Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar & Giacomo Macola, eds, One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards 
a History of Post-Colonial Zambia (Leiden: Brill, 2008). 
22  Particularly important in the context of this book, which initially began life as a study in the social 
history of transport in Zambia, is Gann’s observation in other work, writing about sources in 
Northern Rhodesian history, in which he throws in an aside on copper development in colonial 
Zambia: 
‘The new development led to a tremendous influx of new capital, which was accompanied by 
profound social and economic changes. One of the most important of these concerned 
transportation. Originally transport had largely depended on African carriers and later on bicycles, 
rickshaws, and donkey carts. Ox-waggons, which played so important a part in opening up the 
south, could not be employed on a large scale north of the Zambesi because of the existence of 
extensive ‘fly’ belts, with fluctuating boundaries. Between 1904 and 1909 a railway was built from 
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colonial rule, Gann’s work was solidly based on local source material and took 
on a position that was often at odds with the British Colonial Office and in 
sympathy with the white settlers of Rhodesia.23 Qualified to speak, even if 
tongue in cheek, was the man who initially commissioned Gann to work for the 
RLI, Max Gluckmann, who noted that Gann’s The Birth of a Plural Society was 
‘in several ways a pioneer study’. Writing of the expectations of himself and 
fellow researchers at the RLI, Gluckmann was honest enough to write: 
I suppose that we anthropologists were no more egotistical than most people when we 
planned to have an historian who would produce a study of the development of British 
Central Africa as a mere adjunct to our own researches. I, at least, was thinking of something 
like ‘a schoolboy’s history’, in which we would learn the bare dates when various things 
happened in various parts of the country. It is probably not easy for scholars working in 
countries where at least the outline of events is easily accessible to realize how scattered 
were the historical facts about Central Africa.24 
Far from merely writing on the white side of colonial history, Gann provided 
historians and anthropologists alike with the first professional synthesis of 
Zambian history. A history which, by dint of his extensive association with the 
RLI, was extensively informed by anthropological and sociological theory, and 
far more than white man’s history or a mere ‘Schoolboy’s History’.  
Presumably on account of his experiences as a German refugee who had been 
caught up in the maelstrom of the excesses of the nation-state, Gann was never 
one for glowing recommendations and claims for the future.25 For Gann the 
future was unwritten and unknown, a territory and space the contents of which 
could never be comfortably encompassed in glowing rhetoric. Thus, although the 
past could be approached and discussed with reasonable certainty, the future was 
problematic. It is most likely that it was his ever-present refusal to rejoice in the 
perceived inevitable joys of the Zambian future that led to his work being 
dismissed. In addition his brutally honest approach to much that he saw must 
have contributed to his dismissal. These strands, a refusal to rejoice in the future, 
as well as an untimely honesty, can be discerned in the closing paragraph of his 
Birth of a Plural Society: 
                                                 
the Victoria Falls to the Belgian Congo, but off the railway line communications remained entirely 
inadequate. The decisive change came with the introduction of the motorcar. By 1927 all 
Government stations were supplied with motor transport, and in 1929 the Great North Road was 
opened for cars, linking Fort Jameson with the remainder of Northern Rhodesia rather than 
Nyasaland. The drivers at this time were all Europeans’. 
L.H. Gann, ‘The “Northern Rhodesia Journal” as an Historical Source Book’, in Human Problems in 
British Central Africa, The Rhodes Livingstone Journal, 23, 1958, p. 52. 
23  Schumaker, Africanizing Anthropology, p. 308, no. 8. 
24  Max Gluckman writing in the Foreword to L.H. Gann, The Birth of a Plural Society: The 
development of Northern Rhodesia under the British South Africa Company 1894-1914 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1958), p. vii. 
25  See in this regard Gann’s candid autobiographical article: L.H. Gann, ‘Ex Africa: An Africanist’s 
Intellectual Autobiography’. In: The Journal of Modern African Studies, 31, 3 (1993), pp. 477-498. 
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… the seeds of potential struggles remain; and as the plural society of Northern Rhodesia 
forms part of a more extensive one, it is probable that these will ultimately be decided on an 
arena wider than a purely local one. … The new society possessed means of unlocking 
wealth far beyond the imagination of the most enterprising Bantu chief; and the resources of 
even a backward colonial economy producing primary goods for the world market proved to 
be far greater than those of the most advanced tribal society. … Within its [the plural 
society] framework a social and economic revolution was set off, the outcome of which none 
can as yet foresee.26 
Not surprisingly, published as it was at the beginning of Zambia’s Nationalist 
struggles, on the eve of Ghanaian independence and allied to Rhodesia’s settler 
elite, Gann’s work was not well received in Zambia, let alone the newly 
emergent academic community of historians of African History. George 
Shepperson, a historian of sophistication in his own right, realised the merits of 
Gann’s work and resisted its rejection, yet noted: 
… that while Mr. Gann provides an excellent etching of the elements of European society in 
Northern Rhodesia, much of the detail is missing and there is little colour.27 
The desire to fill in, in full colour, the history of Africa was given impetus by the 
Leverhulme conference on ‘Historians in Tropical Africa’ held in Salisbury in 
September 1960, and the launch of the Journal of African History in the same 
year.28 
Terence Ranger, surely one of the leading voices in the then emergent 
community of African historians, was nevertheless capable of seeing the qualities 
of Gann and his skill as a historian. Writing of Gann’s second book, A History of 
Northern Rhodesia,29 Ranger noted that: 
We can be sure that any volume produced to mark the tenth anniversary of Zambia will have 
very different emphasis from Mr Gann’s. Let us hope that it will be as good as Mr Gann’s 
book is within its chosen field. For here is no mere apologia for the defunct Federation or for 
its white Northern Rhodesian architects; no ‘official’ history.30 
However, Ranger’s prediction turned out to be no more than wishful thinking, for 
in the years following Zambia’s independence there were but two books that 
approached the quality and scope of Gann’s work. Richard Hall’s Zambia, 
published in 1965 immediately after Zambia’s independence, attempted to 
provide the country with a national history, akin to the ‘schoolboy history’ 
requested by Gluckman.31 Andrew Roberts, A History of Zambia, although 
published more than thirty years ago, remains a classic for its clear writing style 
                                                 
26  Gann, Birth of a Plural Society, p. 191. 
27  Shepperson, ‘Literature of British Central Africa’, p. 34. 
28  Terence Ranger, ‘Concluding Remarks’. In: A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (editor), The Emergence of African 
History at British Universities (Oxford: Worldview Publications, 1995), p. 169. 
29  L.H. Gann, A history of Northern Rhodesia, Early days to 1953 (London, 1964). 
30  T.O. Ranger, ‘Introducing Zambia’, review of L.H. Gann, A history of Northern Rhodesia, Early 
days to 1953. In: Journal of African History, 1964, pp. 455-6. 
31  Richard Hall, Zambia (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965). 
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and innovative content.32 Far from being a stodgy, ‘one damned thing after 
another’, Roberts sought to survey the whole span of human history in the 
territory that became Zambia in 1964, and, more importantly so, to explain 
history in Zambia, rather than of Zambia. 
The Republic of Zambia is an amalgam of people thrown together within a 
country with borders determined in boardrooms in Europe. Thus, Zambia’s 
eastern border with Angola runs parallel to the 22 degree latitude and was 
approved by the King of Italy, and Zambia’s border with Congo DRC was agreed 
upon in Europe and given form on the ground by no less than three border 
commissions.33 Given the diversity of the peoples living within the borders of 
Zambia, it is not surprising that there have not been many detailed national 
histories. By and large studies dealing with Zambian history have tended to 
concentrate on either the Lozi kingdom in the west of the country or the Bemba 
polities in the east.  
In the first years after Zambian independence, the first truly Africanist 
histories of Zambia were completed by a number of historians as PhD theses, a 
number of which were later published as monographs. The work of Andrew 
Roberts, A history of the Bemba, began life as a PhD thesis accepted at the 
University of Wisconsin in 1966.34 Similarly Henry Meebelo’s Reaction to 
Colonialism began life as a PhD thesis at the University of London.35 Likewise 
Mutumba Mainga’s Bulozi under the Luyana Kings, developed out of a PhD 
thesis submitted at London University in 1969, and Gwyn Prins’s The Hidden 
Hippopotamus began life as a PhD thesis examined at Cambridge University.36 
Roberts and Meebelo described the first contacts with, and detailed the arrival of, 
representatives of British colonialism in northeastern Zambia. Mainga and Prins 
concentrated on western Zambia primarily prior to the arrival of British 
colonialism. Gerald Caplan, who like Prins and Mainga also worked on Bulozi, 
extended his The Elites of Barotseland through to 1969.37  
Robert Rotberg’s, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa, was 
encyclopaedic in its scope, but was, as the title suggests, particularly interested in 
                                                 
32  Andrew Roberts, A History of Zambia (New York: Africana Publishing, 1976). 
33  John W. Donaldson, ‘Pillars and perspective: demarcation of the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia 
boundary’, Journal of Historical Geography 34 (2008), pp. 471-493. 
34  Andrew Roberts, A history of the Bemba: political growth and change in north-eastern Zambia 
before 1900 (Harlow: Longman, 1973). 
35  Henry S. Meebelo, Reaction to Colonialism: A Prelude to the Politics of Independence in Northern 
Rhodesia 1893-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971). 
36  Mutumba Mainga, Bulozi under the Luyana Kings: Political Evolution and State Formation in Pre-
Colonial Zambia (London: Longman, 1973) & Gwyn Prins, The Hidden Hippopotamus: Reappraisal 
in African History: the early colonial experience in western Zambia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980). 
37  Gerald L. Caplan, The Elites of Barotseland, 1878-1969: A Political History of Zambia’s Western 
Province (London: Hurst Publishers, 1970) 
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the rise of nationalism, as opposed to the establishment of colonial rule.38 Similar 
to Rotberg in scope, if not focus, is Karen Fields’ Revival and Rebellion in 
Colonial Central Africa, which focussed on the interplay between religion and 
social and political movements in Central Africa.39 Published shortly before 
Fields is the work of Fergus Macpherson, Anatomy of a Conquest, which 
consciously focussed on dealing with the establishment of colonial rule in 
Zambia.40 Unfortunately this book, which is solidly researched and contains a 
vast amount of material based on oral research, is undermined by the simple fact 
that Macpherson, in an attempt to bring across the undoubted inequities of 
colonial rule in Zambia, often draws on material that relates to events in Southern 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and includes this in the texts dealing with Northern 
Rhodesia (Zambia).41 Although, to be fair, the work of Macpherson is 
meticulously annotated, the reader is often second-guessing as to know where the 
historical events being described by Macpherson actually took place.  
Thoroughly Zambian in origin and published nearly 30 years after 
independence, Guardian in Their Time is an anthology that sought to document 
Zambia’s colonial history.42 Central to this publication was a contribution by 
Samuel Chipungu, erstwhile Head of Department of History at the University of 
Zambia, entitled ‘Accumulation from within: The Boma class and the Native 
Treasury in colonial Zambia’. In this Chipungu sought to nuance the existing 
scholarship with regard to the role of African elites, who collaborated with 
colonial authorities in Zambia, and sought to discover how ‘the structures of 
colonial administration actually worked’.43 In particular, Chipungu described the 
development of a class of people who, through their association with the colonial 
administration, were able to expand their material, political, and social standing. 
In all of these many and varied publications there is not one that explicitly 
asks itself the question as to how a comparatively small group of men actually 
came to establish colonial authority in Northern Rhodesia. This book does and 
seeks to discover and describe how colonial authority came to be established in a 
territory more than three times the size of Great Britain. A reading of the archives 
indicates clearly that the colonial state was established, not by conquest but in a 
series of initially symbiotic ad hoc relationships between the junior 
                                                 
38  Robert I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 
1873-1964, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965). 
39  Karen E. Fields, Revival and Rebellion in Colonial Central Africa (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985) 
40  Fergus Macpherson, Anatomy of a Conquest: The British Occupation of Zambia 1884-1924 
(London: Longman, 1981). 
41  See in particular, Macpherson, Anatomy of a Conquest, pp. 56, 106-7, 122, 154, 202-3, & 213. 
42  S. Chipungu, ed., Guardians in Their Time: Experiences of Zambians under Colonial Rule, 1890-
1964 (London: Macmillan, 1992). 
43  Samuel N. Chipungu, ‘Accumulation from within: the Boma class and the Native Treasury in 
colonial Zambia’. In: Chipungu, Guardians in their Time, p. 74. 
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representatives of the British South Africa Company and a varied and disparate 
arrangement of resident power brokers.44 Understaffed, under-financed, and 
explicitly warned not to rock the boat, these men sought to come to an 
arrangement with local power elites. In this, this book develops the ideas of 
Killingray, Lonsdale, and others, who argue that colonial authority and colonial 
administrations derived much of their power through their dependency and 
collaboration with local power elites.45 The break out of war in August 1914 
provided these young colonial administrators, for the very first time in their 
careers, with the funding and authority that would allow them to consolidate their 
authority and overwhelm that of their African allies. In a process that began 
before the war, the BSAC officials were able, during the course of the war, to 
make local power elites indebted to, and dependent upon, the authority of the 
BSAC administration. In exchange for funding, drawn from the War Office and 
disbursed by the BSAC administrators, chiefs and headmen supplied military 
labour for the war effort, and in so doing bound themselves to the BSAC 
administration. That is, far from violent conquest, the colonial state came about 
through a long process, in which initially the colonial administrators had very 
little power but which by the end of World War One had switched to the 
advantage of the colonial administration. The incipient administration’s 
insatiable demand for labour throughout the war, coupled with the 
administration’s ability to pay for it, had as a corollary that African Chiefs and 
Headman were bound to the administration as they provided labour in exchange 
for money.  
The coming of colonial rule 
In itself, the formal imposition of colonial rule in the course of the 1880s in the 
territories that surround Zambia did little to change the patterns of trade and 
transport that had developed in central Africa.46 None the less, as colonial states, 
Germany, Belgium, and Great Britain increasingly gained effective control of the 
                                                 
44  See in this regard the papers of Theodore Williams, who was stationed as a junior administrative 
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territories under their rule; as borders and boundaries acquired an on-the-ground 
reality, and duties, taxes, and port duties were enforced, so too the trade routes 
(where the bulk of goods were transported by African labour and which 
crisscrossed the continent regardless of colonial boundaries) went into decline 
and collapsed. In the period 1885 to 1905 African trade collapsed as colonial rule 
was imposed, and new forms of export, extraction, and transaction were imposed 
– at times in a very direct and brutal manner. The examples of Garenganze and 
Hehe are cases in point.47 In contrast to the Germans in German East Africa, the 
English in Southern Rhodesia, and the Belgians in the Congo Free State, the 
BSAC, by the time it sought to establish its authority, simply did not have the 
ability to enforce its wishes on the African populations of Northern Rhodesia. 
On paper and in terms of international law, the British South Africa Company 
(BSAC) was formally awarded jurisdiction in 1891 over the territories that would 
later become Zambia. However, this was not the same as an on-the-ground 
presence of an administration capable of governing, let alone taxing, the territory 
and its inhabitants. Furthermore, by 1897 the BSAC was to all intents and 
purposes bankrupt following a series of ever more violent and hare-brained 
attempts at securing profits for its shareholders. The sacking of Bulawayo and 
Matabeleland in 1893, and the Jameson Raid of 1895, coupled with natural 
disasters and full-scale insurrection and war in Southern Rhodesia (contemporary 
Zimbabwe) stretched the company to its limit, and meant that it was effectively 
unable to extend, let alone exercise its authority in Northern Rhodesia. Scattered 
on the fringes of a territory that is nearly the size of Germany and France 
combined, the BSAC officials, if they wished to travel around the country that 
was formally under their jurisdiction, were, as long as they did not travel by rail, 
at least until 1914, always dependent on African labour and goodwill. Without 
African labour nothing moved in Northern Rhodesia, and labour had to be 
purchased at going market rates, at least until the establishment of motorable 
roads and the wholesale introduction of petrol-driven motor vehicles after World 
War One.48 The manner in which the colonial state gained effective on the 
ground control of the territories that would later make up the Republic of Zambia 
is the subject of this book. 
                                                 
47  Jan-Bart Gewald, ‘More than Red Rubber and figures alone: a critical appraisal of the Memory of 
the Congo exhibition at the Royal Museum for Central Africa, Tervuren, Belgium’, The 
International Journal of African Historical Studies: (2006), vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 471-486 & ‘Colonial 
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Historical Review: (2008), vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 1-27. 
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Structure of the book 
The paper-thin administration and the men within it are discussed in Chapter 
One. The handful of men initially appointed to administer Northern Rhodesia 
were largely incapable of transforming the territory and its peoples into 
something that was in keeping with their envisaged ideal type of a colonial 
state.49 The men recruited to administer the territory, drawn as they were, on the 
one hand, from BSAC mercenary units and, on the other, from English public 
schools and Oxbridge, differed substantially as to how this should be done. In 
some instances BSAC officials were capable of establishing a measure of 
influence and of living successful lives in calm districts with the backing of local 
authorities and people, and yet in other instances BSAC officials found 
themselves completely ostracised from society and living the lonely lives of 
paupers surviving on tinned food and waiting for relief. 
Symbolic of the BSAC administrators’ inability to control and administer the 
territory formally under their jurisdiction was their inability to enforce the ban on 
slash and burn agriculture, which is discussed in the second part of Chapter One. 
Chitemene agriculture allowed people to make a living as agriculturalists on the 
sparse soils of Northern Rhodesia.50 However, this form of agriculture, by its 
very nature, dictated that people moved from place to place as soils were 
exhausted and new stands established. Not surprisingly this was anathema to an 
administration that sought to control and tax its subjects. Shortly after the formal 
introduction of taxation in a number of districts around 1903, district officials 
sought to end chitemene agriculture, ostensibly to protect the environment and 
ensure the conservation of natural resources. It was however the desire by the 
incoming administration to effectively tax its subjects that caused it to attempt to 
prohibit a system of agriculture that dictated the continual movement of people. 
Although the administration sought to enforce the ban, they were unable to do so 
until after World War One. 
The formal establishment of BSAC colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia in 
1891, in the wake of the company’s failure to acquire the fabulously rich copper 
mines of Katanga in southern Congo, coupled with the ending of the long-
distance caravan trade, heralded a new economic order in the region. The 
consequences of this new economic order are discussed in Chapter Two. The 
development of the mines in Katanga had an enormous impact on the societies 
living within the Northern Rhodesian territories that bordered Katanga. Sparsely 
                                                 
49  James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
50  Moore, H.L. & M.A. Vaughan, ‘Cutting Down Trees’. 
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populated, in part on account of the extremely high concentration of copper 
sulphides in the soils, Katanga could not in and of itself supply sufficient labour, 
let alone foodstuffs for the mines being established. As such, the bulk of the 
labour used to establish and develop the mines of Katanga was drawn from 
Northern Rhodesia. In addition, the railroad, which linked the mines of Katanga 
to the Wankie coalfields in Southern Rhodesia and the harbours of South Africa, 
was built with Northern Rhodesian labour.  
Although the Katangese copper mines relied on Wankie coal to power their 
steam driven machines, the mines were consistently desperately short of labour 
in the first twenty years of their existence. To supply sufficient labour to the 
Katangese mines, labour recruiters, such as Macdonald of the African Lakes 
Corporation ALC, played a major role, not only in recruiting labour, but also in 
enforcing BSAC legislation in the absence of any BSAC administrators. That is, 
in their desire to supply labour to the Katangese mines, labour recruiters 
recognised and submitted to BSAC jurisdiction, and in turn enforced BSAC 
legislation upon those whom they recruited for labour in Katanga from what was 
formally Northern Rhodesia. That labour-recruiting companies, such as the ALC 
and the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB), acted as cats-paws for the 
BSAC administration is well illustrated by the role played by these companies in 
enforcing the BSAC’s wishes during the sleeping sickness epidemic that began 
spreading through parts of the territory after 1906. In the absence of an extensive 
on the ground presence in Northern Rhodesia, BSAC administration was usually 
not present and often carried out by others acting on behalf of the BSAC. 
In 1911, when Northeastern Rhodesia and Northwestern Rhodesia were 
wedded into a single administrative unit administered from Livingstone, the writ 
of the BSAC was at best patchy and largely limited to the railway line that ran 
from Livingstone through to Sakania on the border of Katanga. Beyond the 
railway lines, there were administrative posts that were at least nine days walking 
from the railhead. However, since at least 1900, and in some instances long 
before, labourers had been migrating from all districts of Northern Rhodesia and 
on to the mines, cities, and farms of Katanga, Southern Rhodesia, and South 
Africa. Strictly speaking these people were subject to the BSAC administration, 
but more often than not they existed beyond its ken. 
The outbreak of World War One radically transformed Northern Rhodesia, 
and allowed the BSAC to establish colonial rule in the territory. Chapters Three, 
Four, and Five describe the manner in which, between 1914 and 1918 the BSAC 
established an effective on the ground presence that affected the daily lives of all 
people in Northern Rhodesia. In the years of the war, the various communities 
and cultures that made up the societies of Northern Rhodesia were thrown 
together by the war and forced to submit to the dictates of the British. During the 
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war, hundreds of thousands of men and women were recruited – and dragooned – 
throughout the whole of Northern Rhodesia into working as carriers in support of 
the British war effort. Thus men recruited in the far West of Buloziland could 
find themselves working together with men recruited in the Bangweulu Swamps 
as they transported foodstuffs grown by people in Kafue through the Congo 
pedicle for carriers operating out of Kasama who had been recruited from the 
Luangwa Valley. 
Initially the incipient administration sought to hide the war from its subjects, 
yet, as Chapter Three indicates, the needs of war almost immediately made it 
imperative for the British authorities to involve the people of Northern Rhodesia 
in their war effort. Without the assistance of countless thousands of largely 
unnamed and unknown Northern Rhodesian men, women, and children 
conscripted into the British war effort, it would not have been possible for Britain 
to have defended the borders of Northern Rhodesia, let alone launch an invasion 
of neighbouring German East Africa. In order to succeed in its war effort in East 
Africa the British Empire needed and subsequently acquired the labour power of 
the people of Northern Rhodesia and thus established effective colonial rule in 
the territory. 
With a frontline that existed at no less than 1000 kilometres from the nearest 
railway line under their control, the British were faced with a logistical 
nightmare: how to get sufficient troops and supplies to the front in the absence of 
any other form of transport other than human portage. This necessitated the mass 
recruitment of portage labour throughout Northern Rhodesia. Labour was 
recruited through the intercession of chiefs and headmen who, in exchange for 
porters delivered, received rewards in the form of cash payments, firearms, and 
support in their struggles with rivals and subjects. In the quid pro quo 
relationship that developed, Northern Rhodesian chiefs and headmen became 
increasingly dependent upon the British administration for their political 
survival. In exchange for labour supplied to the British, chiefs and headmen 
received goods, favours, and powers that could be re-distributed to subjects, and, 
at the same time, unwittingly chiefs and headmen lost their independence to the 
British. 
By 1915, northeastern Northern Rhodesia was devastated by war and much of 
the country wracked by famine. It became impossible to transport sufficient 
supplies by portage to successfully conduct the war. Chapter Four discusses and 
describes what the implications of this were for the people and societies of 
northeastern Northern Rhodesia. In addition the chapter illustrates what the 
consequences were of a failed trust in industrial technology on the part of British 
military authorities. With the collapse of portage in Northern Rhodesia, military 
planners came up with innovative forms of transport, one of which consisted in 
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the mass hiring of a flotilla of canoes and paddlers from the Chambeshi, 
Bangweulu, and Luapula river systems. In exchange for cash money, BaTwa 
boatmen living in the Bangweulu swamps allowed themselves to be recruited en 
masse to transport war supplies from Kabunda on the Luapula River through the 
Bangweulu swamps and on to a staging post on the Chambeshi River just to the 
south of Kasama. Interestingly the mass mobilisation of the Batwa in exchange 
for cash was only for the duration of the war, where after they withdrew once 
again into the sanctuary of the swamps where they successfully evaded taxation 
by the colonial state. 
In the absence of human portage and with access to limitless funding, British 
war planners sought to overcome the problems of transport by turning to new 
forms of technology. In the event, although Africa was at this stage at the cutting 
edge of technology, the equipment deployed did not live up to expectations. 
Instead of freeing up labour and being able to operate independently of human 
portage, both steam and petrol-driven motor vehicles continued to be reliant on 
extensive inputs of human labour. Thus, steam traction engines deployed in 
southern Congo required thousands of labourers for road and bridge building, as 
well as fuel and water transport. Similarly, petrol-driven motor vehicles deployed 
in Northern Rhodesia between Broken Hill and the frontline at Abercorn and Fife 
were inordinately expensive and required enormous labour inputs for road and 
bridge building. In addition fuel for the motor vehicles had to be transported by 
portage and canoe to fuel depots along the route. The petrol-driven motor 
vehicles did have one comparative advantage, though, and that was that they 
were fast. Tours by visiting commissioners could be completed in as many weeks 
as it had previously taken in months. 
The incessant demand for food and labour on the part of the incipient colonial 
state between 1914 and 1918 had long-term transformative implications for the 
societies and cultures of Northern Rhodesia. Chapter Five discusses what the 
implications were of the continual demand for foodstuffs, coupled to the 
unending recruitment of labour to transport these foodstuffs, that led to a collapse 
in food production in large parts of Northern Rhodesia. The recruitment of young 
people in the prime of their lives meant that labour was no longer available to 
bring new areas under cultivation, and the soils already under cultivation became 
exhausted. In addition, the absence of labour precluded the production of labour 
intensive crops such as maize, millet, and sorghum, which were staple foodstuffs 
across much of Northern Rhodesia at the time. Along the railway line and in 
wide swathes along the transport routes to the frontline, food was hard to come 
by as ever-hungry carriers and military commissars scoured the land for food. By 
the middle of 1915 famine reigned in much of Northern Rhodesia, and the 
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colonial administration began distributing food relief, but only in exchange for 
labour for the war effort.51   
To people in parts of Northern Rhodesia who were living close to the frontline 
for four years and later overrun by German forces in late 1918, it must have 
seemed as if the end of the world was at hand. This was particularly so when in 
late 1918 and early 1919 the global Spanish Influenza pandemic ravaged the 
population of Northern Rhodesia. In its aftermath young men and women, many 
of whom had served as frontline carriers in the war, began preaching an 
apocalyptic vision of the world: a world in which the end of time was nigh and 
Jesus Christ would arrive to save the righteous and expel the English. 
Unfortunately for the believers, the end of time had not arrived and Jesus Christ 
had not returned to earth to save the righteous, instead, in the four years of total 
war in East Africa, British colonial rule had come to be firmly established in 
Northern Rhodesia. Arrested and in chains the believers were summarily judged 
and marched into captivity. Henceforth the people of Northern Rhodesia were 
unable to determine their own destiny and were subjects of the British Crown till 
1964, when the territory was awarded its political independence as the Republic 
of Zambia.  
In contrast to the work of Yorke, who argues that the colonial state was 
threatened and nearly collapsed during the course of the war, this book argues 
instead that it was precisely on account of the war, and in particular the limitless 
funding made available to the BSAC by the War Office during the course of the 
war, that the BSAC was able to establish an effective administration in Northern 
Rhodesia.52 This book argues that, although the territories that would make up 
Zambia had officially become British in 1891, this did not equate to an on-the-
ground presence of colonial authority capable of affecting the daily lives of 
people, let alone determining their destinies. The establishment of effective 
colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia only came about on account of the unique 
conditions that developed in World War One, conditions which necessitated the 
massive application of human labour, which could only be effectively obtained 
through purchase, which in effect bound Chiefs and Headmen to the incipient 
colonial administration. World War One did not weaken the colonial 
administration in Northern Rhodesia, instead it provided the BSAC with an 
opportunity to extend and impress its authority across the territory. 
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52  Yorke, Britain, Northern Rhodesia and the First World War & ‘A Crisis of Colonial Control’. 
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A tissue-thin paper administration 
Introduction 
In 1891, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) of Cecil John Rhodes 
secured an Order in Council that legally extended the company’s Royal Charter 
to the territories that currently make up the Republic of Zambia. However, when 
the BSAC acquired formal jurisdiction over what is today Zambia, this did not 
equate to effective on-the-ground control and government of the territory and its 
people. On paper Zambia may have fallen into the hands of the BSAC, yet in the 
first instance the company did not even have a permanent presence in the 
territory, let alone the means to control and administer it. Added to this, the 
territory was split into two separate administrative entities, Northwestern and 
Northeastern Rhodesia, which were only amalgamated in 1911, twenty years 
after the initial Order in Council. 
The following chapter deals with the nature of the weak colonial state as it was 
established in colonial Zambia between 1891 and 1914. In these years the 
colonial state existed primarily on paper, with an administration that was staffed 
by a mere handful of men who were consistently constrained in terms of 
spending. It was, in effect, no more than a paper tiger, a Potemkin village, 
created and maintained for the purpose of seeing off other claimants and 
maintaining a claim in terms of international law to the territories that would 
make up Northern Rhodesia. The sole military action, the Ngoni campaign of 
1898, although it would come to be the cause celebre of colonial conquest, was 
initiated and prosecuted by forces from Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, with 
the Northern Rhodesian administrations left facing a fait accompli. The 
ramshackle nature of the BSAC administration in Northern Rhodesia is further 
indicated by the fact that until 1911 the territory was administered by two 
separate administrations, the officials of which were as alike as chalk and cheese.  
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By focussing on the issue of chitemene (slash and burn) agriculture, the 
chapter details and discusses the failure of the colonial administration to enforce 
its will on the people of Zambia prior to 1914, and illustrates the weakness of the 
colonial state as it existed in colonial Zambia between 1891 and 1914. The 
colonial administration, as it came to be established in Northern Rhodesia 
between 1891 and 1914, was far from being an unstoppable, overwhelming, and 
all-encompassing juggernaut that thundered over Zambia capable of demanding 
and enforcing subjection to the whim and will of the colonial state.  
The weak colonial state  
The bulk of the archival evidence of the BSAC administration in Zambia is to be 
found in the form of two archival holdings consisting of flimsy tissue-thin carbon 
copies of letters and formal documents.1 Through the years the paper, which was 
not very robust to begin with, has begun to crumble into dust and disappear. In 
this, the archival record reflects the condition of the BSAC administration in 
Zambia in the first twenty years of its jurisdiction between 1891, when its 
authority was extended to Northeastern and Northwestern Rhodesia, and 1911, 
when the territories were amalgamated and Northern Rhodesia was established; 
flimsy, tissue-thin, and ultimately ephemeral. 
For the first ten years the colonial presence, let alone administration, was weak 
and patchy, and present only in a handful of posts scattered around the territory. 
Added to which, landlocked in central Africa, Northern Rhodesia was in effect, 
in the eloquent words of Andrew Roberts: 
…simply an awkwardly shaped piece of debris resulting from Rhodes’s failure to obtain 
Katanga. The [British South Africa] Company now found itself committed to ruling what 
amounted to not one but two huge and sprawling territories: one in the west, with 
communications running south, and the other in the east, with communications running 
further east, to Nyasaland.2 
In Northwestern Rhodesia there was no formal BSAC presence until 1897 when 
Robert Coryndon arrived to take up a position as Resident at the court of the Lozi 
King Lewanika in Lealui.3 In Northeastern Rhodesia three small company posts 
were established at Lake Mweru, Abercorn (Mbala), and Fort Rosebery (Mansa). 
Where, as Gann noted, “No taxes, …, were levied, no important tribe (sic!) was 
subdued, and nothing serious was done to check the depredations of Arab slave 
traders.”4 The presence of a handful of posts served more to shield the territory 
                                                 
1  National Archives of Zambia (NAZ), BSAC 1 and BSAC 2. Thankfully, due to the sterling efforts of 
the staff of the National Archives and Dr. Marja Hinfelaar, the BSAC administration files appear to 
have been saved for posterity by having been digitalized. 
2  Roberts, History of Zambia, p. 175. 
3  Prins, Hidden Hippopotamus, pp. 234-6. 
4  Gann, Birth of a Plural Society, p. 61. 
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from the unwanted claims of other colonial powers than that it actually 
administered the land and its peoples.5 Sir Harry Johnston, founder of the 
Nyasaland Protectorate, is said to have drawn a map in 1890: 
… of what he called British Central Africa studded with towns and a magnificent system of 
railways. A little note in very small print in the corner of the map pointed out that both towns 
and railways were “projected”. … The impression was given to … rival empire builders that 
Rhodes was already effectively occupying vast areas of what is now Northern Rhodesia.6 
Similarly Cecil John Rhodes is said to have stated, “They (the British 
Government) will never cede (to the Germans) places called after the relatives of 
the Royal Family.”7 As a consequence. “Forts like Abercorn and Fife, right on 
the border of Tanganyika, were named after two Dukes who were directors of the 
British South Africa Company.”8 The same could be said of Fort Rosebery, 
named as it was after Lord Rosebery, the Prime Minister of Great Britain at the 
time. 
Around 1900 administrators appointed by the BSAC began establishing 
administrative centres in the territories of Northwestern Rhodesia, operating from 
Kalomo, and Northeastern Rhodesia, operating from Fort Jameson (Chipata). 
However, in contrast to the Germans in German East Africa, the BSAC by 1900 
no longer had the same ruthless ability to arm and deploy armies, as it had done 
with disastrous results in Southern Rhodesia. This was due to the simple fact that 
by 1897, six years after the Order in Council, the BSAC had to all intents and 
purposes bankrupted itself in a series of wars, skirmishes, and natural disasters in 
Southern Rhodesia. After establishing a presence in Southern Rhodesia though 
the building of a series of military forts in 1890, the dream of Cecil John Rhodes 
and his shareholders in the BSAC of finding a second Witwatersrand in Southern 
Rhodesia had failed to materialise. In the absence of spectacular mineral finds, 
the BSAC had begun to lash out around itself in ever more violent and hare-
brained attempts at securing profits for its shareholders. In 1893 BSAC forces 
had overrun the Matabele kingdom and burnt its capital, Bulawayo, to the 
ground. In 1895 BSAC forces under the command of Leander Starr Jameson had 
failed in their attempt to invade and take over the South African Republic. In 
March 1896 the rinderpest epizootic had crossed the Zambezi and destroyed up 
to 80 % of Southern Rhodesia’s cattle herds. In the same month the Chimurenga, 
a war that soon spread across the whole of Southern Rhodesia, began and 
necessitated the direct intervention of the British Government in support of the 
                                                 
5  A point emphasised by Bruce Fetter, Colonial Rule and Regional Imbalance in Colonial Africa 
(Boulder, 1983), pp. 85-87. 
6  Brelsford, Generation of Men: the European Pioneers of Northern Rhodesia, (Salisbury, Rhodesia: 
Stuart Manning Pty Ltd, 1965), p. 36. 
7  Brelsford, Generation of Men, p. 36. 
8  Brelsford, Generation of Men, p. 36. 
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BSAC. All of this meant that there was an effective cap on BSAC spending and a 
strong willingness on the part of the British Government to curtail the activities 
of the BSAC.9 
The Ngoni Campaign 
The thoroughly over-stretched nature of the BSAC administration in Northern 
Rhodesia is indicated by the reluctance of the BSAC to engage in any form of 
action that might not so much endanger its position in Northern Rhodesia as cost 
it money. As a consequence, when Collector John M. Bell wrote to the BSAC 
Administration with the request for a maxim gun, as he anticipated a 
“troublesome time with the Awemba this dry season”, he was advised to come to 
a negotiated settlement or stand down, but above all to avoid conflict.10 The 
Chimurenga that commenced in Southern Rhodesia in March 1896 ensured that, 
“for the best part of a year, while white lives were in peril in the south, there 
could be no question of the BSAC undertaking military campaigns eight hundred 
miles further north”.11 The limited nature of the BSAC administration in 
Northern Rhodesia prior to 1914 is further indicated by the fact that the single 
full-scale military conflagration in the territory before 1914, the Ngoni War of 
1898, was fought with troops drawn from The Nyasaland Protectorate and 
Southern Rhodesia. A contemporary observer who served in Northern Rhodesia 
noted that the war “arose over a highly strung official mistaking an ordinary 
Native dance [first fruits ceremony] for an act of hostility towards the 
Administration”.12 Unwittingly in the aftermath of the war the Ngoni became the 
cause celebre of Zambian history, referred to by many who wished to emphasise 
the violent nature of conquest in Northern Rhodesia.13 A reading of the archival 
material, bereft of its bravura and jingoism, indicates that the war was little more 
than a murderous cattle raid initiated by settlers in Nyasaland and Southern 
Rhodesia, who wished to drive the Ngoni off their lands and acquire Ngoni cattle 
and labour for their own plantations.14 The war was not initiated by the Deputy 
Administrator for Northeastern Rhodesia stationed in Zomba, let alone part of an 
                                                 
9  See Terence Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-7: A Study in African Resistance (London: 
Heinemann, 1967) & Julian Cobbing, ‘The Absent Priesthood: Another Look at the Rhodesian 
Risings of 1896-7’ Journal of African History, Vol. xviii, No. 1, 1977. 
10  NAZ, BS1/1 1896 Collector Chambezi District (2 files) Ikawa collector to administrator Blantyre 
reporting on various subjects: Arab slavetrade. A1/1/1 Ikawa 24/4/96 John M. Bell to the 
Administrator for Northern Rhodesia Blantyre. 
11  Roberts, History of the Bemba, p. 258. 
12  Colin Harding, cited in Barnes, Politics in a Changing Society, p. 93. 
13  Macpherson, Anatomy of Conquest & Chipungu, Guardians in Their Time. 
14  Livingstone Museum Archives (LMA), Accession 18, Copy by E.H. Lane-Poole of correspondence 
relating to the North Charterland Exploration Company (East Luangwa District) 1896. Also relating 
to the Angoni Rising 1897-1898. 
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elaborate plan for the final subjugation of Northern Rhodesia orchestrated by the 
BSAC Board of directors in London. The Fort Jameson (Chipata) District 
Notebook draws to the fore the farcical nature of the war: 
It was not long before the Angoni began to show signs of insolence and the residents at Fort 
Young alarmed, applied to the protectorate for an armed force. Troops were despatched from 
Zomba…It was evident however that it was not the intention of the Angoni to make war 
upon armed troops and upon the arrival of the latter the situation ended in little more than a 
fiasco. Little or no resistance was offered. A few casualties occurred among the followers of 
Singu but none among the troops … All the cattle in the country were confiscated. 1500 
were sent down to Salisbury under Major van Niekerk and a large quantity were availed by 
the Armed forces. Of the remainder a certain number were kept in the country by the 
administration and the NC Coy but the majority were returned to the angoni. There remained 
some thousands unaccounted for many of which were doubtless trampled to death owing to 
the bad herding by the troops. 
The immediate consequence of the suppression of the Angoni was the occupation of their 
country by the Administration of N.E. Rhodesia. … Singu was summarily shot, … 
A station and military post were established.15 
The District Notebook indicates the wanton violence and rapacious greed of the 
BSAC mercenaries deployed in the war, an issue that is echoed, even if it is 
presented in the euphemistic language of a sports event, in the telegrams sent by 
the attacking forces to the Acting Administrator in Southern Rhodesia: 
Weise and party relieved by Capt. Brake. Angoni made poor stand. About 20 killed by 
maxims. Impis reported broken up and retired to hills, being followed up. Full details not yet 
to hand.16 
A contemporary report sent in from the scene of the battle stated: 
There appeared to be several impis advancing to surround the Fort [Young] in lines. The 
seven pounders and maxims opened fire. The troops charged, the Angoni broke and fled. 
They were followed up for some miles and completely dispersed, losing 50 men killed and 
many wounded. Several of the dead and wounded were carried off. Singu’s village and 
neighbouring villages were burnt.17 
In the event, the Ngoni living in Northern Rhodesia were routed, driven off their 
land and robbed of their cattle.  
There can be no doubt that Ngoni society as a whole was devastated 
physically and morally by the campaign. When John Barnes conducted his 
research among the Ngoni fifty years after the event, the impact of the war was 
such that informants inevitably saw and used the war as a point of departure 
whenever discussing social aspects of Ngoni life with the anthropologist. Yet, 
although Ngoni society was most certainly thoroughly affected and transformed 
by the war, the fact of the matter remains that for the majority of people living in 
                                                 
15  NAZ, KDG 5/1 Volume 1 Chipata District Note Book, Fort Jameson Vol I, reverso 2. 
16  LMA, Acc. 18, folio 17. 
17  LMA, Acc. 18, folio 18. 
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Northern Rhodesia the incipient colonial presence went largely unnoticed until 
1914. 
BSAC administrators 
In the first twenty years of BSAC administration in Northern Rhodesia, its 
district officials worked in isolated stations, usually over-stretched, frequently 
subject to disease, and largely left to their own devices. Upon the establishment 
of Northern Rhodesia in 1911, there were one hundred and sixteen administrative 
officers in the territory, roughly one officer for every 6,500 square kilometres.18 
Spread around the enormous territory, these men were separated from one 
another, as well as from the railway line, by extensive distances. In 1913 Henri 
Rolin ‘remarked that the average size of the nine large Districts of Northern 
Rhodesia was [each] two-and-one-half times that of Belgium’.19 In conditions 
such as these, the young men who were initially stationed in Northern Rhodesia 
had to be not only self-sufficient but also, more particularly, able to get along 
with the people amongst whom they were stationed. 
In an article dealing with the sociology of imperialism, Tony Kirk-Greene has 
written of the crème de la crème of the Empire’s administrators, the members of 
the Sudan Political Service: the legendary ‘Blues who ruled the Blacks’.20 
Selected primarily from the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and second 
to none, except possibly the Indian Civil Service, the gentlemen of the SPS were 
truly remarkable in terms of academic and athletic prowess.21 Kirk-Greene 
categorised and analysed the men who were successfully recruited into the SPS 
and noted, amongst other things, that: 
History was the principal subject read …, followed by classics …- the Secretariat and district 
correspondence files are littered with Latin tags and an unusually high standard of doggerel 
and humorous verse obtained, including telegrams sent in rhyme. If there were such a 
creature as the average SPS man, he was likely to have had a Second … from Oxford (plus a 
Blue, of course).22  
In contrast to the intellectual and sporting prowess of the gentlemen of the Sudan 
Political Service, the men who came to be employed by the BSAC in Northern 
Rhodesia were lesser mortals of a different calibre. Whereas the SPS recruited 
                                                 
18  Pressor Gifford, ‘The Framework for a Nation: An Economic and Social History of Northern 
Rhodesia From 1914 to 1939’, PhD thesis, Yale University, 1964, p. 135-6. Present day Zambia is 
752,614 km2, divided by 116 administrative officers, equals 6488.0517 km2 per officer. 
19  Gifford, p. 135, citing Henri Rolin, Les Lois et l’Administration de la Rhodésie (Bruxelles et Paris), 
94. 
20  A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, ‘The Sudan Political Service: A Profile in the Sociology of Imperialism’, The 
International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1982), pp. 21-48. 
21  See for example Wilfred Thesiger who served in the SPS, educated at Eton College and Oxford 
University, where he was awarded a boxing Blue for each of the four years that he was at Oxford. 
22  Kirk-Greene, ‘Sudan Political Service’, p. 37. 
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primarily on the basis of academic excellence and athletic prowess, the BSAC 
was less particular in its selection of men for service in Northern Rhodesia.  
In the initial years of BSAC administration north of the Zambezi, those 
appointed were a varied, not to say motley, collection of men who may have 
contributed greatly to the anecdotal readability of Brelsford’s Generation of Men, 
but were certainly no match to the academic potential of SPS administrators. 
Indeed in the first twenty years of its administration, the BSAC relied on an 
assortment of freebooters and filibusters, some of whom were warlords who had 
established fiefdoms of their own. One such man was Harrison Clark, otherwise 
known as Changa Changa, who fielded an army of his own and made a living 
out of raiding and taxing long-distance trading and slaving caravans between the 
Kafue River and the Luangwa River valley. Although he eventually submitted to 
BSAC rule, until the BSAC was able to establish its own presence, ‘Clark was 
treated as though he had rights and the British South Africa Police at Sinoia were 
instructed not to patrol the northern bank of the Zambezi on account of Clark’s 
presence there’.23 Clark ended his life as a mine compound manager at Broken 
Hill, and his sobriquet Changa Changa continued to live on through into the 
1960s as the name ascribed to mining compound managers throughout Zambia.24 
Less well-known than Changa Changa, but of the same ilk, was a man named 
Ziehl who was employed by the North Charterland Exploration Company, one of 
the multitude of companies associated with the BSAC, which had been awarded 
mineral and prospecting rights in all of the territory of the Ngoni chief Mpezini.25 
Although the NCEC had been awarded mineral and prospecting rights, Ziehl, as 
Harrison Clark had done before, established his own militia ‘dressed them in 
Blue uniforms and armed them with sniders’.26 This group of men collected taxes 
and raided until the BSAC formally established its authority in the district and 
Ziehl was arrested by the BSAC police. Ziehl was sentenced to a jail term of two 
years but immediately released ‘as it is considered inconvenient to hold him’. 27 
That the company was not overly bothered by Ziehl’s activities can be gauged 
                                                 
23  Brelsford, Generation of Men, p. 25. 
24  Brelsford, Generation of Men, p. 29. The District Notebook for Mkushi, reports that the term 
Changa Changa was given to those who had been to the mines. NAZ, KSM 4/1, Mkushi District 
Notebook, Vol. 1, folio 134. 
25  Barnes, Politics in a Changing Society, p. 78. 
26  NAZ, BS1/35 1899-1910, African Lakes Company Ltd., disturbance at Chinde, coal concessions, 
appointments, African Trans-continental Telegraph Ltd. North Charterland Exploration Co. Ltd. 
(A1/4/4/1), Sharpe, the residency in Zomba, 8th May 1899, to the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs. 
27  NAZ, BS1/35 1899-1910 (A1/4/4/1), Sharpe, the residency in Zomba, 8th May 1899, to the Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs. 
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from the fact that following these events Ziehl established himself as a cattle 
trader selling to the BSAC.28 
Upon the establishment of Northern Rhodesia as a single administrative unit in 
1911, the forms of administration in Northeastern and Northwestern Rhodesia 
differed substantially. In Northwestern Rhodesia, the BSAC had sought to 
administer the inhabitants and the territory assigned to it as it would a business 
with company assets that needed to turn a profit. Those employed within the 
administration were drawn ‘from the ranks of the British South Africa Company 
Police, from the clerical service of Southern Rhodesia, from labour agencies, and 
they were mainly on contract’.29 In contrast, in Northeastern Rhodesia a ‘proper 
civil service with recruitment direct from England, often of university graduates’, 
along with salary grades and possibilities for promotion had been established.30 
With the amalgamation of Northeastern and Northwestern Rhodesia in 1911, the 
system of administration as it had developed in Northeastern Rhodesia came to 
dominate, and with that the introduction of administrators drawn primarily from 
outside of southern Africa and often with a university degree. The historian Gann 
noted: 
More emphasis was now placed on education, and from 1914 onwards the Administration 
attempted to engage University trained people only. The average Native Commissioner was 
no longer an ex-labour recruiter or a former police sergeant; he was the son of a barrister or a 
merchant who had learnt to play games at a public school, taken a ‘Second’ or a ‘Third’ at 
Oxford, or just failed to get through the ‘Indian Civil’.31 
The contrast in education that came to exist between the colonial officials in 
Northern Rhodesia and those in Southern Rhodesia became substantial: 
Reading the District reports written in Northern Rhodesia after 1911, one is struck by the 
literate and straight-forward analysis of problems. Most of the younger men in Northern 
Rhodesia in the years immediately preceding the 1914-1918 war had been recruited from 
Oxford and Cambridge. As Englishmen and University graduates, they had a perspective 
different from that of Southern Rhodesian district officers, who were usually South African 
educated and frequently not University graduates.32 
One such university graduate, who as a new recruit considerably improved the 
academic qualities of the BSAC’s administrators after 1912, was Theodore 
Williams (Trinity College, Oxford). The many letters of Theodore Williams, 
                                                 
28  The most comprehensive material dealing with Ziehl is to be found in Jack Thomson, Ngoni, Xhosa 
and Scot: Religious and Cultural Interaction in Malawi (Zomba: Kachere Books, 2007), pp. 113-
123. 
29  Brelsford, Generation of Men, p. 35. 
30  Brelsford, Generation of Men, p. 35. 
31  Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 152. 
32  Gifford, ‘Framework for a Nation’, p. 133. His analysis of the Civil Service Lists for Northern and 
Southern Rhodesia of 1921 are particularly interesting, not to say staggering. At the time Northern 
Rhodesia, with 39 university graduates, had the identical number of officers – 110 – in its District 
Administration as Southern Rhodesia had in its Native department, with merely 6 university 
graduates, p. 133, fn. 67. 
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indicate that in as far as his administrative contacts were concerned he operated 
within a world of fellow Oxbridge graduates. Williams arrived in Northern 
Rhodesia in 1912, and initially stayed with Judge Beaufort, who, as he wrote to 
his mother, ‘was at Queens in 1879’. In addition the other ‘Oxford men here of 
my time are Helm of Wadham,…Eccles of Worcester,…Lloyd of Magdalen,… 
[and] Cartmel Robinson of Merton’.33 Williams first posting was to Mwinilunga, 
where he was subject to the Magistrate Solwezi, Frank Melland, ‘an old Merton 
man’.34 At the end of his first tour in Mwinilunga, Williams walked to the 
railway line at Broken Hill where he ‘fed chiefly with Home, the probationer, a 
Magdalen man about 1 year junior to me – a great chorister’.35 Similarly 
Williams makes mention of Latham A.N.C., ‘a Magdalen man 2 years senior to 
me’ and Vellacott A.N.C., ‘an Oriel man who went down the same year I went 
up’.36  
The ethos associated with public schooling and Oxbridge, of ‘playing the 
game’ and being a gentleman, is to be found in the archival legacy of these men 
and it is clear that it permeated through all aspects of their lives, both as 
administrators and people. Captain W.D. Downes, who was part of the Anglo-
Portuguese Boundary Commission of 1913-1914, described the administrators of 
Northern Rhodesia in the following terms: 
This is the land of the younger sons. How often have I heard it said, ‘my brother is in such 
and such a regiment’, or, ‘did you know my brother in the Navy’? The Rhodesian has not 
had much luck in examinations, but for the most part he is a good sportsman and a 
gentleman.37 
The following example taken from a letter by Williams to his mother, describing 
the execution of a man convicted of murder, neatly illustrates the point being 
made. In the letter Williams described the arrival of missionary Freshwater from 
Mbereshi at the Boma in Kawambwa: 
… the main reason of his coming be to comfort a poor devil who was hanged on Saturday 
morning for murder – a native of course. Which thing I witnessed, and it impressed me 
greatly – he took it like a man. There were just the four of us – [Avery-] Jones, Reardon, 
Freshwater and myself, before sunrise, in an enclosure behind the gaol, and two messengers. 
That evening all the bochras [white men] except Duncan, who though a good chap is no 
                                                 
33  RH, MSS. Afr. S. 776-781. Letters Volume 1: 1912-1914 December 5th Friday 1912, Livingstone, 
My dear mother. 
34  RH, MSS. Afr. S. 776-781, Letter addressed to Mrs. F.R. Williams, Charlton, Constant Spring P.O. 
Jamaica, via England, Kansanshi, Friday Jan 17 1913, My dear father. This is confirmed by RH, 
MSS. Afr. R. 192, Melland (Frank Hulme) Diary of life in north Eastern Rhodesia, 1901 – 43.  
35  RH, MSS. Afr. S. 776-781, 5 March 1915 Livingstone to My Dear Father. 
36  RH, MSS. Afr. S. 776-781, Kawambwa, Monday May 24th 1915: My dear Mother & Mporokoso, 
June 1st 1915, My dear Father. 
37  LMA, Angola – Rhodesia. Anglo-Portugese [sic] Boundary Commission 1913-1914, W.D. Downes, 
7th Feb. 1915. 
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society man, dined at [Avery-] Jones. … Next day played golf. There are two very good hard 
courts too, and we have played every afternoon.38 
Williams, in line with ideas regarding the ideal behaviour of gentlemen in the 
face of mortal danger, notes that the executed prisoner ‘took it like a man’. 
Following the execution the white men dine together as gentleman, with the 
exception of Duncan, ‘a Glasgow man in charge of the A.L.C. store’, who, 
‘though a good chap is no society man’.39 On the day after the execution, the 
gentlemen relax and emphasise their different standing by playing golf and 
tennis. 
The experience of public schooling, with it its associated thrashings and 
sportsmanship, left a major impact on the administrators who came to be 
appointed in Northern Rhodesia. Essentially – and in this Northern Rhodesia was 
no different to other parts of the Empire – the Oxbridge administrators employed 
by the BSAC sought to govern Northern Rhodesia and deal with administrative 
issues in the manner that they had learnt as school prefects and sports captains at 
school.40  
Not surprisingly some of the seedier aspects of public schooling accompanied 
the men in their newfound vocation as administrators in Central Africa. Williams 
private comments in a letter to his father hints at this: 
Vellacott is an Oxford man & all that and quite good company – so far as I know him up to 
date. His fondness for Mporokoso is a trifle unwholesome, and his conceit is unlimited. He 
was 3 years a schoolmaster at a private school between Oxford and Rhodesia, and the aura of 
                                                 
38  RH, MSS. Afr. S. 776-781, Kawambwa, Monday May 24th 1915: My dear Mother. 
39  RH, MSS. Afr. S. 776-781, Kawambwa, Monday May 24th 1915: My dear Mother. 
40  The apocryphal quote attributed to the Duke of Wellington, ‘The Battle of Waterloo was won on the 
playing fields of Eton’, was applied with equal vigour to the Empire as a whole. On the importance 
of the ethos of Cricket in the Empire see Ian Baucom, Out of Place: Englishness, empire, and the 
locations of identity (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 149: 
The playing fields of England 
All up and down the land, 
Where English boys play English games, 
How bright and fair they stand! 
‘Tis there in friendly rivalry 
School meets with neighbouring school 
And English boys all ‘play the game’ 
And learn to keep the rule. 
There each one plays for side, not self, 
And strength and skill employs, 
On the playing-fields of England, 
The Pride of English Boys. 
As Baucom correctly remarks this schoolboy verse identifies ‘what cricket promises to accomplish for 
England: it will train the nation’s and the empire’s governing class to submit themselves to a 
deinviduating [sic] principal of rule, will define Englishness as a principle of sameness, and will clear 
a space of common belonging in which England can see itself repeated, unaltered, across time and 
space’. Baucom, Out of Place, p. 149. 
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a worshipping flock of nice little boys still clings around him and smells sweet in his 
nostrils.41 
 
 
Photo 1.1 & 1.2 Cricket and Tennis at Fort Rosebery circa 1910. 42 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41  RH, MSS. Afr. S. 776-781, Mporokoso, 28 April 1916, My dear father. 
42  LMA, H.G. Harrington photographic collection. 
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Similarly Frank Melland, initially appointed Assistant Native Commissioner, 
Mpika in 1902, showed a proclivity for thrashing his servants. In later years he 
became somewhat of a celebrity and specialist on the ‘Native mind’.43 A fellow 
administrator described Melland in 1923 as: 
a native expert – an Anthropologist and humane idealist – to whom the native in general and 
the Native mind in particular is the single problem in this country viewed from the 
standpoint of eternity.44 
Melland started his career in Africa with some rather extreme views that owed 
much to his background, education, and being ‘an old Merton man’.45 Melland’s 
initial comments on Africa and its inhabitants read like a pastiche of Saunders of 
the River, Boys Own, and some particularly sinister public school mores rolled 
into one.46 In Africa, Melland soon found himself in conflict with his servants. In 
his diary Melland noted that he wished to ‘thrash’ his servant, Jonathan, with a 
whip, and gave him the choice of either a thrashing or no wages, noting rather 
disappointedly, ‘of course the coward chose the fine …though I’d like to have 
given him the thrashing’.47 Not surprisingly, on the following day Jonathan ran 
away, along with some other servants. In their place Melland appointed another 
man, ‘He stayed three days and I choka’d [chikota whip] him: and about the 15th 
[September 1901] got in a good boy whom I hope will stay’.48 It was not to be, 
and shortly after Melland dismissed this servant and sent him on his way with the 
words, ‘if I catch you near the Boma after a quarter of an hour you’ll get the 
Chikoti for your impertinence’. 49  
The colonial administrators who sought to establish colonial rule in Northern 
Rhodesia, though not necessarily averse to physical sanction, were certainly not 
the trigger-happy, fist-throwing, lynching louts that had established BSAC 
                                                 
43  NAZ, KSD 4/1 Vol. 1, Mpika District Note Book, 1901, & RH, MSS. Afr. R. 192, Melland (Frank 
Hulme) Diary of life in north Eastern Rhodesia, 1901-4 3 vols. In 1910 he and a ‘chum’, E.H. 
Cholmeley, cycled through Africa from Northern Rhodesia to Egypt whilst going on home leave, 
NAZ, HM 30 E.H. Cholmeley, CH/2/1, Book of photographs by Cholmeley who travelled through 
Africa in 1910. & Frank H. Melland & Edward H. Cholmeley, Through The Heart of Africa: Being 
an Account of a Journey on Bicycles & on Foot from Northern Rhodesia Past the Great Lakes, to 
Egypt Undertaken When Proceeding Home on Leave in 1911 (London: Constable and Company 
Ltd., 1912). 
44  RH, MSS. Afr. S. 776-781, T.R. Williams, letter 7 June 1923, Chilanga, Native Commissioner’s 
Office, My dear Mother. 
45  RH, MSS. Afr. S. 776-781, T.R. Williams, letter 7 June 1923, Chilanga, Native Commissioner’s 
Office, My dear Mother.  
46  Jeffrey Richards, ‘Boys Own Empire: Feature Films and Imperialism in the 1930s’. In: ‘Boys’ Own 
Empire’ Imperialism and Popular Culture. Ed. John M. Mackenzie. (Manchester: Manchester UP, 
1986). 
47  RH, MSS. Afr. R. 192, p. 38. 
48  RH, MSS. Afr. R. 192, p. 38. 
49  RH, MSS. Afr. R. 192, 11 January 1902. 
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colonial rule in Southern Rhodesia.50 Instead, following the amalgamation of 
Northern Rhodesia in 1911, they were university graduates who depended more 
on their ability to converse and convince than on an ability to lash and lynch. On 
the outer fringes of the Empire, often at many days walking from the nearest 
railway line and attempting to administer extensive tracts of land, the BSAC 
administrators in Northern Rhodesia were forced to rely on tact and not brawn. 
Those administrators, who did resort to violence or failed to respect their 
subjects, more often than not found themselves on the receiving end as their 
actions boomeranged. The Mwinilunga District Notebook provides details of the 
activities of Native Commissioner, G.A. MacGregor (Jackisoni) and his assistant 
J.M. Pound (Kusaloka): 
Mr MacGregor was a man of uncertain temper and his administration was not successful. It 
is generally agreed that he was excessively harsh with the natives, and was so feared that on 
more than one occasion he had to ask the assistance of the mission at Kalene Hill to recruit 
carriers to take him on tour. His police, messengers, and personal servants deserted, and a 
great number of Natives fled either into Angola or the Congo.51 
Accounts of the disorganised state of affairs in Mwinilunga led to Major Hodson, 
of the Barotse Native Police (B.N.P), being sent up in June 1909 to enquire into 
Mr MacGregor’s administration. To Hodson’s surprise he found MacGregor and 
his assistant, Pound, doing their own cooking and washing their own pots and 
pans. In short, they had been left to their own devices and simply ignored by the 
local inhabitants. In the face of uncivilized behaviour, the inhabitants of 
Mwinilunga had sought to deal with MacGregor and Pound by placing a Cordon 
Sanitaire around the offending men. Subsequently both men were recalled, and 
Mr MacGregor’s resignation asked for.52 
The limits to the extent of control that these early administrators could exert is 
well illustrated by the simple fact that in many instances they were simply unable 
to enforce their wishes, not only on the African population, but also on 
representatives of European trading companies operating within the territory. 
Thus in 1896 Collector Bell complained to his superiors that: 
A person named Thomson, employed by the A.L.C. [African Lakes Corporation], declined to 
execute a verbal order I gave him for a few bolts & nuts for Hotchkiss gun.53 
                                                 
50  Although the work of Olive Schreiner was that of a novelist, her words do convey the unease and 
disquiet that contemporaries felt with what was going on in Southern Rhodesia. Olive Schreiner, 
Trooper Peter Halket of Mashonaland (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1897). Unease and disquiet that is 
shared by academic historians in the present who work on the establishment of colonial rule in 
Zimbabwe. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia & D.N. Beach, War and Politics in Zimbabwe, 
1840-1900 (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1986). 
51  NAZ, KSE 4/1 Mwinilunga District Note Book, folio 28. 
52  NAZ, KSE 4/1 Mwinilunga District Note Book, folio 28. 
53  NAZ, A1/1/1, John M. Bell, Collector Chambezi District, at Ikawa 25th June 1896, to the 
Administrator for Northern Rhodesia, Blantyre. 
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Ten years later, the situation had not improved, and in 1906 the Civil 
Commissioner for Fife Division was forced to admit that the trade and tax 
returns, which he had submitted were incomplete, ‘as the A.L.C. agent at Fife 
objected to give returns’.54 Although District officials may have wished to 
transform Northern Rhodesia and its peoples into something in keeping with their 
own ideals, the truth of the matter was that prior to 1914 they were largely 
powerless to do so. 
The greatest domestic event, Chitemene55 
-tema (temene) v.t. to cut down or fell trees:  
-teme miti, to lop trees for the gardens.56 
Symbolic of the BSAC administrators’ inability to control and administer the 
territory formally under their jurisdiction was their inability to enforce the ban on 
chitemene, slash and burn agriculture which allowed people to make a living as 
agriculturalists on the sparse soils of Northern Rhodesia.57 This form of 
agriculture, by its very nature, dictated that people move from place to place as 
soils were exhausted and new stands established. Not surprisingly this was 
anathema to an administration that sought to control and tax its subjects. 
Chitemene and mitanda (temporary villages at newly cleared fields) are part of 
a single agricultural complex that was rejected by BSAC colonial administration 
in Northern Rhodesia as an example of wasteful and primitive agriculture.58 The 
inability of the colonial state to effectively stop chitemene and the settlement of 
mitanda prior to World War One shows up the limits of its power. 
Beginning in 1901, taxation was introduced in a limited number of districts in 
Northeastern Rhodesia.59 A few years after the formal introduction of taxation, 
                                                 
54  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Notebook, vol. 2, p. 152. 
55  RH, MSS. Afr. S. 776-781, Williams, Mporokoso, 14th April 1916, My Dear Father. [The] greatest 
domestic event, treecutting. 
56  The White Fathers’ Bemba – English Dictionary (London: Longmans 1954), p. 760. 
57  Vaughan & Moore, Cutting Down Trees. 
58  ‘In essence chitemene is an agricultural system in which trees are felled or pollarded and the felled 
wood collected and piled upon a patch of land (usually at a ratio of about one sixth of the area 
chopped) and then burnt. The fire destroys the seed of weeds and the resulting ash fertilizes the soil, 
reduces its acidity and raises its calcium levels. Shortly before the rains start small temporary 
housing (mitanda) is built at the newly established fields. Seed is sown at the commencement of 
rains and people move into the mitanda to oversee their gardens’. George Kay, A Social Geography 
of Zambia: A survey of population patterns in a developing country (London: University of London 
Press, 1967), pp. 53-6. 
59  The collection of tax varied from district to district. In the Mkushi District, ‘Hut tax was first 
collected in 1901 wholly in the form of labour used in constructing roads. In 1902 and 1903 coin was 
beginning to be known, and a certain amount of tax was paid in cash, but the greater part was still 
labour, large gangs being sent to Hwamboshi for Broken Hill lead and zinc mine development, and 
numbers being employed in [illegible] transport’. NAZ, KSM 4/1, Mkushi District Notebook, vol. 1, 
folio 5. 
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district officials sought to end chitemene agriculture, ostensibly to protect the 
environment and ensure the conservation of natural resources, but more 
particularly to facilitate the collection of taxes. Moore and Vaughan argue 
convincingly that: 
[T]he primary motives for intervention were almost certainly the need to collect taxes in this 
sparsely populated area, and the larger problem of maintaining control. It was, in fact the 
building of seasonal dwellings (mitanda) in the chitemene fields, rather than the practice of 
citemene itself, which was the original target.60 
Yet, as the work of Audrey Richards makes so abundantly clear, any attempted 
intervention by colonial administrators in banning chitemene and mitanda would 
touch at the very heart of society and was bound to be resisted. 
Chitemene agriculture is an enormous subject of research in Zambian studies. 
At the time of the fieldwork by Audrey Richards in the 1930s it was already 
becoming clear to colonial administrators that chitemene agriculture was the most 
effective and appropriate form of agriculture, given the soils and bush cover of 
the plateau in Northeastern Zambia.61 The later work of Allan62 & Trapnell63 
confirmed this, or as Peters put it: 
Under the conditions of climate, terrain and soils for which it was evolved by a people 
extremely poor in material resources but with a very large land area per head of the 
population the system is very efficient.64  
In her richly written account of Bemba society in the early 1930s, Audrey 
Richards demonstrated the central importance of chitemene agriculture to people 
in Northeastern Zambia at the time. In particular Richards illustrated the manner 
in which chitemene was central to chiefly authority and masculinity.65 Richards, 
who was particularly interested in the economic organisation of Bemba society, 
saw chitemene as the central point around which the agricultural cycle was 
organised. In her extensive portrayal of ‘the tree-cutting rite’, Richards was able 
to convey the excitement and enthusiasm of the events she observed and 
subsequently described, and it is worth quoting her in extenso: 
In old-fashioned villages the headman performs the tree-cutting ceremony with all the 
inhabitants of the village accompanying him. … when he has decided to begin the clearing 
of the bush and fixed the site of his garden, [he] calls the elders of the village and his own 
                                                 
60  Vaughan & Moore, Cutting down Trees, p. 13. 
61  Audrey I. Richards, Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia: An economic Study of the Bemba 
Tribe (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 289. 
62  W. Allan, Studies in African Land Usage in Northern Rhodesia, The Rhodes-Livingstone papers 
number fifteen (London: Oxford University Press, 1949). 
63  C.G. Trapnell, The Soils, Vegetation and Agriculture of North-Eastern Rhodesia (Lusaka: 
Government Printer, 1953).  
64  D.U. Peters, Land Usage in Serenje District: A Survey of Land Usage and the Agricultural System of 
the Lala of the Serenje Plateau, The Rhodes-Livingstone papers number nineteen (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1951), p. 72. 
65  In their elegant restudy of Richards work, Vaughan & Moore, Cutting down Trees, pay particular 
attention to the construction of gender in relation to agriculture. 
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immediate relatives to his hut in the evening. Here they sit on the floor in silence while he 
prays … for blessing on the next day’s work. … The spirits are asked to protect the tree-
cutters when they climb, to give food as the result of clearing the bush, to free the people 
from illness, and to give them children and peace.66 
Richards quotes the words of headman Mwamba as an example of the prayers 
said to the spirits: 
‘You, our Spirits, now we want food. You help us mightily to cut the trees with vigour. That 
is food! Tomorrow I shall go and cut the tree branches. He who climbs the trees let the soles 
of his feet stick to the tree-trunk, and let dead wood fall to the ground only; and all the 
snakes that come out of hollow stems let them run into their holes; and so also the wasps that 
may swarm out of the tree. And then another thing! Those locusts that are here in the land, it 
would be good if you kept them far away, because if those locusts eat the food of we human 
beings so that there is nothing left to eat, then we shall all die of hunger. And then if we die 
of hunger, there will be no one left to praise you, you Spirits’.67 
Richards emphasised the skill of those who then subsequently went out into the 
bush to cut the trees at the chosen sites for new gardens. Describing it as ‘the 
man’s task par excellence in the whole economic routine’, Richards stated: 
The Bemba are daring climbers. They swarm up each trunk grasping with both hands and 
pressing with their naked feet, and once up to the branch level, swing themselves up among 
the boughs, springing or gliding with amazing agility. No tree is considered too high or too 
dangerous to climb.68 
Armed with nothing more than an axe, agility, and bravery, and under the fond 
and indulgent gaze of their elders: 
The young men seize their axes, and rush whooping up the trees, squabbling as to who 
should take the highest trunk. They dare each other to incredible feats and fling each other 
taunts as they climb. Each falling branch is greeted with a special triumph cry.69 
Not surprisingly the cutting of the trees is an event in which Bemba and male 
identity were emphasised and given form. Richards noted, ‘No single bough of a 
tree, however inaccessible, is ever left uncut. Why? “Because the women would 
laugh at us when we come back to the village in the evening. Besides, isn’t it the 
custom of the Bemba?”’.70 
Prohibiting a way of life 
Across Northeastern Rhodesia in 1906 the incipient colonial state sought to ban 
chitemene and mitanda. In the words of the administration, ‘the carefully thought 
out rules for Vitemene cutting and restrictions were communicated to the chiefs 
                                                 
66  Richards, Land, Labour and Diet, pp. 366-7. 
67  Richards, Land, Labour and Diet, p. 367. Collected in ‘Mwamba’s village, 13. vol. 33’. The prayers 
of paramount chief Citimukulu are similar in content, see pp. 369-70. 
68  Richards, Land, Labour and Diet, p. 290. 
69  Richards, Land, Labour and Diet, p. 291. 
70  Richards, Land, Labour and Diet, p. 292. 
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and all approved of by them,’ in a series of indabas (an institution introduced by 
the BSAC, which derived its name from the Zulu word for business or matter, 
and used to denote gathering).71 Secure in the belief that their view of the world 
was correct, and convinced that this view was superior to that of their subjects, 
and that it was acknowledged to be so by their subjects, the officials of the 
incipient administration sought to impose their view of how the world should be 
onto Zambia and its people.72  
The regulations relating to chitemene and mitanda, were part of a package of 
measures that sought to regulate and modernise the way in which life was lived 
in Northern Rhodesia.73 Stationed in Mpika, Native Commissioner, Frank H. 
Melland, wrote of changes wrought by the BSAC in Northern Rhodesia and 
noted: 
The most important change has yet to come, namely in the change of methods of cultivation 
among the Awemba. H.H. the Administrator having prohibited the chopping of trees after 
the current year.74 
Melland continued that ‘simultaneously with the prohibition … an order was 
made for the abolishing of mitandas and amalgamation of all villages of under 20 
huts’. These changes were to take place after the crops of 1906-7 had been 
gathered. ‘Almost all the villages’, were to move their sites and move to ‘better 
soil more suitable for proper cultivation’.75  Secure within the malleable fantasy 
landscape that existed within the minds of the colonial planners, Melland 
enthused, ‘to give some idea of the change all Kopa’s Wabisa are going to 
amalgamate into 5 villages – Luchembe’s 63 will become 19’.76 
The immensity of what was being proposed was not lost upon the BSAC 
officials who were tasked with enforcing the new regulations. The Native 
Commissioner for Chinsali wrote: 
The most important change came in April 1906, causing a revolution in the method of 
cultivation, owing to the prohibition by His Honour the Administrator [R.E. Codrington] of 
the prevalent system of cutting trees (fitemene).77 
The changes that the BSAC sought to enforce struck at the very heart of life in 
Northeastern Rhodesia and entailed not only a revolution in agriculture but also 
in the way in which people could live together. In addition, the changes being 
                                                 
71  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. II, folio 401. 
72  What Nancy Jacobs has referred to as the Veld-Anschaung of the colonial state. Nancy Jacobs, 
‘Grasslands and Thickets: Bush Encroachment and Herding in the Kalahari Thornveld’, 
Environment and History 6, no. 3 (August 2000): pp. 289-316. 
73  On modernization and regulation see, James Scott, Seeing like a State.  
74  NAZ, KSD 4/1 Vol. 1, Mpika District Note Book, folio 8. Dated 26 April 1906. 
75  NAZ, KSD 4/1 Vol. 1, Mpika District Note Book, folio 8. Dated 26 April 1906, emphasis added. 
76  NAZ, KSD 4/1 Vol. 1, Mpika District Note Book, folio 9. 
77  NAZ, KTQ 2/1 Vol. II, Chinsali District Note Book, folio 27. 
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introduced by the BSAC administration also entailed a transformation in the food 
being consumed. 
The wishes expressed by R.E. Codrington, as BSAC Administrator for 
Northeastern Rhodesia, entailed a complete transformation of the social, political, 
and economic life of his subjects. In May 1906, R.E. Codrington, addressed ‘the 
principal Chiefs and Headmen’ of Abercorn district. Native Commissioner for 
Abercorn [Mbala], J. Gibson Hall, recorded the principal points of ‘H.H.’s’ [R.E. 
Codrington] speech: 
 
(1) An order to abandon small camps & rebuild large villages. 
(2) ‘Ntimere’ should cease 
(3) Taxes must be promptly paid. 
(4) (In reply to a question from Chief Makaza) – if the Chiefs saw to the carrying out of the 
first 3 orders, they might seek permission from him on his next visit to kill small game, 
such as pombo.78 
 
Far from being merely a ban on slash and burn agriculture, the regulations 
proclaimed by Codrington in early 1906 envisaged a complete transformation of 
life in Northeastern Rhodesia. The extent of the transformation being demanded 
can be gathered from the report of C.P. Chesnaye, Magistrate for Abercorn 
[Mbala], who addressed Chiefs and Headmen on behalf of the Administrator at 
an Indaba shortly before World War One and stated: 
That the people must hoe around their villages. That hoes were being ordered and that they 
could buy, or work for them. The people were urged to hoe and the disadvantages of ntemere 
were again pointed out to them viz. 
The amount of food needed for their requirements could not be produced by ntemere. 
Every year the trees get less and that means they have to go further to find trees and so 
lose time for cultivation. 
That they cannot guard their gardens properly, spread as they were over a big extent of 
country. 
That ntemere occupied them throughout the year so that they had no time to earn money 
to buy clothes etc. for their families. 
That they had only to pay a small tax. Perhaps if the tax was bigger they would grow 
more food.79 
In his speeches and promulgations Codrington, and his officials, presented a 
vision of the envisaged new order of the colonial state. In its attempt to 
modernise the territory and its people in keeping with this idealised image, the 
need to put an end to slash and burn agriculture was presented by the authorities 
along two fronts: i) the preservation of natural resources and ii) the need for 
order.  
 
                                                 
78  NAZ, KTN 1/1, Mbala District Note Book, folio 50. 
79  NAZ, KTN 1/1, Mbala District Note Book, Notes of an Indaba held at Abercorn on the 28th of July 
1913 by C.P. Chesnaye Esq, magistrate, folio 51-52. 
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Preservation of natural resources 
In justifying the need for an end to slash and burn agriculture in Northeastern 
Rhodesia, the BSAC officials emphasised time and again what they saw as the 
wasteful and inefficient nature of chitemene. Countless colonial observers 
decried the burning of stands of bush and saw it as primitive and in opposition to 
modern agriculture and sound practice.80 In keeping with this perspective, the 
District Notebook for Isoka noted that the practice of ‘“Ntemere”, leads to the 
impoverishment of timber’ and provided a detailed breakdown of the calculated 
rate of deforestation. 
Acreage required per year; 
6 – 10 acres of bush, for one acre garden 
2 – 2 ½ acres of woodland per year per head of population (Family = 4 persons) 
One acre 1200 – 1500 lbs male or 3 ½ - 4 lbs allowance of food per day. 
Trees require 20 years to recover 
4 persons of population require 200 acres woodland, 330 acres ordinary country. 
1 sq mile will support 8 – 10 persons.81 
In a series of indabas across Northeastern Rhodesia, colonial officials 
condemned the cutting of trees. In Luwingo Chiefs and Headmen were told by 
the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr J.C.C. Coxhead, that permission to 
pollard trees would only be granted if it was done under the supervision of the 
Native Commissioner. In the interests of conservation, this permission was later 
withdrawn, and only permission granted to cut shrubs.82 In Isoka, Mr Coxhead, 
impressed on his audience that ‘that the cutting of “temere” was a bad thing and 
should be done as little as possible’.83  
Native Commissioner, Robert S. MacDonald, noted that slash and burn 
cultivation was practised almost all over the Fife Division with the exception of 
the villages along the banks of the Luangwa river. It was, however, in his view: 
undoubtedly a very wasteful form of cultivation and I fear that unless some steps are taken to 
restrict the cutting of trees, there will be some danger of the land becoming deforested.84 
                                                 
80  A perspective that continues into the present. Chitemene agriculture, seen by colonial 
administrations as an example of wasteful and primitive agriculture. In the recent past, it is still seen 
as a primitive thing that can be used in parliamentary debates to threaten and cajole the government 
in exchange for agricultural subsidies. Thus. In: Lusaka during a parliamentary debate dealing with 
agricultural inputs in 2003, Mr Chiti M. Sampa, MP for Mporokoso theatened: 
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81  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. 1, folio 35. 
82  NAZ, KSZ 5, Luwingu District Note Book, vol. I, folio 122. 
83  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. II, folio 288. 
84  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. II, folio 401, notes by Native Commissioner, Robert 
S. Macdonald, 1907. 
37 
 
Prohibited from cutting trees, Magistrate C. McKinnon told an indaba held at 
Fife on the 28th November 1907 that the ‘Chiefs and people were … to hoe their 
old “temere” fields and plant beans, cassava, maize and Kaffir corn’.85 Chiefs 
Kafwimbi and Nyera replied that not only did their people not have hoes ‘but the 
open land in this country was not suitable for Malese [red millet], their main 
food’.86 In addition Chief Kafwimbi noted that ‘beans and other things were not 
food’, instead they were only ‘relish’.87 
Prohibited from cutting trees and establishing temporary shelters next to their 
fields, the Chiefs saw their livelihood threatened by the new legislation. In an 
indaba with Native Commissioner, Robert S. Macdonald, chiefs stated in 
conclusion: 
They said they had nothing else to speak of. The food question was the only thing they had 
to talk about. They were afraid the people would starve if temere should be abolished.88 
The opposition expressed clearly affected MacDonald, for in an earlier report he 
had written, ‘the custom had been followed by many generations and it is no easy 
matter to get natives to break off habits sanctioned by long usage’.89 Added to 
which the people who actually conducted slash and burn agriculture did not 
accept the argument that a prohibition would conserve the woodland. In a 
supplementary indaba held in Fife in late November 1907, a man named 
Muwango drew attention to the necessity of temere when he stated: 
the old Malesi fields could only be cultivated for one year and after that fresh temere would 
require to be made. He said they had temered now for many years and there was no apparent 
diminuation of the rainfall. He reckoned the rain came from heaven irrespective of any 
natural causes.90 
Thus, although the BSAC officials believed and argued that a prohibition would 
conserve natural resources, the inhabitants of Northeastern Rhodesia argued that 
the legislation would lead to a collapse in their food production. 
Need for order 
One aspect of the administration’s attempt at remodelling the society of 
Northeastern Rhodesia was that this was to some extent based on a specific 
understanding of Northern Rhodesia’s history. That is, to some extent the 
colonial administrators attempted to recreate Northern Rhodesia as they believed 
                                                 
85  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. II, folio 289. 
86  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. II, folio 289. 
87  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. II, folio 289. 
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it had existed prior to their own presence in the territory. Thus Native 
Commissioner, Robert S. Macdonald, in writing on the implementation of the 
plethora of legislation associated with the ban on cutting trees, wrote: 
In the days prior to the advent of the Government it was the custom to build fairly large 
villages. These were usually stockaded as a means of defence against the Awemba raiders. 
However since the ‘Pax Britanica [sic!]’ has spread over the country the people have broken 
up the big villages and ‘squatted’ all over the place. Although, from a health point of view 
this system of living ‘en famille’ was no doubt an advantage (e.g. should an epidemic break 
out, there was less chance of its decimating the population) from an ‘Administrative’ point of 
view it was far from satisfactory. 
In 1906 when His Honour the Administrator made a tour of inspection he decided that it 
would be advisable to put a stop to the ‘Mitanda’ System. Orders were accordingly given 
that the people were to return to the former custom of settling in large villages.91   
Thus apart from banning the cutting of trees, at the same time the administrator 
sought to introduce a new system which, to quote the words of Macdonald, ‘from 
an “Administrative” point of view’ would be satisfactory. Essential to this 
‘Administrative’ perspective was that mitanda would henceforth be prohibited, 
and smaller villages merged into larger villages.  
In July of 1906 Mr Codrington, Administrator Northeastern Rhodesia, spoke 
to Chiefs and Headmen in the Serenje district. Codrington told these men that 
they were ‘to give up the small villages and to build proper villages, under the 
chiefs’.92 Mr Leyers, Native Commissioner Isoka district, warned his subjects 
that: 
[the only way]their present method of cultivation could go on was by the suppression of 
‘mitanda’ and the gathering of people into fair sized villages of old. This should be done. 
The young men were warned that they would be punished if they disobeyed their chiefs 
words as regards ‘temere’ and ‘mitanda’. 93 
By 1907, at least on paper, it appeared that in some districts the wishes of the 
administration for the establishment of larger villages was coming about: 
Almost all the villages have amalgamated well, in 1907 the villages have slowly grown in 
number and are probably approaching a number that is normal in times when there was no 
interference from wars or administrative orders. 94 
What is striking though is that the administrators were clearly operating from an 
imagined ideal type that existed within their minds, within which villages had an 
ideal number of inhabitants ‘that is normal’, and which conveniently excised 
their own role from the equation. 
                                                 
91  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, folio 371, Notes by Native Commissioner Robert S. 
Macdonald, 1907. 
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Interestingly the chiefs, who were clearly against the prohibition of cutting 
trees, did support the wishes of the administration as expressed by its native 
commissioners that people should remain settled close to their chiefs and not 
establish mitanda. In a context in which ‘wealth in people’ was of crucial 
importance, it was in the desire of the administration for larger administrative 
units under a few selected chiefs that the wishes of these chiefs and the 
administration came together. 95 The conclusion of an indaba with chiefs in 
Chinsali in November 1907 serves to illustrate the point being made: 
All the chiefs agreed to keep a sharp lookout on their people and prevent them breaking 
away into mitanda.96 
Chaina Harrington, stationed as District Commissioner in the Mweru-Luapula 
District at Fort Rosebery [Mansa], wrote of the chiefs in his district, and of their 
desire to retain control over as many people as possible: 
Taken as a whole the 43 independent Chiefs are a decent lot… I find a good chief makes 
good people and a bad chief bad people. The character of a chief much depends on the Boma 
official, and if that official supports the chief and governs through him he will be surprised to 
see the power these chiefs have and how they will assist. … They have but one grievance, 
that is the ‘Insakwi’ grievance viz. heads of families who have no standing leaving their 
proper villages against the orders of their chiefs and hiding themselves away in the bush in 
‘Insakwi’ viz. wretched grass shelters which they generally make into villages and call 
themselves headmen and independent of their chiefs. This causes endless troubles especially 
in collecting the hut tax because their tribal head has no authority over them, … The men 
who do this are usually all men with several daughters and with these they are able to get 
some young fellows to follow them. 97 
In this the falling together of the aims of the incipient administration and chiefs 
becomes clear, and it heralded a far closer alliance as time went on. 
Failure in the face of on-the-ground realities 
Reading between the lines, one can glean the discomfort of some of the colonial 
officials tasked with enforcing the new legislation. Writing in 1907, Native 
Commissioner for Isoka, Robert S. MacDonald, drew attention to what was 
essentially the crux of the matter when he wrote: 
Still I fear it will be some considerable time before the people realise that the migration from 
village is condemnable. During the years they were living in ‘mitanda’ they seem to have 
imbibed the idea that ‘the land was theirs and the fullness thereof’. Further, being scattered 
                                                 
95  Jane Guyer, ‘Wealth in People, Wealth in Things – Introduction’, Journal of African History 36.1 
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96  NAZ, Isoka District Note Book, vol. II, folio 290. 
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as they were over the country the power of the chief was diminished and every man became 
to a great extent a ‘law unto himself’.98 
As MacDonald’s words indicate, the issue revolved around who held ultimate 
authority over the land: the chiefs who had provided protection in the instable 
years of the late nineteenth century, the British South Africa Company, or the 
various and many individual household heads who lived spread around the 
country.  
Initially it seemed as if the desires and directives of the BSAC administration 
were being attended to. Thus the Chinsali District Notebook for 1907 recorded 
‘only one case occurred of the break of the Fitemene rules’.99 Similarly, the 
Mpika District Notebook also recorded only ‘one case of breach of the 
Kitememwe prohibition’ for 1907.100 However, it was clear that people were not 
happy with the legislation. In the following year, Headmen from Chinsali District 
‘went, with the approval of the Native Commissioner to Fort Jameson to 
interview His Honour the Administrator [L.A. Wallace] with regard to the 
abolition of Fitemene’.101 In a subsequent visit to the District by the 
administrator, ‘the Awemba Chiefs asked that fitemene be re-allowed but His 
Honour refused to reopen the subject and told them that he considered that their 
real reason was they objected to the work entailed by proper cultivation’.102 
Wallace maintained this position when he spoke to chiefs and headmen further to 
the North at Fife. In Fife the administrator addressed the assembled chiefs and 
headmen on the issues of mitanda and temere: 
(i)  Mitanda: The Native Commissioner had reported that ‘mitanda’ had now quite ceased. 
This was most satisfactory, and Chiefs and District Headmen had done well in giving 
hearty assistance to the Official in this matter. 
(ii)  Temere: According to information supplied by the Native Commissioner, the 
instructions with regard to ‘temere’ had, generally speaking, and with the exception of a 
few sections on the Loangwa River, been completely disregarded.103 
In other words, although people appeared to comply with the new legislation in 
so far as it applied to where and with whom they established their villages, it was 
a different matter altogether with regard to how and where people sought to make 
a living out of slash and burn agriculture. It is clear that after a year (1907) in 
which many people had planted a crop on their original field, which had been 
cleared and used in 1906, the low returns were such that people attempted to 
establish new fields in 1908 so as to ensure an adequate harvest. That is, after 
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two growing seasons, the fertility of the soils of the fields cleared in 1906 was 
exhausted by 1908, and new fields had to be cleared if people were to survive. 
The administrator complained: 
In cases where the ground was not suitable for hoeing, temere cutting was allowed only in 
the immediate neighbourhood of each village – avoiding banks of streams and Govt. Roads – 
In spite of this, temere had been, and were being, made in widely scattered out-of-the-way 
places. And in many instances near dambos frequented by game, for the purpose of illicit 
hunting. To all appearances more temere than ever before had been made this year. This was 
a matter of regret, Chiefs and people had shown a reprehensible disobedience.104 
Anxious to save the situation, the administrator was reduced to holding out 
concessions to those villages that appeared to abide by the legislation. Thus, after 
complaining of hunting by people, and threatening that offenders could be 
charged under the Game Regulations, ‘the Administrator was ready to make 
…[concessions] in the matter of Natives killing game, and thus empowered the 
Native Commissioner to grant, at his discretion, to deserving villages where the 
people should have been found to have obeyed regulations affecting temere, 
mitanda, and taxation’.105 
However, the prohibition of slash and burn agriculture was not to be. In the 
face of almost complete negation of its legislation, particularly in 1908, a locust 
invasion in 1906 and 1907, and then bad crop returns for 1908, the administration 
was forced to reconsider its position. Particularly when in the course of 1908 ‘the 
Attitude of the Awemba … gave rise to a certain amount of anxiety’.106  
According to an entry in the Mpika District Notebook by Native Commissioner, 
Frank Melland, ‘[t]hey changed completely from the cheerful attitude they had 
always borne’.107 In the face of increasing tension and the near total disregard for 
the administration’s legislation, the administration was forced to back down. 
Consequently, in the words of Melland as Native Commissioner Mpika, ‘many 
concessions were made as to killing of game, and after mature consideration the 
attempt to abolish “Fitemenwe”, … was reluctantly abandoned’.108 The same 
occurred in Chinsali, where the District Notebook for 1909 noted, ‘it was found 
necessary to re-allow fitemen and permission to cut trees was granted in 
March’.109 In Mbala although ‘every effort … [had] been made to make them 
relinquish “ntemere” in favour of hoeing’, the administration was powerless to 
stop the practice and reduced to ordering that the practice should cease by 
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1914.110 Even so in July of 1913, at an indaba held at Abercorn (Mbala) 
Magistrate, C.P. Chesnaye, was forced to concede and seek a compromise: 
‘ntemere would be allowed around their villages but trees were not to be cut so 
far from the villages that the people were unable to return to their villages to 
sleep’.111 
Conclusion 
Whereas in 1906 a colonial official could write that ‘the carefully thought out 
rules for Vitemene cutting and restrictions, were communicated to the chiefs and 
all approved of by them’, the truth of the matter was that within three years the 
administrative plans had come to nought, and the administration was incapable of 
enforcing its wishes.112 That is, although on paper Northern Rhodesia fell under 
the administration of officials of the BSAC, in reality these officials were 
severely limited as to what they could do on the ground. On the issue of 
chopping trees for gardens, the chiefs and headmen chose to completely ignore 
the colonial administration, and side with their subjects. However, there was an 
emergent alliance between the BSAC and certain chiefs and headmen on issues 
of mutual importance and shared interest. It was in the legislation’s appeal for the 
concentration of people in villages around chiefs and headmen that the BSAC 
and the chiefs and headmen found one another. In a context in which “wealth in 
people” was of crucial importance, African leaders, recognised as chiefs or 
headmen by the BSAC, strengthened their position by siding with the BSAC and 
enforcing its legislation with regard to the ending of mitanda and newly 
established independent villages. 
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2 
New economic order 
Introduction 
Without the deployment of human labour power nothing could be transported or 
moved in pre-colonial Zambia, and this situation did not change with the advent 
of colonial rule in 1891. Prior to colonialism the inhabitants of Zambia were 
integrated into international trade through participation in long-distance trading 
networks that spanned the continent from east to west. The defeat of influential 
trading polities, such as those of Msiri in the Congo Free State and Mkwawa in 
German East Africa, and the ever-increasing control enforced by European 
powers on both the Atlantic and Indian coasts, effectively cut off Zambians at all 
levels of society from the products of this long-distance trade.1 Yet, shortly 
thereafter, a new world of wage labour, the wages of which enabled the purchase 
of trading goods, became available. Men, and occasionally women, came to be 
employed in new economic ventures such as had never existed before in the 
territory. Initially there was a consistent lack of wage employment for people in 
the immediate vicinity of their homes, yet within ten years the demand for wage 
labour was such that there was a consistent shortage of labour. The establishment 
of colonial rule, and more specifically new forms of economy, was facilitated by 
new forms of technology introduced into the continent, which brought about 
structural changes in the relationship that had hitherto existed between labour and 
transport in Africa. In particular, and of relevance to this book, are the new forms 
of transport that were introduced following the establishment of colonial rule in 
Africa.2  
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Labour and transport in Central African history 
Hitherto research into the relationship between labour and transport in Africa has 
been comparatively understudied, yet labour and transport are integrally 
connected in Africa. For a wide variety of reasons, related primarily to geography 
and climate, the bulk of transport in Africa, prior to the introduction of motorised 
transport in the early 1900s, was conveyed by human labour. It was only in 
specific sectors of Central Africa that the absence of horse sickness and the tsetse 
fly allowed for the use of pack animals. On account of the tsetse fly, draught and 
pack animals, such as oxen, donkeys, and horses, which were employed 
elsewhere in the world for transporting goods and people, could not be used in 
Zambia.3 Tsetse flies transmit trypanosomes, parasites in the blood, from one 
host to another. As a result of these parasites, domestic animals can develop 
trypanosomiases (sleeping sickness), which is inevitably fatal. The consequence 
of this was that whereas in the rest of the world draught and pack animals were 
used to transport goods, in Zambia the transport of goods and people was 
dependent on the muscle power of people.4 
Reliant on the muscle power of porters, journeys through central Africa 
covered at most 25 kilometres per day, with porters carrying loads of on average 
no more than 20 kilograms. Any more than that unnecessarily tired the porters, 
and brought down the total distance covered. Prior to embarking upon a journey, 
the goods to be transported were divided up into loads of approximately 20 
kilograms apiece. Large items, such as tusks, people, crates, and even pianos, 
would be slung under poles that would then be carried by more than one porter.5  
In contrast to the stereotypical image of Africa as a stagnant or at best slowly 
moving continent, the movement of people – and with them goods and ideas – 
was the standard, and extensive trading systems and trade routes existed within 
and across Central Africa, all of which were totally dependent on African labour. 
Archaeological evidence indicates the existence of long-distance trading routes 
throughout Central Africa prior to 1400. The arrival of European ships on both 
the Atlantic and Indian Ocean coasts in the late 1400s provided new products and 
a further impulse to already existing trade routes. The coupling of maritime 
trading networks to the already existing trade routes led to the reorientation and 
                                                 
For Europeans, a way of life for hundreds of thousands, indeed millions, throughout sub-Saharan 
regions became a feature denoting ‘backwardness’, an anachronistic waste of labor, to be made 
redundant by modernization and investment in railways and then abolished as soon as possible by 
colonial governments. 
3  The standard work on tsetse fly and trypanosomiases remains the excellent work by John Ford, The 
Role of Trypanosomiases in African Ecology: A study of the Tsetse fly problem (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1971). 
4  Stephen J. Rockel, ‘“A nation of porters”: the Nyamwezi and the labour market in nineteenth-
century Tanzania’. In: The Journal of African History, 2000, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 173-195. 
5  Jan-Bart Gewald, ‘People, Cars and Mines’, & Rockel, ‘A nation of porters’. 
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or expansion of already existing trade routes. Slaves, ivory, beeswax, gold, and 
other goods passed from the interior to the coast, and goods offered for sale on 
the coast travelled in the opposite direction. Prior to 1890 the inhabitants of 
Zambia were integrated into the international trade network through their 
participation in long-distance trading networks that spanned the continent from 
east to west.6 Porters and goods linked the Lunda kingdom of Kazembe, which 
lay at the centre of the continent, to both the Atlantic and Indian trade systems.7 
Chiefs and potentates sought to monopolise and control the routes of trade that 
traversed the continent. The fortunes of polities and their leaders were closely 
linked to control over trade routes and were heavily contested. Thus, comparative 
newcomers, such as Chief Msiri could and often did dislodge venerable Chiefs 
from access to and control of trade routes, with major implications for all 
concerned. The establishment of control by Msiri over the trade that used to be 
under the Lunda Kazembe transformed central Africa, the consequences of which 
continue to play out in contemporary Zambia and Congo.8 
It was in the late nineteenth century that transport routes powered by human 
power reached their furthest extension and sophistication. The extent of these 
routes is indicated by the discussions that the German explorer, Heinrich Barth 
had in Yola, Nigeria, in 1851 with Sherif Mohammed ben Ahmedu, ‘a native 
from Mokha in Yeman, who had travelled all over the eastern shores of the 
African continent, … and had penetrated from Mozambique to Lake Nyassi 
[Malawi]’.9 Sherif Mohammed offered to guide Barth across the continent from 
Kano to the Indian Ocean by way of Lake Malawi, ‘that magnificent lake’, for 
the sum of 300 dollars, to be paid upon completion of the trip in Zanzibar. In 
addition the Sherif provided Barth with a 33-day itinerary that led from 
Mozambique Island to Lake Malawi. 
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Goods passed from hand to hand, and along with the goods came ideas, 
stories, and tales that were linked to the goods.10 European muskets travelled 
over seventeen hundred kilometres from where they had been landed, and it 
could take ‘five years for a barrel of gunpowder to travel from the coast to the 
river villages above the equator’.11 Goods travelled across the continent, together 
with fantastic stories of Europeans, as the returning dead from the depth of the 
sea.12 Often these fantastic tales explained the origins of the exotic goods being 
imported. In west central Africa, inland people told and retold stories about 
‘strangers from the spirit world who purchased Africans in order to feed on their 
life force, … Their King was Mwene Puto, Lord of the Dead.’13 
It is incontestable that the slave trade contributed to major population 
disruptions, instability, and in a number of cases to the decimation of people in 
parts of Central Africa.14 Yet at the same time, the new food products introduced 
to Africa from the new world, specifically maize and cassava, served to enable a 
greater population density than had been possible before. And, in addition, these 
new food products, much as South American silver bullion had done for 
Europe’s mercantile trade, served as fuel to power the long-distance trade within 
Africa itself. Maize produces nearly twice as many calories per hectare as millet, 
and 50 per cent more than sorghum; in addition it is less vulnerable to drought 
and birds.15 When it reached Central Africa between 1548 and 1583, ‘[maize] 
was adopted especially in forest-savannah borderlands’ where its hard grains 
provided an easily divided and packaged long-lasting nutritious portable food for 
long-distance traders, and thus literally acted as the fuel that served to further the 
long-distance trade.16 Similarly, cassava reached Central Africa shortly after 
1600 and spread quickly through the southern savannah margins, where it 
became the staple crop of the Lunda, Luba, and Kazembe kingdoms.17 Writing 
on the pre-colonial history of the Lunda Ndembu, James Pritchett has noted: 
‘Without Cassava, Central African agriculture could probably not have sustained 
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the volume of slave and other trade in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’.18 
Cassava, is, as has been noted often before, truly a poor man’s crop of choice, its 
tubers and its leaves, can all be eaten, and in combination with high protein foods 
such as dried or smoked fish provides a wholesome diet. In contrast to most 
foods, the cassava tubers can safely be left in the ground for 18 months. Cassava 
can be transformed into a long-lasting nutritious powder that can produce instant 
porridge through the addition of water and became, along with maize, an 
important foodstuff for long-distance trading caravans. Indeed, Pritchett has 
argued that the Lunda-Ndembu made a living for themselves through supplying 
long-distance traders and raiders with cassava.19 With caravans of up to a 
thousand porters and merchants regularly traversing the Central African Plateau, 
food emerged as the key to maintaining the caravan system. The switch from 
millet and sorghum to cassava greatly increased the local and regional 
availability of food; in addition its impact on the division of labour was equally 
profound: ‘Cassava played a key role in freeing men from food production’.20 
It follows from the above that should one seek to come to an understanding of 
Central Africa, it is imperative that we do not lose sight of the importance of 
long-distance trade. Which was integrally tied up to the issues of labour and 
transport: without labour no transport, without transport no goods, without goods 
no transport. Or as Stephen Rockel succinctly put it: ‘Without porters, nothing 
would have moved’.21 The question as to how these porters were remunerated for 
their labour remains a major point for discussion and debate. Justin Willis has 
drawn attention to the issue of alcohol in trade and the importance thereof for 
caravans.22 Stephen Rockel has argued that the relationship between labour and 
transport that developed was such that ‘in sub-Saharan Africa, caravan porters 
were the first migrant labourers’.23 None the less, the labour needed for long-
distance trade remained under the control of a few centralised chiefs who 
monopolised the trade and trade routes, and used the profits to bind people and 
thus their labour to them.24 
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Labour  
Following the murder of Msiri in Garenganze, the execution of Mlozi at 
Karonga, and the defeat of Mkwawa in Uhehe, the polities of Northeastern 
Rhodesia, were effectively cut off from the long-distance trading networks that 
had hitherto existed in the region.25 Writing of the Bemba chiefs at this time, 
Henry Meebelo noted: 
As Arab caravan routes were being throttled by colonial officials in neighbouring territory, 
fewer and fewer goods were reaching the crocodile kings, and this growing scarcity in the 
supply of European consumer goods accentuated the economic competition among the 
Bemba rulers.26 
Severely limited in their access to trade goods that they could use to maintain 
their ‘wealth in people’, African chiefs struggled to retain the allegiance of their 
subjects. 27 Andrew Roberts has described in great detail how between 1891 and 
1900, as the Bemba chieftains were cut off from their access to long-distance 
trade, their authority over people diminished, and they failed to take a unified 
stand against the incoming BSAC.28 Giacomo Macola describes a similar process 
for the Kingdom of Kazembe, albeit in an earlier era where the control of long-
distance trade had to be ceded to Msiri, prior to Msiri’s death at the hands of the 
Congo Free State.29 In the aftermath of these events, the stockaded villages and 
settlements that had characterised much of Northeastern Rhodesia came to be 
abandoned, as men established their own villages independent of the chiefs from 
whom they had previously received protection in exchange for tribute.30 In the 
new conditions that existed in Northeastern Rhodesia, where the power of chiefs 
had previously depended on their ability to provide protection and trade goods to 
those willing to acknowledge their power, a new way of living came about. A 
new condition in which individuals could and did find employment independent 
of the power structures that had existed previously. In the situation that 
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developed young men could enter salaried employment and earn a wage in cash, 
which they could use to acquire and purchase trade goods of their own choice. 
 
 
Stevenson Road31 
The Stevenson Road, or Tanganyika-Nyasa road as now known, took its original name 
(Stevenson Road) from the fact that a philanthropist named Stevenson from Glasgow subscribed 
a considerable sum of money to have a road made between the lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika. 
The engineer employed for this purpose was an engineer from India named Stewart, who as 
report says gave up a good appointment there to take up missionary work in Africa. This man 
was undoubtedly an able man and a skilful engineer, as can be seen by the road which he 
engineered between Karonga and Lufira. In the making of this road Mr Monteith Fotheringham 
of the African Lakes Corporation assisted and evidently superintended the working of the 
Natives. This portion of the road, which must have been made about 1880 to 1882 was entirely 
neglected and allowed to grow over for many years and it was not until 1896 that the B.C.A. 
Administration remade or more correctly speaking hoed and cleared the track. 
In 1896 the British South Africa Company started from Nyala and made an entirely new road as 
far as Mambwe, completing the road right through to Kituta the following year. The road 
through the British South Africa Company’s territory being entirely made by that company is 
now properly known as the Nyasa-Tanganyika road. The original ‘Stevenson’ road never 
reached Lake Tanganyika. 
From the year it was first made, improvements have been made each year to the Nyasa 
Tanganyika road and in 1901 the road was widened to 30 feet throughout its whole length, the 
original width being only 8 feet. 
… 
In 1905, as there was no traffic along the road it was decided not to clean more than 8 feet in 
width. This road has been cleaned each year and the drifts repaired & filled with stones; this 
work is done by men from villages on the road itself. 
 
 
The demise of the polities that had determined access to central Africa led to 
an increase in opportunities for foreign companies such as the African Lakes 
Corporation (ALC) and the Tanganyika Concessions Limited (TCL) in 
particular. The Tanganyika Concessions Limited was a company closely allied 
with Cecil John Rhodes but headed by Robert Williams. In 1900 TCL gained 
prospecting and mining rights to Katanga in the Congo Free State.32 In the 
following year the company began developing a prospect that would soon 
become the mine of Kambove and the site of the contemporary city of Likasi.33 
As the TCL expanded its prospecting operations in Katanga, it also set about 
developing copper mines at Kambove and Lumbumbashi, developments that 
required substantial labour, the bulk of which came to be recruited in 
                                                 
31  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. 2, p. 121-2. 
32  Robert Hutchinson & George Martelli, Robert’s People: The Life of Sir Robert Williams, Bart., 
1860-1938 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1971), p. 118. 
33  Robert Hutchinson & George Martelli, Robert’s People, p. 135. 
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Northeastern Rhodesia.34 In addition, the mines required substantial mining 
equipment, which prior to the development of the railway from Livingstone 
through to southern Congo (1906-9) had to be portaged through Northeastern 
Rhodesia to southern Katanga.  
Lying literally in the heart of Africa, the logistics involved in transporting 
industrial goods to Katanga and Northeastern Rhodesia were simply staggering. 
The bulk of industrial goods were landed at the mouth of the Zambezi River at 
Chinde in Mozambique. Thereafter, they were transported by small steamers up 
the Zambezi to the Shire River, from where they were transported by boats and 
porters through to Lake Malawi.35 Goods were then transported by boat, small 
steamers, and dhows along Lake Malawi to Karonga, whereafter the goods would 
be carried by porters in to Northern Rhodesia. To do this, carriers made use of 
the Stevenson Road, along which the African Lakes Company had established a 
few stations.36 Karonga was connected to Fife (Isoka), by the Stevenson Road, 
and the road between Fife and Kasama came to be built in 1899 and extended in 
1901.37 Apart from the route that followed Lake Malawi, there was another that 
left the Zambezi at Tete and simply traversed Northeastern Rhodesia via Fort 
Jameson (Chipata), Serenje,  Sokontwi, Chinama, and on to Kambove.  However, 
until the completion of the railway line to southern Congo in 1909, the bulk of 
goods transported to Katanga were carried there by porters from Karongo on 
Lake Malawi via Fife on to Kasama and on to the Luapula River and into 
southern Congo.  Effectively all imported consumer goods for Northeastern 
Rhodesia not supplied from Fort Jameson, viz. Abercorn, Mweru, Kasama, Fife, 
Chinsali, and Luena, were imported from Karonga on Lake Malawi, and carried 
to Fife and onwards by porters.38 
The transport of goods for the mines developing in Katanga provided labour 
opportunities, and thus the ability to pay tax, for many who lived athwart the 
routes that led to the Congo. Thus in the Fort Rosebery [Mansa] District, Chaina 
Harrington recorded that initially there were no work opportunities, which would 
enable people to pay their taxes, ‘until the 1903/4 year when the Tanganyika 
Concession loads commenced to pass through via Tete-Ft Jameson-Serenje-
                                                 
34  On developments in Katanga in the early 1900s see, R.R. Sharp, Early Days in Katanga (Bulawayo: 
Rhodesian Printers, 1956). 
35  For a contemporary view detailing the development of this route, Fred. L.M. Moir, Afrter 
Livingstone: An African Trade Romance (London: Hodder and Stoughton, n.d.).& R.C.F. Maugham, 
Zambezia: A General Description of the Valley of the Zambezi River, from its Delta to the River 
Aroangwa, with its History, Agriculture, Flora, Fauna, and Ethnography (London: J. Murray, 1910). 
36  Gann, Birth of a Plural Society, p. 60. James B. Wolf, ‘Commerce, Christianity, and the Creation of 
the Stevenson Road’, African Historical Studies, vol. 4, no. 2 (1971), pp. 363-371. James McCarthy, 
The Road to Tanganyika: The Diaries of Donald Munro and William McEwan (Zomba: Kachere 
Press, 2006). 
37  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. 2, p. 60. 
38  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. 2, p. 154. 
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Sokontwi-Chinama to Kambove’.39 Furthermore this work, along with money 
earned in the building of a new administrative centre at Fort Rosebery on the 
Mansa River, enabled 6411 people to earn enough money to be able to pay their 
hut tax. However, what is particularly striking is the amount of employment 
opportunity that was created by the TCL alone. Harrington recorded that no less 
than 5441 people carried TCL loads, whilst approximately 1000 worked in other 
ways mostly at the new Boma and in transport for the administration.40 
Associated with the transport of goods for the mines of Katanga, was the 
transport of materials for the African Transcontinental Telegraph Company 
(ATT). Founded in 1892 and funded by Cecil John Rhodes, the ATT attempted 
to construct a landline from Rhodesia to Cairo.41 Apart from funding the 
construction of the telegraph line, the ATT also funded the further development 
of the Stevenson Road that linked Lake Malawi to Lake Tanganyika.42 The 
District Notebook for Isoka noted that: 
The original employment most popular was in transport of loads from Karonga. In 1901 
there was a phenomenal demand for labour owing to transport of ATT material.43  
This demand for labour only became greater when in the course of 1901 the TCL 
steamship, S.S. Cecil Rhodes, had to be manhandled in pieces from Karonga on 
Lake Malawi to Lake Tanganyika along the Stevenson Road.44 Frank Melland, 
who had only just arrived in Africa to take up a position in Northeastern 
Rhodesia, provided a graphic description of the transport of the Cecil Rhodes and 
the role of human labour in this endeavour: 
The next day [31 July 1901] brought us to Chomba Hill – a long steep incline, leading on to 
the plateau, where we fell in with Boyd of the TCL. Who was taking up waggons, each 
drawn by 100 men, the first to get up the hill: They were carrying machinery for the ‘Cecil 
Rhodes’ a steamer being built on Tanganyika.45 
Indeed, so large was the demand for labour that there was a labour shortage and 
higher wages had to be paid. A contemporary report stated: 
The demand for labour was phenomenal, owing to the ATT Telegraph material transport and 
the T.C.L. Cecil Rhodes SS material. Transport companies had to pay high prices to any 
agents who supplied them with boys. The CC [Civil Commissioner] reported that from 4/- to 
                                                 
39  NAZ, KDF 3/1, vol. 1, District Notebook, District Commissioner and Magistrate, Mweru-Luapula 
District at Fort Rosebery, p. 490. 
40  NAZ, KDF 3/1, vol. 1, District Notebook, District Commissioner and Magistrate, Mweru-Luapula 
District at Fort Rosebery, p. 490. 
41  Daniel R. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851-
1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 101-2. Howard Hensman, ‘The African 
Transcontinental Telegraph’. In: A. Williams, ed., Engineering Wonders of the World Volume 1 
(1910), pp. 192-204. 
42  Michael Gelfand, Northern Rhodesia in the Days of Charter: A Medical and Social Study, 1878-
1924 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1961), p. 110. 
43  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. 1, p. 59. 
44  Robert Hutchinson & George Martelli, Robert’s People, p. 101. 
45  RH, MSS. Afr. R. 192, Melland, volume 1. 
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5/- p.m. had to be paid to boys on Fife station work, and that labour, except for transport 
purposes was difficult to obtain.46 
The wages paid to carriers allowed for the establishment of a number of trading 
stores that flourished between 1898 and 1906.  
The building of the Stevenson Road, the transporting of loads for the TCL, as 
well as the telegraph line and all that was associated with it between Fife and 
Abercorn, led to a short-lived boom in and around Fife. A large number of 
companies, some of which actually traded on the London Stock Exchange, such 
as The African Lakes Corporation, The African International Flotilla and 
Transport Company, and Tanganyika Concession Limited, as well as individual 
traders such as, Mr L.W.J. Deuss and Mr Ferreira de Mathos, opened trading 
stores in and around Fife in the hope of cashing in on the boom.47 However, by 
1906 the railway linking the harbours of South Africa to Broken Hill – to reach 
Elisabethville in 1909 – had been built, and the use of porters to transport goods 
to Katanga from Lake Malawi no longer made economic sense; as a consequence 
the bulk of trading stores in Fife closed down leaving only ‘Mr D. Ross of 
Karonga [who] opened a Native store in Fife township’.48  
The words of the Civil Commissioner Isoka, writing the annual report for 
1906 on trade and commerce for the ‘combined North Loangwa & Awemba 
Districts’, indicate clearly that trade within the districts was negligible. Thus 
under the heading ‘Trade’, the commissioner noted, ‘there is none, excepting 
Native trade, that is goods sold to Natives for cash’. However there was ‘a certain 
amount of what is “carrying trade” or “transport” which brings a considerable 
amount of money into the country’. The ‘carrying trade’, consisting of loads in 
transit for the Congo, was substantial, but, in the words of the commissioner, 
‘next year there may be none’.49 In the event, the ‘carrying trade’ continued to 
expand substantially until the coming of the train. Thus in 1907 the Civil 
Commissioner wrote: 
There have been some 11,000 loads carried this year, as compared with 3000 last year, 
giving employment to some 20,000 men. These loads were chiefly for the Congo Free State 
& were carried via Kasama to Fort Roseberry. No wagons were used. All transport being 
done by porters.50 
In the following year the collapse of the ‘carrying trade’ to Katanga became 
apparent.  
                                                 
46  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. 2, p. 300. 
47  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. 2, p. 131. 
48  NAZ KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. 2, p. 131. In the event Ross abandoned the store in 
1912, p. 132. 
49  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. 2, p. 153. 
50  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. 2, p. 155. 
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At a baraza held by the administrator, L.A. Wallace, at Fife in September 
1908, it was noted that only one-fourteenth of the taxes due had been paid.51 
Noting that he was ‘aware that opportunities for work had dwindled greatly 
during the last twelve months’, the administrator suggested that young men 
should allow themselves to be recruited by the Rhodesian Native Labour Board 
for work in Southern Rhodesia ‘as there were and would be no chances of wage-
earning work within the Fife Division’.52 In reply Chief Muwanga stated that he 
had sent 50 men in the previous year, of which only one had returned. He wished 
to know what had become of them and ‘feared that they were dead’. Similarly 
Chief Kafwimbi wished to know what had become of his men who had also 
failed to return from Southern Rhodesia. Although the administrator attempted to 
allay the fears of the chiefs, the subsequent work of Charles Van Onselen has 
shown the validity of their concerns.53 That this recruitment was not without 
controversy is indicated by what happened to Muwanga’s own son. In the 
following year, in 1909, the administrator once again addressed the assembled 
chiefs at Fife. When the chiefs were asked to come forward and speak, Muwanga 
stepped forward, ‘professed his loyalty to the Administration’, and continued by 
stating that he ‘deprecated the fact that certain of his men including his own son 
had been recruited by Boma Messengers’.54 In addition Chipokosa, Sectional 
Headman, ‘complained of the dissatisfaction produced by the ill-treatment of 
certain headmen during the R.N.L.B. recruiting in 1908’.55 
Interestingly, and in contrast to the stereotype ascribed to them by colonial 
administrators, namely that the inhabitants of the Fife Division were ‘very ‘stay-
at-home’ people … [who did] not readily come forward for work outside of the 
territory’, substantial numbers of men worked far beyond their villages.56 Apart 
from being recruited by the RNLB for work on the mines of Southern Rhodesia, 
there were also a number from the Fife division who ended up working on the 
Chiromo-Blantyre railway in southern Malawi.57 Having worked as carriers 
between Fife and Karonga, these men were recruited in Karonga and put to work 
in southern Malawi.58  
 
                                                 
51  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. 2, p. 291-2. 
52  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. 2, p. 292. 
53  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. 2, p. 293. See Charles Van Onselen, Chibaro: African 
Mines Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933 (London: Pluto Press, 1976) for details of working 
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55  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. 2, p. 295. 
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Tax 
Desperate for labour, particularly for its mines and farms in Southern Rhodesia, 
the BSAC attempted to introduce taxation in its Northern Rhodesia territories in 
an effort to get people to enter into salaried work. Beginning in 1901 taxation 
was introduced in a number of districts in Northeastern Rhodesia. It was, at best, 
a haphazard affair. In later years Melland, erstwhile Native Commissioner, 
provided a first hand account of the tenuous nature of taxation as applied in 
Northeastern Rhodesia: 
The starting of the hut tax, […], in a land of which we had no census, and where we had no 
idea if the natives would submit to a tax. Some did and some did not, for a long time. We 
started by enrolling ‘hut-counters’. Men [who] went out and returned with bundles of smoky 
straws, one plucked from the roof of each inhabited hut. With unfailing memory the hut-
counter handed in bundle after bundle, giving the name of the headman, his chief, and the 
stream on which the village was situate.59 We tabulated each village under the chiefs, with 
the name of the stream recorded as a guide to situation; and on that data assessed and 
collected the tax – in kind. In kind! We took tons of grain we did not need, sheep, goats, 
anything, to get the idea started.60 
In some areas of Northern Rhodesia where tax came to be imposed, tax could, as 
Melland indicated, initially be paid in kind or labour. Tax labour, labour 
employed in lieu of tax, provided the initial colonial administrators with 
substantial numbers of workmen who were often put to work on extensive road-
building projects. As with other districts in the territory, a taxation of 3/- per year 
was introduced in Isoka in 1901.61 In the absence of cash, a system developed in 
which the representatives of the administration paid earnings for labour services 
to tax-paying men in cheque. The same held true for Kasama, where in the first 
four years part of the tax was paid in produce and labour.62 However, this was 
soon discontinued in accordance with instructions from Headquarters in 1903, 
when the Civil Commissioner Fife instructed Native Commissioners ‘that cash 
must be paid to Natives for work done, & that no taxes be received other than in 
cash’.63 With the demand for tax payments to be made in cash, men began 
                                                 
59  Melland’s description bears an uncanny resemblance to the words of Alfons Vermeulen, a trader in 
Congo, who described a woman trader who traded on behalf of a large number of villages and 
recalled her orders by means of sticks: 
Now she unpacks and she needs space for that. For she has up to fifty packets of different owners and out 
comes her ledger … that is, a bundle of sticks bearing all sorts of notches. She picks up one of these, 
rummages in her heap of packets, gets one of them out, thinks a little about it and says, ‘White man for this 
package I must have a bushknife’. 
Alfons Vermeulen, De pioniersdagen van Chicongo, cited in Jan Vansina, Being Colonized: The 
Kuba Experience in Rural Congo, 1880-1960 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010), p. 
64. 
60  Frank Melland, ‘Northern Rhodesia: Retrospect and Prospect’, Journal of the Royal African Society, 
vol. 29, no. 117 (Oct., 1930), pp. 492-3. 
61  NAZ, KSL 3/1, Isoka District Note Book, vol. 2, p. 263. 
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entering into wage labour in substantial numbers. The bulk of these men came to 
be employed as either carriers for the portage of goods or as migrant labourers in 
the mines and farms of Southern Rhodesia but also sometimes as far away as the 
goldmines of the South African Rand, the diamond mines of Kimberley, and 
beyond.64 Not surprisingly people sought to avoid taxation, and many did so by 
simply moving away beyond the reach of the colonial officials, either across the 
borders of the territory or into inaccessible areas: 
Some tribes, especially in the Bangweulu swamps, fled to the waters rather than pay tax. 
Once they marooned me [Melland] on an island.65  
In turn, colonial officials torched the huts of those who failed to comply, or 
employed them in a variety of tasks in exchange for tax payment.66 Nonetheless, 
for the first five years after the introduction of taxation in parts of Northeastern 
Rhodesia, there were ample opportunities for employment, and the taxes paid and 
collected exceeded expectations, much to the surprise of the administrators.67 
European adventurers and African transport labour 
In the first decades of the twentieth century there were numerous exploits of 
white men in Africa that captured the imagination of the world’s reading public. 
Yet obscured and hidden to most was the importance of African labour in 
facilitating and allowing for these exploits. Hidden behind the scenes are the 
thousands of labourers that enabled the white man to move through and across 
the African continent. All too often, whilst they marvel at the achievements of 
the explorer, observers forget that the technology being used by the explorer, be  
 
                                                 
64  The defeat of the Boer republics in the South African War (1899-1902) heralded an enormous 
programme of economic and political reconstruction, which emphasised the reconstruction and 
development of South Africa’s mines and agriculture, and led to an enormous demand for labour 
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Notes for officials district travelling68 
In taking census the official arrives at a village and has all tax-papers produced and put on the 
roofs of the huts of the payers. He then goes round and takes each tax-paper and initials it and 
enters the owners name in his census book and any other details such as absentees their probable 
whereabouts exemptions and any other items that he may think desirable to know. No 
exemption paper are now issued at the Boma [administrative centre] and can only be obtained 
from the official on the spot when census [is] taken. In this manner it is easy to check any 
attempt at fraud. Owners of villages are also held responsible for any false information supplied 
to the official making enquiries. 
In travelling round a Native taxation division it is the duty of the Headmen to accompany the 
official and in case of a chief to send his responsible capitao. 
At every village of importance short indabas [(an institution introduced by the BSAC which 
derived its name from the Zulu word for business or matter and used to denote gathering] are 
held and natives are encouraged to make any complaints or enquiries before the Native 
Commissioner. 
The Division is divided into 10 taxation Divisions in charge of a chief or headman who are 
responsible for its tribal Government. Each Division is called out in rotation to furnish workers 
and the time of the year being fixed by the headmen themselves in 1903. In this manner the 
Natives know when they are wanted for work and make their arrangements accordingly. The 
chiefs and Headmen are responsible for the collection of the tax, calling out labour Notification 
of the removal of existing villages and the settlement of new comers within their respective 
divisions. They are empowered to hear and determine minor native cases and also act as 
constables. They arrest criminals and bring them before the Native Commissioner Court for 
trial. 
As work can be found for Natives a notice is sent to the Chiefs or Headmen of the Division 
in whose turn it is to furnish labour, that there is work for his people to earn money to pay their 
taxes. The Chief or Headman then send round messengers to say that his people should be ready 
to go to work. Government messengers are then sent who go round with the headman or Chiefs 
Capitao to the different villages calling out men. They remain with the Natives until they have 
prepared food etc for the road and then generally all assemble together at the principal village in 
the taxation division and come in with the chief or Headman to the Boma. 
This is done as work may be forthcoming and until all villages have been visited and all 
Natives in the particular division have been given a chance to earn money. When the 1st 
Division has become exhausted the 2nd and succeeding Divisions are called up in the same 
manner until all have been visited. 
As soon as all Natives have been called up in his division the Chief or Headman reported the 
matter to the Native Commissioner and no more demands are made upon his division until the 
31st of December by which time the hut tax has become due and owing. Messengers are then 
sent with the headman to notify that the hut tax for the year is due to check taxes. 
 
P.C. Cookson 
Native Commissioner. 
 
 
                                                 
68  NAZ, KDN 1/1, Kasama District Note Book, vol. 2, p. 386-7. Bear in mind that this text refers to an 
ideal type, which only exists in the mind of the Native Commissioner who drew up this series of 
notes, and it is highly unlikely that taxation ever was carried out in the manner described. Instead, 
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who drafted the same, sought to aspire to. 
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it boat, bicycle, car, or aircraft, could only function on account of the massive 
deployment of African labour. In central Africa, where draught animals were 
severely limited on account of tsetse fly infestation, it was the use of African 
labour that allowed for the movement of white men engaged in intrepid 
expeditions. 
The dependency of white men on African labour for their transport through 
Africa is well illustrated by the examples of two European men who have entered 
into the annals of Zambia’s colonial history, Paul Graetz, and Frank Melland. In 
April of 1908, a young colonial official in Mpika, Frank Melland, noted in the 
station’s district notebook that, the ‘automobile expedition Graetz’ had passed by 
the settlement.69 Paul Graetz, otherwise known as ‘Bwana Tucka Tucka’, 
introduced the motorcar to colonial Zambia in 1908, when he became the first 
person to drive across the African continent between 1907 and 1909.70 Graetz’s 
continuing popularity is such that reruns of his trip with replicas of his vehicle 
are organised by tour-operators, and whole websites are devoted to Graetz and 
his exploits.71 Although a reading of his travelogue indicates that Graetz had his 
fair share of ‘traveller experiences’, what is omitted from these texts is the simple 
fact that the expedition would not have been possible without African labour. 
Graetz’s trip from Dar es Salaam in German East Africa through to Swakopmund 
in German South-West Africa was only possible through the extensive use of 
African labour for road and bridge building, as well as the portage of petrol by 
labourers recruited to prepare the way and establish fuel dumps along Graetz’s 
intended line of travel.72 Indeed, when fuel ran out, or the fuel in fuel dumps had 
evaporated or leaked away, Graetz became stranded until such time as new 
supplies of fuel could be physically portaged to him. At one stage, whilst 
stranded at the Lukakashi River near Serenje, Graetz had to wait for three weeks 
for fuel to be brought up by rail from Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia and then 
portaged from Broken Hill to his involuntary encampment. In keeping with the 
carrying load of an individual porter, the 50-gallon drum (approximately 220 
litres) had to be manhandled by 12 porters. The size and weight of the load made 
an indelible impact on travellers on the route between Broken Hill and Mpika, 
and, prior to the arrival of the petrol, rumours of the impending arrival of an 
enormous drum had reached Graetz at his encampment.73 
The man who assisted Graetz in his passage through Northern Rhodesia was 
Frank Melland, who, after graduating from Oxford, first arrived in Northern 
                                                 
69  NAZ, KSD 4/1, Mpika District Note Book, vol. 1, folio 4. 
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Rhodesia in 1901 and was appointed Assistant Native Commissioner, Mpika in 
1902.74 Inspired no doubt by the exploits of Graetz, in 1910 Melland and a 
‘chum’, E.H. Cholmeley, cycled through Africa from Northern Rhodesia to 
Egypt whilst going on home leave.75 Melland published an account of this trip. 
Dedicated to their mothers and published in 1912, the full title of their exploits 
reads, Through the heart of Africa Being an Account of a Journey on Bicycles & 
on Foot from Northern Rhodesia past the Great Lakes, to Egypt undertaken when 
proceeding home on leave in 1911. In completing their trip Melland and 
Cholmeley entered into the annals of settler mythology. Young probationers who 
served under Melland, such as Theodore Williams, wrote letters full of awe to 
their mothers, describing Melland as ‘an old Merton man of about 34,  [and] 
author of a book … of a trip he made a few years ago from Rhodesia to Cairo on 
foot’.76 
Although young probationers and settler mythology may have had them 
slogging through Africa by themselves, Melland was a more pragmatic man and 
noted: 
As for our method of travel and transport, the journey from Rhodesia to the Soudan would, 
we knew, have to be performed in the manner to which we had been accustomed in the 
course of our duties: complete equipment and a large supply of provisions would have to be 
carried by native porters, while we ourselves went partly on foot and partly on bicycle.77 
Freed from walking on account of their bicycles, Melland and Cholmeley were, 
however, limited by ‘the fact that the day’s trek has to be entirely regulated 
according to the capacity of one’s carriers’.78 Carriers, and the limits to which 
they could carry materials, limited the extent to which Cholmeley and Melland 
could travel across Africa. Drawing on his experience of district tours within 
Northern Rhodesia, Melland rather modestly noted: 
Even for a short trip of three to four weeks, it is difficult to travel in any comfort with less 
than thirty carriers; tents, beds and bedding, cooking utensils, crockery, provisions, lamps, 
guns and ammunition have to be taken and in loads averaging at most fifty lbs. in weight.79 
Not surprisingly thus, for a journey which could last up to six months, ‘during 
which we knew but vaguely to what extent we could re-stock such provisions as 
tea, coffee, flour, sugar, and other necessities, and as we were also obliged – 
since we were after all proceeding on leave to England – to carry a certain 
quantity of respectable clothing, a caravan of sixty porters, which included the 
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carriers of drugs, carbide, cameras, books, five loads of spirit tanks, and other 
apparatus for the preservation of zoological specimens, was for two travellers, by 
no means an excessive allowance’.80 Furthermore, as Melland noted: 
Experience in African travel, moreover, shows that, without indulging in luxuries, it is a 
mistake, especially when a tent has to be one’s home for half a year, to deprive oneself of a 
few creature comforts for the sake of lessening one’s impedimenta by two or three loads. An 
extra table or two and a few books add considerably to one’s comfort, and anything that 
tends to alleviate the inconveniences of camp life is worth considering in its effect on temper 
and health.81 
To be sure, Melland and Cholmeley did cycle across a substantial part of Africa, 
but they did this with an enormous retinue of men to provide them with the 
minimal comforts considered necessary for an expedition. By this stage the ideal 
type of minimum comfort considered necessary for white travellers in Africa was 
well established.82 Thus, in addition to sixty porters, Melland and Cholmeley 
were accompanied by a number of personal attendants, including a cook and two 
gun-bearers.83 All in all, for the two men cycling home through Africa, no less 
than 66 other men were necessary to enable them to successfully complete their 
highly enjoyable trip.  
Not surprisingly, the supply of labour for their expedition was the largest 
obstacle. As Melland noted, ‘the problems that remained to be solved were to 
what extent, and where, we could rely on obtaining carriers en route, and how far 
we should have to carry provisions to last us for the whole journey’.84 The 
unbroken provision of labour was essential to the success of their expedition; it is 
understandable thus that Melland and Cholmeley set off on their expedition in 
the company of Mr R.A. Osbourne, Inspector of Labour recruiting in Northern 
Rhodesia.85  
The expeditions of Graetz, as well as that of Melland and Cholmeley, 
highlight the central importance of African labour in ‘those parts of Central 
Africa where the existence of tsetse fly renders the use of all transport animals 
impossible’.86 In addition, bicycles and motor vehicles were insufficient in and of 
themselves to transport the expeditions. That is, in both instances the extensive 
mobilisation of African labour was necessary to allow for the passage of these 
products of industrial technology. Without African labour, neither Melland and 
Cholmeley’s bicycles, nor Graetz’s car, which represented the very pinnacle of 
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industrial technology at the time, could travel far in the ways envisaged by their 
manufacturers and drivers. This limitation on movement in the absence of 
African labour extended to the whole of Northern Rhodesia prior to 1914. 
Railroad in Zambia 
Photo 2.1 Stephen Kappata, People Used to Walk Long Distance to Look for Employment in 
the Railline (personal collection J.B. Gewald) 
 
 
 
A silver wedge in the bushland spaces 
Cleaving North through a heathen land,  
Stamping the wild with the White Man’s traces, 
Trimming the rough for the Master Hand,  
Girdling earth with a magic band, 
Lighting the night with a steady gleam, 
Meeting dawn in the far-off places, 
These are the fruits of Rhodes’ Dream!87 
Gouldsbury, ‘Rhodes’ Dream’ 
 
Over the heart of a poor and primitive continent civilization has laid a 
finger of steel; it has stirred a hundred tribes together; it has brought 
them new wealth, new ambitions, new knowledge, new interests, new 
faiths and new problems.88 
Wilson, Economics of Detribalization 
 
                                                 
87  From the poem ‘Rhodes’ Dream’ by Cullen Gouldsbury, cited in George Pauling, The Chronicles of 
a Contractor (Bulawayo: Books of Rhodesia, 1969), plate 30. 
88  Godfrey Wilson, An essay on the Economics of Detribalization in Northern Rhodesia (Livingstone: 
Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1941), p. 9. 
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In the present, the racist sentiment of colonial doggerel and the well-intentioned 
paternalism of Godfrey Wilson rankle; yet as the painting of Stephen Kappata 
points out, the railway line had an enormous impact on societies in Northern 
Rhodesia. The building of the railway between 1905 and 1909 required labour 
that was drawn from all over Northern Rhodesia, and from its arrival in the 
territory the train provided work, transport, and a wholly new experience that 
extended beyond travel alone.89 To be sure, the railway line did indeed facilitate 
the dragging of African labour into the dragooned and disorientating world of 
contract labour in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, so decried by Godfrey 
Wilson and his intellectual heirs.90 Yet, at the same time trains and work 
associated with the railway facilitated and enabled access to the products of 
industrial capitalism that were so sought after by young African men and women, 
and which Rhodes and his associates had seen as the instrument that would bind 
Africa to England for perpetuity.91 Stephen Kappata and Godfrey Wilson both 
realised and emphasised the importance of the railroad, and interestingly colonial 
administrators emphasised the importance of the railroad for related reasons. In 
fact the perspectives of Wilson, Kappata and colonial administrators all represent 
different views of one and the same issue: the change wrought to society by the 
introduction of an aspect of industrial technology and all that is associated with 
it.  
The earliest references to railways in Central Africa are in the context of 
Britain’s drive to end the slave trade, and the belief that ‘legitimate trade’ would 
bring about the demise of slavery. Following the reports of David Livingstone in 
the late 1850s, the existence of slavery in Central Africa had become common 
knowledge in Britain.92 In the 1860s, when Livingstone ‘disappeared’ into the 
African continent in the wake of the miserable failure of his Zambezi Expedition, 
Livingstone’s call for British intervention and the introduction of ‘legitimate 
trade’ was taken up by many a young man who had been inspired by 
                                                 
89  Regarding the wholly new experience, Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The 
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90  ‘Boarding the enclosed cattle trucks signified a momentous plunge into an inorganic, noisy, 
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62 
 
Livingstone.93 One such young man was Lieutenant Cameron, who travelled past 
the headwaters of the Congo and Zambezi Rivers in 1874, and wrote extensive 
reports on slavery in Central Africa and what he believed ought to be done about 
it. His words and sentiments echoed those of David Livingstone when he 
concluded a letter to the Earl of Derby with the following words: 
In conclusion, let me add that, in my belief, this internal Slave Trade will continue to 
increase until proper means of communication are opened up, and the country brought under 
the influence of civilization and legitimate commerce.94 
Exactly what Cameron meant with ‘proper means of communication’ is made 
clear in a follow up letter to the Earl of Derby, in which he suggested that the 
Congo and Zambezi rivers be connected: ‘The steamers we should require for 
this should not be ships, but tea-trays with a kettle and a pair of wheels’.95 
Cameron continued by claiming that, ‘the eastern part of the continent might be 
easily opened up by a railway from Mombasa to the Tanganyika via 
Unyanyembe’96 and concluded his letter by emphasising that: 
Proper means of carriage and communication are what is at present wanted in this continent; 
and if they were once established, the worst and principal portion of the Slave Trade would 
die a natural death, leaving the question of domestic slavery, which is not such a flagrant 
evil, to be settled hereafter.97 
In other words, the building of railways, and the concomitant trade and 
commerce that would be associated with such an undertaking would undercut 
and bring about the end of slave trade in Central Africa.98  
The imperial dreams of a railroad linking Cape to Cairo exercised the fantasies 
of imperial power brokers, and inspired imperial administrators and the common 
man alike.99 Trains and railways captured the imagination of Victorians and later 
generations as symbols of progress and power.100 
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(not approved). Lieutenant Cameron, R.N., to the Earl of Derby, Luanda, 29 November 1875. 
96  Which is exactly what Imperial Germany did. 
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This darkest Africa must see the light of civilisation and humanity. … We hear of 
railways.101  
The train and all that it entailed was as powerful a symbol of progress as the 
telegraph was and the aeroplane later would be. Yet the train, in contrast to 
Killingray’s telling characterisation of the failure of the aeroplane in Africa as an 
instrument of imperial control, was more than merely symbolic.102 It, as with the 
steamer, transported in a single carriage or wagon more than a caravan of 100 
porters could ever hope to carry, and at distances, cost, and a speed that could 
only have been dreamed of before the arrival of the train.103 Even if the train 
travelled at speeds of just under 25 kph on many stretches of the track in 
Northern Rhodesia, it still travelled at a pace that was far in excess of anything 
that carriers could hope to attain.104 Once the train arrived, it was used as a 
convenient, efficient, and reliable form of transport by anybody who lived within 
a 40 km radius of the railway line.105 Administrators hitched lifts on the train 
whilst on ulendo, and planned the itineraries of their district inspection tours in 
keeping with the timetable of the train.106 Africans used the train to travel back 
and forth in a country that was coming to be newly created in the imagination of 
its subjects.107 Once established, the railroad was used to ferry goods and people 
to markets, mines, and war, and transformed South Central Africa forever. 
 
                                                 
101  Comments from the audience following the reading of Joseph Thomson’s report to Royal 
Geographical Society, 28th November 1892, p. 119. Joseph Thomson, ‘To Lake Bangweolo and the 
Unexplored Region of British Central Africa’, The Geographical Journal, vol. 1, no. 2. (Feb., 1893), 
pp. 97-115. 
102  David Killingray, ‘“A Swift Agent of Government”: Air Power in British Colonial Africa, 1916-
1939’, Journal of African History 25 (1984), pp. 429-444. 
103  See Jan Vansina’s description of the impact of the steamer on the Kuba kingdom in Congo: ‘Almost 
from the day Luebo was founded, caravans could no longer compete with the river route. A single 
ship carried more merchandise than several of even the largest caravans and brought them to Luebo 
at a significantly lower cost than any Angolan caravans could afford’. Vansina, Being Colonized, p. 
29. 
104  RH, MSS. Afr. S. 776-781, Williams, Elizabethville, 23 January 1917, My dear Mother. Theodore 
Williams describes traveling from Livingstone to Sakania by train in 26 hours (840 km), and that in 
1913 the trip from Sakania to Elizabethville took 13 hours (208 Km). 
105  RH, MSS. Afr. S. 871, Chastell (F.A.) Reminiscences of service in Northern Rhodesia 1913-34. 
Notes that farms radiated around the railway line to about 25 miles. Any further meant that the farms 
were no longer profitable. RH, MSS. Afr. S. 776-781, Williams, Chilanga, September 1st 1923, ‘My 
dear mother, …camped at Harvey’s farm …– 13thousand bags of maize for a crop … 100 acres of 
spuds in the ground and 50 acres of wheat & 90 dozen eggs going to market every week. But of 
course 22 miles from the rail cuts down profits’. 
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Building the rail line 
Ian Phimister and John Lunn have done more than others to emphasise and draw 
to the fore the political economy of railway construction in the Rhodesias, and 
one can do no better than to read their work regarding the intricacies of high 
finance, financial constraints, long-term economic perspectives, and railroad 
construction in what would become Zimbabwe and Zambia.108 Similarly the 
work of Leroy Vail has unpacked and illustrated the cynical legacy of railway 
construction in Nyasaland.109 This contribution will not concern itself with ‘any 
serious and sustained analysis of ... [the] financial structure and control’ of 
railways, neither will it present an in depth analysis of labour, either white or 
black on the railways.110 Instead it seeks to investigate the variety of ways in 
which the coming of the railway changed and influenced the social life of people 
in Northern Rhodesia. 
The discovery of diamonds (1867) and gold (1886) heralded the 
industrialisation of South Africa and the social and economic transformation of 
Southern Africa as a whole.111 Industrial mining, or to be more specific, the 
profits generated by industrial mining in South Africa, enabled Cecil John 
Rhodes to finance an enormous programme of imperial expansion at little initial 
cost to the British treasury.112 In Southern Rhodesia the expansion of imperial 
rule was brought about through military occupation by a band of freebooters, 
which soon led to the outbreak of a full-scale war in 1896 that nearly bankrupted 
the BSAC.113 For the people of southern colonial Zambia, imperial rule was 
announced and given concrete form by the building of a railway line between 
Livingstone and Broken Hill between 1904 and 1906.  
The railway in Northern Rhodesia came to be built by countless hundreds of 
largely unknown African labourers employed by the contracting company of 
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George Pauling.114 Starting in Kimberley in the Cape Province, the railway 
reached Bulawayo in 1897, Wankie Colliery in 1903, Victoria Falls in 1904, 
Broken Hill in 1906, and finally Ndola and Katanga in 1909.115 Construction on 
the railway north of the Zambezi River began prior to the completion of the 
Victoria Falls Bridge. By means of an electric powered cableway, which had 
been erected over the gorge, thousands of tonnes of railway material, including 
dismantled locomotives, were transported to the north bank.116 In this way the 
railway proceeded northwards, with up to ten kilometres of track being laid in a 
single day.117 The Victoria Falls Bridge had been pre-assembled in England, so 
that when all the sections were on site it took only nine weeks to assemble the 
main structure, and a mere fourteen weeks to complete the whole bridge.118 
Initially the line of rail was extended from the Victoria Falls to Kalomo, which 
was the administrative centre at the time; however, the rail was extended almost 
immediately on to Broken Hill (present-day Kabwe) on account of the lead and 
zinc mine, which was being developed there, before being extended even further 
north to Ndola and the Belgian Congo.119 
Before it impacted on societies by its ability to rapidly transport and transfer 
people and goods from place to place, the railroad impacted directly on a number 
of communities in Northern Rhodesia, as it was being built through its demand 
for labour. It was a demand for labour that ebbed and flowed depending on the 
state of the economy and the demands of the mining industry.120 In the course of 
research for this book, virtually no archival material could be found that dealt 
with the labour that actually built the railway in Northern Rhodesia. The archival 
holdings of the BSAC administration for the period concerned (BSA2) contain 
no files that deal with railway workers, let alone their conditions of service or 
living conditions. This is largely due to the fact that the BSAC left responsibility 
for the recruitment of labour for the building of the railroad to Pauling and 
Company Limited, who in turn depended upon a loose collection of, what John 
Lunn referred to as, ‘settler contractors’, of whom he noted: 
Relatively little attention has been paid to date to the role of the settler contractor in the 
Rhodesias. Contractors were to be found particularly on the mines, in the building industry 
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and on the railways. The contractor was part of that fluid stratum of the white settler 
population … Struggling, not always successfully, to establish themselves within the white 
middle class, these settlers flitted from one activity to another, or combined several at once, 
depending upon the economic climate and their own inclination.121 
The bulk of the work was of the ‘pick-and-shovel’ variety that required stamina 
and physique more than that it required skill, and the turnover of workers in this 
hard manual labour was understandably high. In contrast, plate-laying was more 
complex and ‘plate-laying subcontractors appear generally to have been on the 
permanent staff of Pauling and Co. Limited’.122  In early 1906, as the railway 
approached Broken Hill, a display was given of their skill when: 
the plate-laying gangs, who had been with Pauling for many years, laid the last half-mile into 
Broken Hill with materials being offloaded from the train as it slowly passed over the newly 
laid track just placed on the formation. This last dash was filmed by Pathé, the first news-reel 
to be made in Northern Rhodesia.123 
Not surprisingly, workers employed in plate-laying gangs were regarded as 
expert workers and paid accordingly, with the majority being in long-term 
employment with Pauling and Co. Limited.124 
The initial building of the railway consumed as much labour as could be 
supplied. Lunn details how in Southern Rhodesia native commissioners ‘acted as 
auxiliary recruiters and clearing houses for labour for the construction works’, 
with chiefs and headmen drawn in through a mix of incentives and 
compulsion.125 The Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) established in 1903 
ostensibly sought to bring about a measure of order and even-handedness in the 
recruitment of labour.126 However, the RNLB was unable to supply Pauling and 
Co. Limited with the amount of labour that it needed, and it was agreed upon that 
Pauling and Co. could recruit directly in Northwestern Rhodesia, with the BSAC 
‘enjoining the administration to give them every assistance’.127   
Records indicate that, for the building of the railway from Livingstone through 
to Broken Hill and on to Sakania in the Congo Free State, labour was recruited 
from all over Northern Rhodesia. Thus in the far east of the territory at Fort 
Jameson [Chipata] it was recorded that in early 1906 inhabitants of the district 
were working in the ‘Transvaal … [and] this year there is mine work in S. 
Rhodesia and in North Western Rhodesia and work on the Railway all under 
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proper agreements’.128 In the middle of the territory, Chief Mwansakombe visited 
the Fort Rosebery [Mansa] Boma in early 1906 to report that, ‘many of his 
people [were] away at Railway & Kambovi [mine]’.129 The station’s District 
Notebook recorded: 
1905/6 was a more busy year. The Tanganyika Concession Co. Still recruited for loads and 
work at Kambovi. They engaged all together at Madona 10500 men of whom 4000 were 
Luapula District Natives the balance coming from the Awemba and Mweru Dists. There 
were nearly 700 registered here for Railway work and 148 for the Northern Copper Co. at 
Broken Hill. 130 
The demand for labour was such that there was a fear on the part of missionaries 
working in Northeastern Rhodesia and the Nyasaland Protectorate that the BSAC 
would force people to work on a road connecting Isoka to the railroad. 
In addition, I hear they are going to commence a road 500 miles long south of Ikawa to 
connect with the Bulawayo-Tanganyika Railway for which alone they want 20,000 boys. 
Even this might not disturb the position, provided the question of forced labour was not 
introduced. It would seem to be the case, however, that they have a regular ‘cordon’ of 
officials stationed round the best labour districts who are compelling the natives to go to 
Karonga to carry loads for the B.S.A.Co. only – refusing to allow them to work for the 
corporation as they have hitherto been in the habit of doing. BSA Co’s Askari, stationed in 
the villages have been stated to have actually threatened to shoot if the natives refused to 
work for the B.S.A.Co.131 
As noted earlier, very little information is available on the individual labourers 
who built the railroad.132 However, at times unexpected finds can be made; under 
the headline, ‘Veteran of railways is destitute’, the Times of Zambia reported in 
October 1966: 
Mr. Jeke Mwanza Mutawishi, who helped on the construction of the Victoria Falls bridge in 
Livingstone from 1902 to 1905, and also worked on the Livingstone – Congo railway is now 
poverty stricken. Mr. Mutawishi, about 90, a Mutala from the Congo has been in Zambia 
since 1902.133 
People from the Tonga Plateau had been engaged in migrant labour to the mines 
and farms south of the Zambezi River prior to the arrival of the railway north of 
the river. Ken Vickery cited an informant who stated: 
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My father, went to Bulawayo with some friends before the railway came here. He stayed for 
six years; some friends, two or three years. He went because he wanted lubono [wealth or 
goods]. Because there were many Europeans there, a railway, many things to buy – clothes 
especially. He brought back blankets, clothing, and a little money.134 
The building of the railway expanded employment opportunities, both as railway 
workers and migrant labourers, for people on the Tonga Plateau. In addition as 
soon as the railway line had been established, communities living within 20 
kilometres of the railroad began growing crops to cater for the demand created.135  
Following the construction of the railway, the railway line required a standard 
amount of labourers who worked on the maintenance and repair of the track and 
everything associated with it.136 This amount of labour was never very large and 
remained stable through the years; but it was in terms of transporting labour that 
the railway had its greatest impact on the peoples of colonial Zambia.  
It was in another sphere of labour that the railway had a major impact, and that 
was in the harvesting of wood to fuel the trains. Initially the railway, as it 
progressed through southern Zambia, was fuelled by locally harvested wood. 
This condition continued until the coalmines at Wankie came into production.137 
Arriving in Northern Rhodesia in 1905 to take up a posting at Kalomo, E. 
Knowles Jordan, described travelling in a construction train from Livingstone: 
About six o’clock the train got up steam and we bundled our kit into a large truck loaded 
with iron sleepers and tried to make ourselves comfortable among the mail bags. … We 
spent most of our time beating out the sparks that fell on us in showers from the engine, 
which was stoked with logs of wood.138 
Theodore Williams, who took up a posting in Mwinilunga in 1913, described the 
effect of this relentless use of wood as fuel in a letter to his mother: ‘The trees are 
cleared for about 150 yards from the line most of the way as from Broken Hill to 
Elisabethville … [as] they burn wood fuel in the engine’.139 Agreement was 
reached between the BSAC, as the formal government of the territory, and its 
subsidiary companies that had been contracted to build the railroad, that all 
timber along the railway line was to be the property of the railway company.140 
Consequently, until the supply of Wankie coal came to be guaranteed a, ‘ruthless 
deforestation … was then being practised in order to keep the boilers going’.141 
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Photo 2.2 Railway Building near Broken  
 Hill, c. 1906, Carpenter Collection 
 Frank and Frances Carpenter  
 Collection (Library of Congress) 
 http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/200 
 1705561/ 
 
 
 
Linked to the deforestation that occurred for fuel, was the extensive 
deforestation that came to be carried out in the forests of southwestern Zambia 
for railway sleepers and cordwood from 1911 onwards.142 In 1915, saw mills 
situated in Livingstone won the contract for railway sleepers for the Beira and 
Mashonaland and Rhodesia Railways. This was a contract to provide sleepers for 
approximately 4,000 km of railway under the administration of the British South 
Africa Company.143 Not surprisingly Zambezi Sawmills Limited sawmills 
                                                 
142  Geof M. Calvert, Sitimela, A History of the Zambesi Saw Mills Logging Railway 1911-1972 
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70 
 
became ‘the territory’s first and, until after the Second World War, only 
secondary industry’.144 By the early 1920s, the sawmills had also acquired a 
contract for the nearly 16,000 km under the administration of South African 
Railways. By this stage the sawmills had established their own ever-extending 
railroad into the teak forests and employed 45 Europeans and 1500 Africans in 
1926.145 Evidence collected in the 1980s indicates that the Zambesi teak forests 
have failed to recover from this intensive logging and may never do so again.146 
 
 
Rhodesian Development147 
 
The Cape- to Cairo scheme, which owes its genesis to the Imperial forethought of Mr. Rhodes, 
aided by such whole-hearted and enthusiastic fellow thinkers as the late Mr. Beit and Sir 
Charles Metcalfe himself, is not merely a project for the drawing of a double line of steel rails 
from south to north through the African continent. The men who devised that great operation 
were business men, and, whilst the ultimate end is kept constantly in view, the main line 
construction remains in abeyance from time to time for the purpose of running branches to open 
up the mineral and agricultural wealth of the country through which it passes. The railway 
development of Rhodesia goes on side by side with the great trunk line, whose subsidiaries are 
pushing their ramifications in the North-Western territory wherever a mine or an industry gives 
evidence of being able to support them. And at times the main artery ceases to throb whilst its 
capillaries are being so extended. The administration, in fact, is connecting up the most valuable 
centres by constructing its system of railways to a number of objective-points, without for a 
moment losing sight of the central purpose of the undertaking. The main line of the Cape-to-
Cairo railway has now been completed as far as Broken Hill, and there for the nonce it will stop. 
The engineers, working loyally for the development of the splendid country comprised in North-
Western Rhodesia, have set up their next objective point at Bwona Macubwa, 110 miles north 
of Broken Hill, and close to the Congo Free State frontier; and a line is to be constructed to that 
place at once, opening up a most valuable area, extensively mineralised, well watered, and 
abundantly timbered. As Sir Charles Metcalfe pointed out to our representative, there is a 
copper mine at Kansanshi, … Kansanshi will probably become the next objective-point, and be 
coupled up by rail with Bwona Macubwa. 
The continued importance of carriers 
With the completion of the railroad bridge at Livingstone in 1906, substantial 
regions in southwestern Zambia came to be directly linked to the harbours of 
South Africa, yet in the absence of motor vehicles all goods had to be transported 
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by carriers, and any agricultural production at more than a days walk from the 
railway line was undercut by the cost of agricultural produce brought by the 
train. Bomas (administrative centres) established by the BSAC administration, in 
so far as they did not exist along the railway line, continued to be dependent on 
carriers to bring their produce and correspondence from the nearest point along 
the rail line.  
BSAC administrators developed detailed and complicated tables detailing 
rates of pay for labourers to and from the line of rail, making distinction between 
multiple employers, the provision of food, levels of delay, and so forth. In all, the 
extent of attention and level of detail displayed in developing standardised carrier 
rates indicates the dependence of the early administrators on carrier borne 
transport and their anxious desire to ensure that stable and mutually agreed upon 
working relations came to be established.148 
 
 
Wages: Carriers149 
Mumbwa to Broken Hill 
Carriers to and from Broken Hill receive the following rate. 
1. 3/6 per trip if loaded only one way. With food. 
2. 4/6 per trip if loaded both ways and working for two different employees. With food. 
3. Proceeding to and from Broken Hill with loads & employed with food by the same employer 
3d per day or 4/- per trip. 
If delayed at Broken Hill or Mumbwa for over 3 days with food, 2d per day extra. 
 
Other Stations 
3d per day with food. 
Signed F.C. Macaulay 1/8/1912 
 
 
A year after having sought to determine standardised carrier wages in Mumbwa 
for carriers, they were increased in 1913 when BSAC official, Mr. Coxhead, 
‘altered the rate of wages’ with carriers to receive 4d per day with food.150 Apart 
from carriers, who were to be paid per day at a rate of 4d per day, labourers were 
to be paid a minimum of 3d per day.151 In addition the following addendum was 
added: 
The following fixed prices for certain journeys have been used by myself. Their object is that 
where a carrier is energetic he shall not on this account get less money and on the other hand 
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where he is lazy he will not thereby get more. Where carriers are kept waiting at the terminus 
they must of course be paid for such.152 
With their continued dependence on carriers for all their needs, administrators 
were anxious to ensure that they were treated fairly and properly. Until the mass 
introduction of motor vehicles in the 1920s, carriers would remain the main 
source of transport in Northern Rhodesia, and would continue to be relatively 
well paid for their services. 
Conclusion 
The violent and brutal establishment of colonial rule in the territories surrounding 
Northern Rhodesia in the 1880s and 1890s effectively cut off the inhabitants of 
the territory from the carrier-borne long-distance trade. Chiefs and headmen, who 
had overseen the trade and thereby bound followers to themselves through the 
allocation and redistribution of trade goods, lost their authority and were 
powerless to prevent their erstwhile followers from moving elsewhere. In the 
early 1900s, as the copper mines of Katanga in southern Congo came to be 
developed, and an infrastructure, consisting of telegraph lines, railways, crushers, 
smelters, and towns, constructed to facilitate these mines, thousands upon 
thousands of people were able to find employment as workers, carriers, and 
porters. Interestingly, although a railway line was constructed to facilitate the 
mines, this did not have any further impact on transport elsewhere in the country 
beyond the railway line. The absence of any alternative form of transport ensured 
that carrier transport remained of central importance till the mass introduction of 
motor vehicles that could operate independently of the railway line in the 1920s. 
Until then, carriers remained of central importance and could depend on a fair 
wage.  
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3 
World War One 
Introduction 
At the start of World War One, the bulk of the population in Northern Rhodesia 
lived their daily lives well beyond the ambit, let alone control, of the minimal 
BSAC administration that in terms of international law was formally in charge of 
the territory. At the end of the war there was not a district in the territory that had 
not been affected by the war, and the bulk of the population was subject to the 
wish, whim, and control of the colonial administration.  The following chapter 
looks at the manner in which during the course of the war the colonial 
administration successfully extended and exerted its authority over the 
population of Northern Rhodesia. The chapter argues that, in the course of the 
war, in what was initially a mutually symbiotic relationship, the colonial 
administration relied upon and worked through African chiefs and headmen in 
the territory to fulfil the labour and food needs of the British military forces 
operating in Central and East Africa. Desperate for labour and food, the colonial 
administration rewarded chiefs and headmen in cash, support, and kind for food 
and labour supplied. In this manner the colonial administration bound African 
chiefs and headmen to the authority and support of the Empire and ensured their 
ever-increasing dependence.  
The coming of war 
In August 1914, through a mindless succession of misunderstandings, bluffs, 
counterbluffs, jingoism, and the seeming logic of a series of mutually binding 
treaties, the world plunged into war.1 That the war, triggered by the assassination 
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of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo, had a direct and long-lasting impact in 
Africa is overlooked by most.2 The first and last shots of this war were to be fired 
in Africa, and ‘the first Allied occupation of enemy territory in the Great War’ 
was to take place in German South-West Africa, with troops operating out of 
Northern Rhodesia.3  
In the contemporary world, mention of World War One evokes images of the 
blood-soaked trenches of the Somme and the waving scarlet poppies of Flanders’ 
fields that will be forever England. Only a few historians and enthusiastic war 
gamers will recall the name of Paul Lettow-Vorbeck and the Great War that was 
fought out in East and Central Africa and continued on in Northern Rhodesia 
until after the guns had fallen silent on the Western Front. To all intents and 
purposes, World War One is taught as a European event. To be sure, after a few 
moments of thought, and when pressed, historians will note that in 1917 the 
Americans pitched in – thereby ensuring that the line manned by mutinying 
French soldiers held. English historians will recall the emergence of another in 
the long line of tragic English heroes, Lawrence of Arabia. Historians of China 
will recall the taking of Tsing Dao by elements of the Japanese Navy. Historians 
of international relations will recall the war as leading to the establishment of the 
League of Nations and the mandated territories that resulted from the dissolution 
of the Ottoman Empire and the German Empire. It was, after all, a World War. 
However, very few will consider the war as it was fought out in Africa; yet in 
that continent – as in the rest of the world – the effects of the war continue to 
play out in the present.4 
Although news of the outbreak of the war reached some parts of Northern 
Rhodesia within hours of the formal declaration in Europe, other regions of the 
territory were left totally in the dark until carriers brought in post bearing the 
news. Within hours the German station at Schuckmannsburg (Eastern Caprivi, 
German South-West Africa), which was reliant on the telegraph office of the 
BSAC at Livingstone, was occupied by Rhodesian Troops operating out of 
Livingstone, guided by the cattle trader Harry Susman, thus becoming ‘the first 
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Allied occupation of enemy territory in the Great War’.5 At the same time, 
Assistant Native Commissioner Theodore Williams stationed in Mwinilunga in 
northwestern Northern Rhodesia, had to wait nearly a full month until the 2nd of 
September 1914 before he and his district received formal notification of the 
outbreak of war.6 Williams, infused with the jingoism of naivety, immediately 
applied for leave to be allowed to enlist.7 Symptomatic of the schizophrenic 
nature of colonial rule, initial formal BSAC policy was not to inform the African 
population of what had taken place, choosing instead to portray the war as a 
‘white man’s affair’: 
I am directed to inform you that war has broken out between England and Germany. You are 
not in a position to be much disturbed, but your station should not be left unoccupied. 
Natives need not be informed as yet.8 
Williams would shortly come to be directly involved in the war and subsequently 
relieved of his jingoistic naivety, whilst his subjects in Mwinilunga would also 
come to be directly involved in the war in ways which could not have been 
envisaged by themselves, let alone the BSAC administration and Williams. 
World War One had devastating consequences for the inhabitants of East and 
Central Africa.9 For no less than four years competing armies were to move 
through and disrupt the societies and communities of the region. Writing of the 
war as it was fought out in southeastern German East Africa (GEA), one 
historian noted: 
The many war memoirs from both sides … sometimes give the impression that the war was 
fought in an empty country. The fact that there were people in the country from whom 
‘requisitioned’ foodstuffs and porters were taken, and who had to survive in the midst of the 
fighting, is treated as an embarrassment best ignored. The two armies’ demand for food and 
labour put more stress on local societies than the fighting itself.10 
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The societies of what are now the states of Ruanda, Burundi, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Malawi, Kenya, Congo, and Mozambique were ravaged by warfare as 
the competing armies criss-crossed the region.11 Throughout the war, rival armies 
dragooned men into military service, and conscripted hundreds of thousands of 
men and women as porters, tenga tenga. In addition, tremendous demands and 
strains were placed upon the ability of communities to make available food 
supplies for the armies. Indeed, so harsh were these demands that by 1917 there 
were districts in northern colonial Zambia that were devoid of people and 
denuded of all agricultural produce.12 How many people died as a direct result of 
the war in East and Central Africa has not been calculated or estimated, but that it 
should lie in the hundreds of thousands is beyond dispute.13  
The war in Northeastern Rhodesia  
Although British forces may have overrun Schuckmannsburg within hours of war 
being declared, it was another matter altogether along Northern Rhodesia’s far 
northeastern border with German East Africa; here it was the British forces that 
were precariously isolated. Within days of war being declared in Europe, German 
forces operating out of German East Africa attacked British positions at 
Abercorn and Fife in Northern Rhodesia and Karonga in Nyasaland. Since 
German forces in German East Africa were in direct communication with one 
another through an extensive network of telegraph and heliograph stations, they 
could and did rapidly transport troops and supplies via railways and steamers on 
Lakes Tanganyika and Malawi.14 British forces in Northern Rhodesia, on the 
other hand, were operating without telegraphic communication at a distance of no 
less than 1500 km from Livingstone, the administrative centre of the colony, and 
at a distance of 1000 km from Broken Hill (Kabwe), the nearest line of rail that 
could be used by the British.  
In August 1914, German forces operating out of Neu Langenberg (Tukuyu) 
were repulsed with serious losses at Karonga, Nyasaland (Malawi). Belgian 
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forces drawn from Katanga in southern Congo were deployed with forces under 
British command along the Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) border.15 In November 
1915, British forces massed on the southwestern frontier of German East Africa 
came under the command of General Northey.16  
At the same time, on the northern borders of German East Africa, British 
forces were placed under the overall command of General Jan Smuts. Operating 
out of Kenya in early 1916, forces under the command of the South African 
generals Smuts and Van Deventer sought to bring pressure to bear on Lettow-
Vorbeck from the North.17 These South African forces were of European descent, 
in contrast to the German forces facing them, yet their carriers were all Africans 
recruited throughout East Africa.18 The Feld Abteilung Field Company formed 
the basic unit of German forces in East Africa consisted of: 
15 to 20 European German officers and N.C.O.s with 200 trained African askari and two or 
more machine-guns. These companies were self-contained mobile units, each with its train 
of enlisted African carriers who were partially trained to bear arms. Such a company in the 
field would be accompanied by a force of irregulars (Rugaruga), armed with firearms or 
spears. The total ration strength might amount to normally about 400.19 
In the four years of war, the mass movements of the two opposing armies were 
guided by the principle that the most effective form of waging warfare was to 
engage in offensive activities, whereby the initiative could be seized from the 
opponent; ‘Northey, like von Lettow-Vorbeck, believed that offensive action 
alone secured defences’.20 However, in so doing, it was, as in all wars of the 
modern age, the civilian population that suffered the most. 
In May 1916, British forces operating out of Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland advanced into GEA. German forces withdrew ahead of them in the 
direction of Iringa. By late June, German forces had abandoned their regional 
bases in southwestern GEA, in some cases with massive loss of supplies; in 
Njombe British forces found about ten tons of wheat and three tons of maize.21 
Both armies sought to rob food from each other, or where that could not be done, 
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to destroy the enemy’s stores. In either case, it was the local producers of the 
food who were most likely to go hungry. By July 1916, Northey’s forces were 
disposed in two groups some 40 miles apart, around Njombe and Buhoro. They 
had cleared the Nyasaland and Rhodesian frontiers and occupied some 4000 
square miles of German territory thereby depriving the German forces of the 
major part of the Southern Highlands granary.22 It appeared that for the people of 
the Northern Rhodesia, that the worst of the war had come to an end, yet nothing 
could have been further from the truth, and the war would continue to impact 
directly on their lives in Northern Rhodesia.  
War and soldiers 
The strenuous nature of the war in GEA can be gathered from the fact that in 
January 1917 some 15,000 European troops were withdrawn and evacuated to 
South Africa. Commenting on conditions in Tanganyika, W.W. Campbell, a lorry 
driver with literary ambitions stated: 
Distressed and depressed beyond measure, we felt that death and ugliness lurked 
everywhere. It was in the air we breathed, the water we drank, the sun that warmed our 
bodies; it crawled on the ground, dropped heavily from rain-sodden trees, hung suspended in 
the humid, reeking atmosphere. Every living thing went in fear of its life, or turned upon 
another in self-preservation. Human life itself was an embodiment of ignorance and 
suspicion. It permeated our very souls, turned bright thoughts into dark, and made one long 
for the fate that he feared.23 
African soldiers also suffered terrible casualties, not so much on account of 
military action as on account of disease. Deserters, returnees, and those invalided 
out of service accelerated the spread of diseases in host communities into which 
they entered. A medical report drafted in 1917 for Kenya noted, with regard to 
the impact of servicemen: 
There is no doubt that the consequence of the military operations in the native reserves can 
only be likened to those produced by a disastrous epidemic of not a temporary character … It 
is indubitable that these men return to further scatter throughout the country the seeds of 
dysentery, tropical relapsing fevers and other protozoal diseases, bacillary diseases, 
helminthic affections, infections granulomata, skin diseases; and the less regarded mumps, 
chicken-pox, measles and influenza.24 
In 1918, when German forces invaded Northern Rhodesia, they inadvertently 
brought with them mutant strains of influenza that would become known as the 
Spanish Influenza. After the surrender of German forces, the carriers and soldiers 
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of both armies dispersed and returned to their home areas, thereby ensuring that 
the disease spread far and wide through the region.25 
Carriers 
Armies, it is well known, march on their stomachs, and it was primarily the 
incessant demands for food, and the labour to carry this food that devastated 
African societies. In 1957, Lettow Vorbeck, the officer commanding German 
forces, claimed that 2 million Africans had served in his army in some capacity, 
either as askari or as porters or as peasants growing food for the army.26 
Recruitment for service in colonial armies, either as soldiers or as carriers, was a 
very direct affair: ‘They used to chase people as if they were chasing chickens’.27 
A former German askari stated: ‘if they were short of soldiers they forced 
anyone they saw to join their forces’.28 Felicitas Becker, writing of carriers in the 
war in Tanzania, noted that porters ‘are a silent presence in … war memoirs’ 
although the ‘need for them is evident at every turn, … they are rarely 
mentioned’, instead ‘they were treated with the utmost disregard’.29 The fear that 
Africans had of German forces and of being forced into portage can be gauged 
from the comments of Dr Ludwig Deppe, who served with German forces 
throughout the campaign. Deppe noted that, although water was provided in 
accordance with German orders, the villages themselves ‘were almost all as if 
died out… people fear, with good reason, that they might be strung along on the 
“kamba” (rope) as involuntary porters’.30 
Porters, young men and women in the prime of their lives, were pressed into 
service as tenga tenga carriers, and made up the bulk of the armies moving 
through East Africa. The agricultural potential of eastern and central Africa was 
depressed as thousands of men and women were dragooned into service as 
porters or otherwise, and the land was stripped of it agricultural produce.31 The 
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work of Mel Page and others has brought to the fore the central role played by 
porters and detailed the enormous sacrifices incurred by these Africans in World 
War One in Africa.32 In August 1917, British command operating out of Kenya 
controlled 140,122 porters.33 The men of the Carrier Corps were believed to have 
died at the rate of 400 per month during part of the campaign.34 But, as Becker 
has noted, ‘the army on the march was forever hungry for porters to replace those 
who escaped, died, or fell ill. For many people … the choice was between the 
risk of forced portage and that of starvation in the forest’.35 Porters died due to a 
multitude of causes that ranged from being killed as a result of direct combat and 
untreated wounds, through to malnourishment and disease. Dr Horace R.A. Philp 
who served as government medical officer during the war and was a missionary 
CSM doctor in peace time, provided a stark picture of human destruction in 
Tanganyika and Kenya: 
Large numbers have died in base hospitals, on the roads and in the reserves after reaching 
home. Further, the men left for active service well and fit. Those repatriated have returned 
mostly physically unfit, bringing with them diseases innumerable.36 
The young men and women, who served as carriers and porters for the opposing 
armies, were withdrawn from their communities at a time when these were in 
desperate need of all the productive capacity that they could muster. The mass-
conscription of young people and the incessant requisition of foodstuffs would 
have major and long-lasting effects on the region. 
The recruitment of labour 
There was no forced labour, that was not thought of. There were not sufficient white men to 
spare in the country to supervise it, had such means of obtaining labour been possible.37 
Formally, if not in practice, native commissioners did not recruit labour; instead 
labour touts and later recruiting agencies, often working in conjunction with 
chiefs and headmen, sought to recruit labour. With the outbreak of war, native 
commissioners were ordered to become directly involved in the supply of labour 
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and foodstuffs that would make possible the carrier transport necessary for the 
war effort. As with the labour touts and recruiting agencies before them, native 
commissioners turned to the chiefs and headmen in an effort to fulfil the quota 
set for them by the administration and the military authorities. In so doing, and in 
a process that developed in the course of the war, the native commissioners 
fundamentally altered the relations of power that existed between chiefs and 
headmen, on the one hand, and the colonial administration, on the other, and thus 
the relations between the chiefs and headmen and the people who were subject to 
them.  From being thoroughly dependent on the goodwill and support of local 
authorities for the enforcement and implementation of their administrative 
wishes, the colonial authorities ended up with a situation where the war was 
essential to the successful maintenance and continuation of Zambia’s headmen 
and chiefs. Indeed, but for the war, a number of chiefs and headmen would not 
have existed, let alone risen to the positions of power which their co-operation 
with the colonial administration allowed for. 
In the years prior to the war, BSAC administrators had consistently sought to 
transform Zambia into something that was in keeping with their imagined ideal 
type. Native and district commissioners had, rather ineffectively, sought to 
enforce their worldview on all aspects of everyday life in Zambia.38 Under their 
command they had attempted to centralise and amalgamate villages, appoint and 
dismiss chiefs and headmen, enact and enforce the collection of taxes, prohibit 
forms of agriculture and hunting, order and regulate the building of roads and 
paths, and generally convert the economies, societies, landscapes, and ecological 
environment of Zambia into something that was in keeping with their 
modernising view of the world. The new found urgency, more particularly the 
availability of funds and the solid financial backing of the British crown in its 
desire to win the war, ensured that for the first time since its founding the 
colonial administrators of Northern Rhodesia were operating in a condition in 
which money was not an issue. In this newfound condition the native and district 
commissioners were able to fundamentally change their relationship with the 
chiefs and headmen of Zambia. 
Turn to chiefs 
As noted earlier, the BSAC administration was initially loath to tell the African 
population of the outbreak of war in Europe. Yet, circumstances on the ground, 
primarily the need for labour on the part of British forces, soon determined that 
BSAC administrators turned to the African population of Zambia with a plea for 
allegiance and support in the form of labour and food supplies. Through indabas, 
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BSAC administrators spoke to assembled chiefs and headmen throughout the 
territory and told them of the ‘white man’s war’, whilst at the same time 
demanding set quotas of labour and foodstuffs in support of the war effort.39 
In a process that was repeated all over Zambia, district commissioners, such as 
Mr H. Groad (D.C. Luwingu), met ‘all the chiefs’ and ‘explained to them the 
progress of the war in Europe in G.S.W.A. and on the Northern Border, and 
while congratulating them on the large supplies of food and labour they had 
provided, he impressed on them the necessity for further large frequent and 
regular supplies of labour’.40 Similarly in Mumbwa, Magistrate E.S.B. Tagart 
and District Commissioner J.F.A.  Speedy ‘pointed out that though the enemy 
had been conquered in their territory to the South of the Zambesi … they [the 
enemy] were still active upon our Northern Border in the neighbourhood of 
Abercorn and Fife … His Honour the Administrator therefore required that every 
able bodied man in the villages should give his personal service as a carrier and 
sign on’.41 In Mpika, Native Commissioner P.W.M. Jeff and Assistant Native 
Commissioner E.B.T. Ford met ‘the Chiefs of the Division’ at an indaba, where 
‘[i]t was explained that an unusually large number of carriers would be required 
this dry season; each chief was notified what number he would be expected to 
recruit each month in proportion to his population’.42 
Far from being the potentates and ultimate authorities imagined by many, the 
chiefs and headmen across Zambia did not have the immediate authority to force 
people into signing contracts as migrant labourers, Kings African Rifles (KAR) 
and Northern Rhodesia Police (NRP) recruits, or war carriers. Indeed, in some 
instances, when first approached to recruit labour for the war effort, chiefs sought 
to evade the issue. The response of assembled chiefs, in Mumbwa, amongst the 
Ila-speaking people, when told of the administration’s desire for war carriers, is 
indicative: 
For some time there was no response from the Chiefs eventually one or two began to point 
out that nearly all the young men were already at work: that they had no longer any control 
of their young men and could not make them turn out to work: that several had already gone 
and not yet returned others were afraid that they might be killed in the war and wanted to 
wait and see their friends come back safely and see what money they received.43 
In other areas, chiefs and headmen called for incentives. Thus Chief Serenje 
suggested that ‘all small headmen should receive subsidies’, whilst Chief 
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Chiwale ‘reminded the Visiting Commissioner of their request for permission to 
kill game’, and chiefs Nchimisi, Muchinka, and Mpumba asked for firearms with 
which to hunt. 44 These requests indicate how the supply of labour for the war 
effort was a process in which chiefs and headmen sought to bring pressure to 
bear upon the administration; in exchange for labour, they expected extensive 
rights and privileges to buttress their own positions.  
Chiefs and the high demand for labour 
The demand for labour and food supplies remained high throughout the war, with 
a particularly high demand in the run up to the invasion by British forces of GEA 
in late 1916. Consequently, throughout the war, BSAC administrators 
consistently thanked and reminded their subjects of the development of the war 
and the continued need for labour. The words and sentiments of Administrator 
Wallace, speaking to assembled chiefs at Serenje in July 1917, are emblematic of 
what was being said by the administration at the time: 
He told them that he was glad to see the good work that had been done by most of the people 
in connection with War Transport - Hoped that they would not be called on to help much 
longer – but in the next few months they must continue to do their best, & obey orders.45 
In the course of 1916 and 1917, across much of Zambia, the recruitment of 
labourers for the mines of Katanga by recruiting agents working for Robert 
Williams, or for the mines of and farms of Southern Rhodesia by recruiting 
agents of the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau, came to be suspended.46 In early 
1917, as the demand for labour for war purposes remained high, the 
administrator extended the ban on the recruitment of labour by the RNLB across 
much of Northern Rhodesia, and, in contrast to his later claims, admitted in 
writing that labour could no longer be recruited voluntarily in the territory. In his 
writing, Wallace underscored the central importance of the chiefs and headmen 
in the administration’s drive for labour, when he claimed: 
that very little pressure will be needed to induce the natives to make up their minds to do 
what the administration requires of them. The chiefs and headmen will help if we support 
them by punishing those men under them who disobey their orders. If the chiefs themselves 
made any objection we are not in a position to punish them for disobedience but I have little 
fear of this.47  
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Prior to this, BSAC administrators had already explicitly told chiefs and 
headmen that those who sought to supply the BSAC administration with food 
and labour could rely on their support and physical sanction: 
The Chiefs might all know that they would receive every assistance from the Boma, the 
messengers, and police if necessary in upholding their legitimate authority. Let them bring 
forward specific instances of disobedience and offenders would be swiftly punished.48 
In other words, the administration would continue to act through, and bolster the 
position of, those headmen and chiefs prepared to work with them. As such 
Zambian chiefs and headmen, in enforcing the wishes of the administration, in 
turn became dependent upon the support of the administration for their own 
position. 
The colonial administration needed the cooperation of chiefs and headmen in 
their drive to fulfil the needs of the war effort for food and carriers. Zambia’s 
chiefs and headmen were well aware of the desire for food and labour on the part 
of the administration, and, more importantly, they were aware of the dependency 
of the administration upon the chiefs and headmen to supply these scarce 
commodities. In the symbiotic relationship that developed, chiefs and headmen 
were willing to help the BSAC administration on condition that they as chiefs 
and headmen received direct assistance from the administration. Chief Mpeseni, 
of the Ngoni, spoke for many when he stated, ‘the chiefs would assist the 
Government …[and] would provide men for carriers, and for the Native police if 
needed’, with the proviso that, ‘we chiefs will help the Government, if you will 
help us to use our influence’.49 
Support and physical sanction 
Throughout the war, the administration, desperate for labour and food, acted to 
bolster the position of those chiefs and headmen prepared to assist the 
administration. In May 1918 Visiting Commissioner, Hugh C. Marshall, 
addressed a meeting of chiefs and headmen in the presence of magistrate P.E. 
Hall at Serenje, and explicitly threatened those who failed to fulfil the demands 
of the administration: 
Marshall, ‘spoke upon the War and the present position. The Administrator was aware that 
some headmen had done good work and that many men had engaged for military porter work 
outside the territory others had shirked this work when messengers had been sent to call 
them in. All the headmen must understand that War work is the most important of all, those 
who had deliberately disappeared to avoid carrier work would probably be punished, it is 
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very necessary that headmen should give the names of their people who disobey their orders 
in this connection’.50  
At the beginning of the war, when chiefs and headmen had initially been 
approached with a demand for labour and food, chiefs and headmen had 
underscored their own relative weakness and demanded that the BSAC 
administration actively support them. In the Mumbwa District, a native 
commissioner recorded in 1915 that in response to the administration’s call for 
labour, chiefs had ‘promised to do what they could, but said they would be 
powerless without messengers to assist them’.51  In the changed circumstances of 
war, the native commissioner noted that ‘they were told that messengers were 
going out the same day’. 52 
The desperate need for labour on the part of the administration led to the 
further centralisation and strengthening of the position of the chiefs and 
headmen, as the administration was forced to work through them in its drive for 
evermore labour. The noted historian of Zambia, Lewis Gann, noted how the 
BSAC extended its power and influence through appointing messengers ‘drawn 
from aristocratic local families’.53 Now as the demand for war carriers increased, 
administrators continued to appoint the sons of chiefs and headmen as 
messengers, thereby extending the power not only of themselves but also of the 
chiefs and headmen.54 In Mumbwa district chiefs and headmen who appeared to 
‘have some influence’ and had assisted the administration in the supply of war 
carriers, found their sons appointed as messengers.55 Conversely chiefs and 
headmen who did not support the BSAC in its drive for food and carriers could 
expect that action would be undertaken against them. Thus, in addressing chiefs 
and headmen at Fort Jameson in late 1915, the magistrate decried the ‘great 
unwillingness’ to supply labour, and claimed: 
In other districts where war loads were passing natives have had to turn out two or three 
times. The Awemba sometimes even six. Their women who unlike the Angoni, never do any 
tenga-tenga, have had to do so this year. You are considerably better off than in any other 
district in this respect. But remember that if it is necessary to do so the Government can 
make you do this work.56 
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Under the changed circumstances of war, the administration could and did 
threaten with violence those who failed to support them in their war effort. The 
magistrate’s words, spoken as they were in the district neighbouring Nyasaland, 
where earlier in the year John Chilembwe and his followers had been brutally 
massacred for failing to support the British, could not have been expressed more 
clearly.57 
Finance 
The indabas arranged by the administrators in their drive for war labour followed 
a set pattern in which the assembled chiefs and headmen were cajoled and 
berated, and then feted.58  In much the same way as they would have done when 
they were school prefects and sports captains, the BSAC officials consistently 
complained about the lack of support and the need for ever greater efforts, after 
which the chiefs and headmen would be praised for their efforts. An address by 
the magistrate in Fort Jameson, who had earlier alluded to the death of John 
Chilembwe, concluded, ‘I shall inform the Administrator of the assistance you 
have given in securing police recruits. He will be very pleased’. 59 However, in 
addition to words of praise and slaughtered cattle, the BSAC administration also 
provided direct monetary incentives to the chiefs and headmen who cooperated 
with it. Apart from payments paid directly to the people who brought in food or 
worked as carriers for the administration, chiefs and headmen asked for and 
expected extra payment from the BSAC administration in exchange for the 
provision of food and labour.60 For its part the administration provided and held 
out the promise of future rewards. Thus at an Indaba held in Mpika in April 
1915, chiefs were told to ‘select capitaos to recruit labour, who would receive 
presents later on, according to results’.61 Whilst at Chinsali assembled chiefs and 
headmen were told that, ‘Chiefs would be paid 1/- for every ten men they 
recruited’.62 Needless to say, the monies provided by the administration often did 
not meet up with the expectations of chiefs and headmen. Thus, whilst visiting 
Mkushi in 1917, Visiting Commissioner H.C. Marshall was told by chiefs and 
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headmen that, ‘they had nothing important to discuss but complained of the 
smallness of the subsidies they received’.63 
Often the promises of financial reward made in 1915 were not fulfilled. Even 
when by their own admission, it was clear to the colonial administrators involved 
that the chiefs and headmen had gone out of their way to assist in the war effort. 
At an indaba held at Fort Jameson on 4th August 1917, L.A. Wallace, the 
administrator of Northern Rhodesia, greeted the assembled chiefs and ‘first and 
foremost’ thanked them for having ‘attended to his words and … done 
everything that they were told to do in providing military porters’.64 In response, 
Chief Sagiri spoke and expressed his gratitude, but noted that the ‘the chiefs had 
done much good work for the Government and wanted their subsidies to be 
increased’.65 Wallace replied that ‘he was giving the matter of reward 
considerable attention’ as the chiefs and headmen had ‘done far more work’, but 
that he would decide at the end of the war.66  
Firearms 
Historians of Central Africa have repeatedly drawn attention to the central 
importance of firearms in the sociocultural history of the area.67 In his ground-
breaking work dealing with firearms in pre-colonial Zambia, Giacomo Macola 
has indicated how from the 1700s onwards firearms impacted, were appropriated, 
and used in radically different ways by the various polities of the territory. 
Chokwe and Yao raiders came to depend on firearms for their very existence, 
whilst Ngoni raiders, who had very specific ideas regarding masculine prowess 
and prestige, consciously refrained from using firearms in their raiding 
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activities.68 Far more than merely instruments to be used in warfare and hunting, 
firearms occupied a central role in religious and political ritual.69  
In the context of World War One and the BSAC administration’s incessant 
demand for labour and food, chiefs and headmen repeatedly and insistently asked 
for firearms, ammunition, powder, ignition caps, and shot in exchange for 
fulfilling the administrations demands. In response, the administration rather 
lamely sought to fob off the requests by claiming that the guns could not be given 
as they were all being used in the war. At Serenje, in May 1918, Visiting 
Commissioner H.C. Marshall replied in response to requests by chiefs Nchimisi, 
Muchinka, and Mpumba for firearms with which to hunt: 
There are no guns available they are all at the War, perhaps the Administrator may loan 
some guns after war.70 
A year previously, at a similar meeting in Mkushi, Marshall had used an identical 
argument when, in response to a request for breach loading rifles, he had told the 
chiefs and headmen ‘that all guns were at the war, but when the war was finished 
a certain number might be sent to Mkushi for them’.71  
Evasion 
Between 1914 and 1918, there was a continual demand for labour on the part of 
the BSAC administration; not surprisingly, some communities sought to escape 
being drafted into the war effort. The District Notebook for Mumbwa District 
provides a clear and detailed overview of the manner in which the administration 
struggled to recruit labour in the district, and how men of the district dispersed in 
an attempt to avoid detection and conscription. Thus when Magistrate E.S.B. 
Taggart toured the district in September 1915 in an effort to recruit labour for the 
war, he reported that at Lusengo ‘only women were seen at the village. All men 
were entirely said to be (untruly?) at work’.72 In other instances, chiefs and 
headmen engaged in passive resistance and through their behaviour made clear 
their opposition to the demands of the administration: 
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Kasonkomona … suffers from some enlargement of the testicles… gave the impression that 
he was a hopeless passive resister of the old school. He could give no assistance with men 
for transport: his cattle were sick: his people paid no attention to him: he knew of no one 
whom he could nominate as a district messenger. 73 
Then again, there were chiefs who appear to have feigned senility: ‘Mukobeko is 
in his dotage’.74 Although Taggart did eventually manage to recruit 214 men for 
war transport work, he concludes his report as follows, ‘Practically no assistance 
was given by the Chiefs. Usually when asked they said all their men were away 
at work’.75 
The cool reception given to Taggart as magistrate of the district was no 
different for the young probationer, P.A.T. Simey, who toured the district 
between 2nd and 28th May 1916 in an effort to recruit war carriers. Simey 
summed up his tour with the following words: 
Recruiting of war carriers was met with no, or but little assistance from chiefs. Most villages 
being found deserted but for women & invalids & old men – Mono gave a little assistance 
and also Mwkapolive, but no attempt was made on their part to call in those who were hiding 
nearby.76 
Six months later, when Simey had been promoted to the position of Assistant 
Native Commissioner, and engaged from 14th to 30th September 1916 in another 
tour of the district in an attempt to recruit labour and collect taxes, he met with 
the same reaction: 
The collection of tax was a total failure ... This was due to the impossibility of attempting to 
combine tax collection with recruiting of war carriers. From every village the majority of 
men had fled leaving only the old men and invalids and the women behind. It was only by 
careful explanation of Gr. 8/1916 to various headmen of their duties under it that any men 
were recruited as carriers at all. The Chiefs gave no assistance, on the contrary they withheld 
information & concealed the whereabouts of their people in many cases. 77 
The frustration felt by Simey is palpable in the concluding words of his formal 
report in which he stated: ‘This habit of running away on the approach of an 
official should be put down most firmly, since it hampers him considerably on 
his tour by loss in time & lack of information’.78 That the conditions that had led 
to the frustration expressed by Simey did not end is illustrated by the words of 
Native Commissioner L.J. Tweedy, who toured the district from 3rd to 20th 
December 1916 and met with the same results: 
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on arrival to the villages situate [sic] on and near the Chilanga road. … I had the utmost 
difficulty in collecting anything at all the people having all run away and only invalids and 
old women remaining.79 
This process of running away or hiding at the approach of BSAC officials 
engaged in recruiting for the war was mirrored in other districts of the country, 
and reflected the reluctance of many to become involved in a war that was 
patently seen as not being there own. 
Appeals to the abstract 
One of the issues that requires more research is the more metaphysical issue of 
appeals to the abstract notions of patriotism, duty, and so forth, which were 
deployed by the British administrators as they sought to convince people to 
support the war effort and enlist as soldiers or carriers in support of the British. 
The correspondence and personal papers of British administrators are awash with 
patriotic sentiment in support of the war effort.80 But the extent to which the 
sentiments contained within these appeals were grasped and shared by African 
audiences is a matter for debate. What exactly did African audiences think of 
statements by administrators, which we now know to be only partly true? In 
Luwingu, to the north of the Bangweulu swamps in 1915, District Commissioner 
H. Groad, in addressing chiefs, claimed that: 
It was the custom of the English that in war every person did some work to further the 
common end, whether in the fighting line or in other spheres. It must be the same here and 
there must be no slacking.81 
Groad’s words, which appealed to sentiments instilled in the boarding schools of 
England and Natal, made sense within that paradigm, but what they meant in 
central Africa is another matter altogether.  
Similarly, when Magistrate E.S.B. Taggart and Native Commissioner J.F.A. 
Speedy addressed chiefs at Mumbwa and spoke of military operations on ‘our 
Northern Border in the neighbourhood of Abercorn and Fife’, which required the 
mass recruitment of war carriers, what exactly did the assembled chiefs 
understand? Did these men, at more than 1200 kilometres distance from, 
‘Abercorn and Fife’, know of these settlements, let alone that they utilised or 
comprehended the concept of ‘our Northern Border’?  Indeed, what did they 
think of the appeal that they ‘help to drive off the enemy and save their 
country’?82  Similarly, how did the African men react to being likened to women 
                                                 
79  NAZ, KTJ 3/1, Mumbwa District Note Book, vol. 1, p. 423. 
80  Indeed a reading of these papers makes it clear that the sentiments expressed by the actor Hugh 
Laurie as Lieutenant The Honourable George Colthurst St. Barleigh MC in the television series 
Black Adder Goes Forth are not particularly exaggerated. 
81  NAZ, KSZ 5/1, Luwingu District Note Book, p. 125-6, Meeting with chiefs, 11 September 1915. 
82  NAZ, KTJ 3/1, Mumbwa District Note Book, vol. 1, p. 366, Meeting of chiefs, 2 September 1915. 
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and children? In what can only be referred to as a patronising speech, Speedy and 
Taggart addressed their audience with a fantasy rendition of pre-colonial African 
practises and gave vent to their racist and sexist sentiments: 
When they themselves used to go out to war they often started with their women and 
children carrying food for them but never took them into the fight, why should the whiteman 
do otherwise with the carriers of their supplies? In any case it was no time to wait. A man 
with an enemy on his boundary did not wait until that enemy had reached the threshold of his 
house – if he was wise. It was essential that carriers turn out at once.83 
In addressing the chiefs, Taggart and Speedy further claimed that ‘there was not a 
chance of any of the men now asked for of hearing a shot fired – they would be 
paid and fed for their work as they always were, but this was no ordinary work, 
money was a secondary consideration, that they had to remember was that they 
were going to help the whitemen to keep the enemy out of the country and to 
save the property and lives of their own people’.84 Given the attrition rates that 
existed amongst frontline carriers, it is to be wondered if Taggart and Speedy 
ever came to rue their needlessly optimistic words.85 
Conclusion 
In exchange for labour and food, the colonial administration supported and 
rewarded African chiefs and headmen, and thereby extended its control over 
Northern Rhodesia. 
Anxious for carriers and food supplies, yet thinly spread across the territory, 
BSAC administrators needed to work through the chiefs and headmen, and were 
dependent on their support. In turn, in exchange for carriers and food supplies the 
BSAC administrators promised and undertook steps to support and increase the 
authority and influence of the chiefs and headmen of Zambia.86 A decade and a 
half prior to the formal introduction of indirect rule, BSAC administrators, 
operating under the pressures of wartime conditions, sought to administer the 
                                                 
83  NAZ, KTJ 3/1, Mumbwa District Note Book, vol. 1, p. 367, Meeting of chiefs, 2 September 1915. 
84  NAZ, KTJ 3/1, Mumbwa District Note Book, vol. 1, p. 367, Meeting of chiefs, 2 September 1915. 
Italics added. 
85  Gelfand, Northern Rhodesia, pp. 274-5 contains a detailed breakdown of war carrier deaths. 
86  These events in Zambia mirror exactly what Frederick Cooper has described with regard to Indirect 
Rule for other parts of Africa. Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, 
History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), p. 184: In discussing colonial rule, Cooper 
summed up the background to indirect rule; ‘colonial states, …, were thin: they needed the 
legitimacy and coercive capacity of local authority to collect taxes and round up labour, and they 
needed local knowledge’. To this end chiefs or ‘people whom colonial rulers [sometimes] mistakenly 
thought influential’ were appointed to carry out the day-to-day administration of ‘their’ people. 
Cooper aptly provided the following rider, ‘such people had to enforce colonial power – under threat 
of dismissal or worse – but they could not be pushed too far or they would become too discredited to 
serve the regime’. 
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territory and its African population through Zambia’s chiefs and headmen.87 In 
this ‘marriage of convenience’ African chiefs and headmen were able to extend 
and expand their influence and authority through the acquisition of all manner of 
material and immaterial provisions from the BSAC administration in exchange 
for labour and food supplies. Yet there was a flipside to this in that the colonial 
administration did not loose sight of its goal to extend and expand its authority 
across the territory.  Consistently the administration ensured that its labour 
recruitment, and the subsequent enhancement of the status of chiefs and 
headmen, was in keeping with its ultimate aims and objectives: to establish and 
consolidate its control over the territory.  
For four years during World War One, labour was recruited all across 
Northern Rhodesia, from Mwinilunga to Chipata, from Mumbwe to Serenje, and 
in all of these places across Zambia the BSAC was able to extend its influence. 
In a process that covered four years, Zambia’s chiefs and headmen supported and 
assisted the British war effort through the supply of labour and food stuffs; in 
exchange the chiefs were rewarded in a number of ways, as outlined above, 
ranging from financial incentive through to the supply of messengers and 
policemen that were used in enforcing the will of the chiefs on their subjects. 
Through their alliance with the colonial authorities, chiefs and headmen were 
once again able to centralise their power for the first time since the ending of the 
long-distance trade in the 1890s. However, although the chiefs were able to 
extend their control over their subjects, at the same time, the colonial state, by 
supporting and working through the chiefs, extended its control over the chiefs 
and their people across all of Zambia. 
 
                                                 
87  Exactly when Indirect Rule was introduced to Zambia is a matter for debate: Fields, Revival and 
Rebellion, p. 32, fn. 7; Roberts, History of Zambia, p. 202. 
  
4 
War, the limits of technology, 
the application of human labour,  
and the extension of colonial rule 
Introduction 
The African continent has often been the site chosen for deployment of the very 
cutting edge of western technology, and nowhere has this been more so than in 
the context of war. From French Nuclear testing in the 1960s, Italian airborne gas 
attacks in the 1930s, German concentration camps in the 1900s, and British 
massed musketry the 1890s, Africa has borne the brunt of European hubris. 
However, as equally important as the effective and efficient killing of enemies in 
war, are the issues of transport and communication in war, and this, as we have 
seen, was particularly true in the context of World War One in Northern 
Rhodesia. This chapter details how, in an effort to overcome the limitations of 
human-borne transport, the very cutting edge of imperial industrial technology 
was introduced into central Africa. Unfortunately for the British, the technology 
introduced failed to reduce the demand for labour, and in one specific instance 
can be seen to have increased the demand for labour for transport purposes.  
The frontline on the border between Northern Rhodesia and German East 
Africa provided enormous logistical difficulties for British forces. No less than 
1000 kilometres from the nearest railhead at Broken Hill, the frontline could only 
be reached on foot through tsetse-fly infested country where draft animals could 
not be used as they would be killed through infection with trypanosiamiasis. In 
addition, no roads suitable for wheeled transport had been built. This meant that, 
in the first instance, British forces were totally reliant on carriers for their 
transport needs. From late 1915 onwards, British forces were commanded by 
Major-General Sir Edward Northey, whose first and most pressing problems of 
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command related to transport.1 Taking up his command, Northey travelled by rail 
to Livingstone and: 
… spent three days interviewing many old Colonials who knew the Frontier well, and 
discussing and arranging the very difficult question of supply and transport over the six 
hundred miles from the Rhodesian Railway to the North-Eastern Border.2  
Northey was informed that ‘in this country, except on a few bits of road south of 
the Frontier, all transport had to be done by Carriers, who consume as much as 
they carry in one month’.3 Administrator Wallace, who had sought to ensure the 
effective supply of goods and materials to the front by carriers, worked out the 
capacity per distance of carriers: 
The average rate of travel for carriers, … is about 15 miles per day. The net load carried is 
60lbs to which has to be added cooking pots blanket etc. Their rations are 2½  lbs of meal 
per day. A carrier would therefore eat the full weight of his load in 24 days, that is on a 12 
days journey outward (180 miles) and 12 days return.4 
Clearly, the transporting of goods to the front 600 miles away could not be 
effectively done by carriers. Indeed, Wallace calculated that, should he wish to 
ensure the supply of 1 ton per day at the front 600 miles from the railhead, he 
would need no less than 71,000 carriers.5 At the time there was a taxable 
population of approximately 120,000 in Northern Rhodesia of which 
approximately 80,000 could be recruited. However, ‘it was found that[,] if more 
than one third of these away at a time[,] cultivation suffered, with a consequent 
loss of the food we so much wanted’.6  
Anxious to find a solution to these pressing problems, the colonial 
administrators put their faith in technological innovations. However, in the short 
term, the technology that appeared to hold so much promise could only function 
with the application of substantial amounts of African labour, and was, 
economically speaking, far more expensive and inefficient than the labour power 
that it had sought to replace. In the end, petrol-driven motorcars and steam-driven 
traction engines, although they may have stood at the very forefront of imperial 
industrial technology, failed in the context of war in Northern Rhodesia between 
1914 and 1918. Yet, although imperial industrial technology failed, at the same 
                                                 
1  For further information on Northey, see G.W. Hatchell, O.B.E., ‘The British Occupation of the 
South-Western Area of Tanganyika Territory, 1914-1918’. In: Tanganyika Notes and Records, 1958, 
Number 51, pp. 131-155. 
2  NA, WO 95/5329, East Africa Brig Gen E. Northey’s War Diary, 4 Dec. 1915 – 8 Apr. 1916, 7 
January 1916. 
3  NA, WO 95/5329, East Africa Brig Gen E. Northey’s War Diary, 4 Dec. 1915 – 8 Apr. 1916, 7 
January 1916. 
4  NA, CAB 45/14, East Africa Campaign Great War: Accounts of activities on and around the 
Northern Rhodesia Border, folio 2. 
5  NA, CAB 45/14, East Africa Campaign Great War: Accounts of activities on and around the 
Northern Rhodesia Border, folio 3. 
6  NA, CAB 45/14, East Africa Campaign Great War: Accounts of activities on and around the 
Northern Rhodesia Border, folio 4. 
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time bold plans that used and controlled African labour in ways and scales never 
seen before proved to be successful and in the long-term contributed substantially 
to the increased control of the incipient colonial state in Northern Rhodesia. 
Nsumbu Island 
‘The Sub-district was formed as the outcome of the 
Luapula-Chambeshi water transport, which was started for 
war purposes in 1916’.7 
 
The effective supply of British forces on the frontline through the use of carriers 
soon reached the limit of what was possible. Faced with a logistical collapse and 
seeking to overcome the limits of carrier portage, British military officers 
actively sought alternatives and resorted to other and at times new forms of 
technology. One such form was the audacious attempt to transport goods from 
the railhead to the frontline by canoe in a landlocked country. After a few 
attempts a route was established that led from the railhead at Ndola, via the 
Luapula and Chambeshi Rivers through the Bangweulu swamps to a frontline 
depot near to Kasama. Eventually an estimated 12,000 people and 2000 canoes 
were registered and employed in the transport of goods along this route. 
However, before this could be done an effective route had to be found through 
8000 square kilometres of swamp. 
Attempting to illustrate the interconnected intricacies of the Chambeshi River, 
the Bangweulu Swamps, and the Luapula River, Frank Debenham, professor of 
geography at Cambridge University, resorted to a mischievous and slightly 
shocking yet effective image. To a reading public that had never visited Northern 
Rhodesia, let alone the Bangweulu swamps, Debenham asked his audience to 
imagine an enormous thick pile carpet that was stretched out on an inclined table 
of which three of the four legs were raised from the ground. The carpet’s thick 
pile had been shorn to different lengths and in different directions, leaving parts 
of the carpet almost bare, and others luxuriously thick. At the highest point of the 
table, a tap was fitted that allowed water to flow onto the carpet. As the water 
travelled to the lowest point it sought out the easiest way across the table top, 
flowing swiftly where the pile had been shorn in the direction of the flow, 
stagnating and piling up where its way was impeded by the pile, to eventually 
flow off the table at its lowest point. In this manner Debenham illustrated the 
way in which the Chambeshi River that rises in the northeast of Zambia flows 
                                                 
7  NAZ, KTA 4/1, Nsumbu Island District Note Book, folio 8. 
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southwestwards through a myriad of channels and swamps to eventually join the 
Luapula River on the Congo border.8 
Hopelessly lost, wracked by fever, and stubbornly keeping to his own course, 
David Livingstone died in an ill-fated attempt to cross the Bangweulu Swamps 
and reach the Luapula River, the headwaters of the Congo River in 1873.9 It was 
not until the advent of aerial photography and the Cambridge University 
expedition led by Professor Debenham between 1946 and 1949 that the 
Chambeshi, Bangweulu, Luapula river system would be ‘cartographically 
disciplined’, surveyed, and mapped. Although enthusiastic colonial officials 
placed signposts at strategic places in the swamps in the 1950s, these soon 
disappeared, and travel through the flat, wet, green, and seemingly endless 
wetlands was once again only possible with the assistance and goodwill of the 
swamp’s local inhabitants.10 At the outbreak of war in 1914, the situation was no 
different: ‘it was impossible to go far into the swamps at all for one would 
quickly be lost without expert guides, and there were none willing to act as 
such’.11 Nonetheless, in 1911 oberleutnant Paul Graetz had bludgeoned, carried, 
and threatened his way through the Chambeshi River to Lake Bangweulu and on 
to the Luapula River where his boat ‘Sarotti’ had sunk at Kabunda.12 Thus, 
although colonial officials knew that the Chambeshi and the Luapula rivers must 
be connected, exactly how and where was not known to them.13 
Having served as a Native Commissioner and worked as a professional hunter 
and trader in the Bangweulu area, it was J.E. Hughes who suggested a route 
through the swamps in late 1915. However, when C.J. Josselin de Jong, who as 
Secretary for Agriculture in Northern Rhodesia had conducted surveys in the 
Bangweulu area and supported the establishment of a rubber factory on the 
Chambeshi River, had attempted to pass through the swamps, he was stranded on 
account of low water levels. Nevertheless, Hughes remained convinced that 
‘there must be a channel, [and] decided to make a trial to get through and see if it 
were possible to send transport in boats that way’.14 To this end, he ‘persuaded 
some of the swamp men to take him by canoe from the Chambezi to the 
                                                 
8  Frank Debenham, Study of an African Swamp, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1952), p. 
85. 
9  Frank Debenham, ‘New light on Livingstone’s last journey’, The Geographical Journal, vol. CXX, 
part I, March 1954, pp. 1-12 & C.H.J. Rawstorne, ‘Livingstone in the Luwingu District’, The 
Northern Rhodesia Journal, vol. II, no. 6, 1955, pp. 58-66. 
10  In September 2006 the author travelled into the swamps in the company of Father Mpundu. 
11  NA, CAB 45/14, ‘East Africa Campaign Great War: Accounts of activities on and around the 
Northern Rhodesia Border’, Manuscript of lecture given by Sir Laurence Wallace, folio 6. 
12  Paul Graetz, Im Motorboot quer durch Afrika – Teil 1 Vom Indischen Ozean zum Kongo, (Berlin: 
Verlag Gustav Braunbeck & Gutenberg, 1912). 
13  NA, CAB 45/14, ‘East Africa Campaign Great War: Accounts of activities on and around the 
Northern Rhodesia Border’, Manuscript of lecture given by Sir Laurence Wallace, folio 6. 
14  NA, CAB 45/14, ‘East Africa Campaign Great War: Accounts of activities on and around the 
Northern Rhodesia Border’, Manuscript of lecture given by Sir Laurence Wallace, folio 6. 
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Luapula’, and ‘after fourteen days in the canoes, with seldom even a nearly dry 
place to sleep on he emerged in the Luapula’.15 Hughes was persuaded that a 
‘direct useful canoe passage could be found … and forwarded a map illustrating 
certain proposals’.16 In addition Hughes offered to transport goods for the 
government in his own canoes and those chartered from inhabitants of the region. 
In the years prior to the war the colonial state had struggled to establish its 
authority across the wetlands, yet, given the nature of swamps the world round, it 
had been comparatively easy for the area’s inhabitants to withdraw and escape 
from the unwanted attentions of authorities.17 Sir Laurence Aubrey Wallace, who 
was Administrator of Northern Rhodesia at the time, noted that the swamps were 
inhabited by a ‘tribe who practically lived in canoes’.  Established villages did 
not exist, although there were ‘groups of temporary shelters erected where solid 
land rose a few feet, or even a few inches, above the swamp’.18 These people, 
who were referred to as Watwa,19 kept almost entirely to the swamps, where they 
were primarily engaged in fishing and the trapping of game, which they 
exchanged for flour and other commodities with people living beyond the 
swamps. Although they spoke a dialect that was mutually intelligible to 
Chibemba speakers, Swedish traveller Rosen wrote that neighbouring groups of 
people ‘look down upon the Batwa as inferior beings, like to imitate their bass 
tones, just as they make fun of them in other ways. For example, they say that 
they have webbed feet’.20 Sir Laurence described the difficulties the 
administration had in attempting to gain some measure of control over the 
Watwa, noting that they kept strictly aloof, ‘they paid no tax or tribute to 
anyone’, and prior to 1919 no tax was paid by inhabitants of the area. 
Furthermore, ‘it was seldom that they were seen by Europeans, and when seen 
near the edge of the swamps they quickly disappeared in their canoes, and amidst 
all the intricacies of the innumerable small channels it was impossible to follow 
them’.21 Travelling through the swamps in 1914, Swedish traveller Eric von 
Rosen provided a description of a Watwa settlement on an island of at most 20 
                                                 
15  NA, CAB 45/14, ‘East Africa Campaign Great War: Accounts of activities on and around the 
Northern Rhodesia Border’, Manuscript of lecture given by Sir Laurence Wallace, folio 6. 
16  H.C. Marshall and Gordon Lobb, ‘Water transport in the Bangweulu swamps’, The Northern 
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metres in diameter. Von Rosen noted that both Hughes ‘the otter hunter’ and 
Captain Harrington (D.C. Fort Rosbery) had ‘laid especial stress on the fact that 
if a Batwaman should see that I or any of my people bore arms, we should never 
he able to get near them’.22 
The Hughes proposal, apart from enabling a constant and steady re-supply of 
the frontline, thus had the added advantage of bringing the inhabitants of the 
Bangweulu into the ambit of the colonial state. The proposal consequently came 
to be supported by the military and administrative authorities. Visiting 
Commissioner H.C. Marshall, writing in 1917, commented: 
It was realised that if the route proved satisfactory as a means of getting forward a large 
tonnage of stores, the lake inhabitants (who for many years had shown considerable 
independence and very little desire to move away from their homes on the water and engage 
in any kind of work) could be offered employment on a large scale agreeable to themselves 
and of great service to us.23 
Although hunting and gathering was not necessarily considered by colonial 
administrators to be ‘work’, the fact remained that they would come to depend 
upon the Watwa for the successful transport of the colonial state’s war materials. 
In January 1916, contracts were signed with Hughes, and a trial shipment of 
about ten tons consisting primarily of biscuits was dispatched from the railhead 
at Ndola to the frontline stores at Kasama.24 Within 15 ten-hour working days all 
the canoes of the small flotilla owned by Hughes ‘arrived safely through the 
marsh and passed up the Chambezi and took one of its tributaries to within 30 
miles of Kasama, the main food depot’ south of the front.25 Hughes had 
successfully made the journey and showed the feasibility of the water route 
through the swamps.26  
Following on the news of Hughes’ success, Administrator Wallace 
commented, ‘we thus had a new route and a new and less wasteful method of 
transport’.27 A mode of transport that, as with the carrier portage that continued 
to operate in parallel to this waterborne route, provided employment for tens of 
thousands of young men from all over Northern Rhodesia.  Specifically, from the 
railhead at Ndola, the waterborne route consisted of the following three stages: i) 
70 miles of carrier transport across the Congo Pedicle to Kabunda/Kapalala on 
the Luapula River, ii) 400 miles of canoe transport via the Luapula to the 
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23  Marshall & Lobb, ‘Water transport in the Bangweulu’, p. 191. 
24  NA, CAB 45/14, ‘East Africa Campaign Great War: Accounts of activities on and around the 
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Bangweulu swamps and on to the Lukulu River a tributary of the Chameshi 
River, and iii) 30 miles of carrier transport to Kasama.28 
The colonial administration used the railway line to drain and transport 
thousands of labourers from Western Zambia to Broken Hill (Kabwe) and Ndola 
from where they were then deployed to work as carriers. Colonial officials who 
had worked in the western districts were employed to recruit labour for the war 
effort as carriers. The first loads to be transported from Ndola to 
Kabunda/Kapalala were carried by a ‘large numbers of Barotse natives [who] 
were brought by Mr. Venning [founder of the Boma in Balovale]29 ‘from 
Kalomo and there entrained for Ndola’.30 These labourers were issued with 
‘food, salt and meat (when procurable) … and they received pay at the average 
rate of 4s. per trip [Ndola to Kabunda about 100 Kilometres]’.31 
Situated on the Luapula and with thousands of carriers and innumerable loads 
passing to and fro, Kabunda soon developed into a settlement of great 
importance.32 On the route from Ndola to Kabunda a staggering 6000 carriers 
from the northwest of the territory were used as porters. Writing after the war, 
Administrator Wallace noted that ‘over this route, during the latter part of 1916 
and in 1917, 2500 tons were transported’.33 Sergeant ‘Kabunda’ Clarke oversaw 
the despatch of loads from Kabunda and stayed on after the war to trade, 
becoming ‘Kapalala’ Clarke.34 The road from Ndola to Kabunda/Kapalala 
remained the colonial administration’s ‘main line of communication with the 
Mweru-Luapula district’ in the aftermath of the war.35   
Following on the success of Hughes’ venture, Native Commissioner Luwingu 
E.H.B. Goodall was instructed to make a tour of the whole water system by 
canoe and to organise the supply of canoes and paddlers.36 In early 1916 
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Wallace, as administrator for Northern Rhodesia, reported on the success of the 
venture to his superiors in London, with the following words: 
For the forwarding of supplies to the North we have opened a new route from Ndola to the 
Luapula by carriers, thence by canoes up the Luapula, Bangweolo and the Chambeshi River 
to within a day of Kasama. The first canoes have arrived at the rubber factory in fourteen 
days from their start on the Luapula … Mr. Goodall has come down that way and has 
brought 500 canoes with him capable of taking up between 3000 & 4000 loads which are 
being sent to the Luapula now, 1500 men from the Barotse District having arrived at Ndola 
for that purpose. Mr. Josselin de Jong went up by this route to see whether it was of any use. 
Mr. J.E. Hughes took him through and has now taken up the first loads. This will 
considerably ease the other routes and will be cheaper than transport by motor though it may 
not be a possible route in the driest season.37 
Goodall systematised the organisation and payment of the canoes and paddlers, 
and oversaw the development of the water routes to ensure ease of passage. This 
included the digging of a new channel cut between the Luapula River and Lake 
Chali.38 In August of 1916, Goodall selected the southeastern point of Nsumbu 
Island (a small island of about eight square kilometres) as his headquarters from 
which to organise the supply of canoes and paddlers, ‘being the most centrally 
and conveniently situated, at the or close to all the main canoe routes between the 
largest centres of population on the Lake and in the Swamps’.39 Two routes were 
developed through the swamps, depending on water levels.40 Once the system 
was up and running, goods were transported in 12 to 14 days from the railhead at 
Ndola via ‘Kapalala, on the Luapula, through the Bangweulu Swamps, up the 
Chambeshi to Chiwutuwutu [Kasama depot] on the Great North Road, for the 
troops then operating on the Tanganyika border’.41   
Goodall, based at Nsumbu Island, systematised and supervised the transport 
route through the numbering: ‘a numbered metal label nailed to each craft’, and 
registering of all craft.42 Canoes and paddlers were collected from all the river 
systems, and Goodall ‘soon had registered over 12,000 paddlers and 2,000 
canoes’.43 The canoes were hired for whatever period they were needed and the 
owners received hire payment at the rate of 6d. per load per trip. Paddlers were 
engaged for two complete journeys and received 6s. pay and 2s. food allowance 
per journey. An extra shilling was paid to those who completed the journey in 
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under one month.44 Canoes in need of repairs were dealt with at Kabunda, free of 
charge to owners.45 In this manner boats, ‘ranging from small ones of not more 
than 12 inches wide which with only one paddler carried 120 lbs, to large ones 
which with 5 or 6 paddlers would carry half a ton’46, transported nearly 70,000 
loads of an average 25 kilogram a piece between January 1916 and February 
1917.47 
Apart from a cast-iron stove that was sunk and not recovered following a 
hippo attack, most goods made it safely along the water route from Kabunda to 
Chiwutuwutu. The goods transported were described as consisting primarily of 
‘native food (grain purchased on the railway)’ with the balance made up of 
‘European rations, machine gun parts, safes, petrol, bicycles, police equipment, 
bales of blankets and calico, rice, salt, “comforts” for troops, etc.’48 Or as Gordon 
Lobb, the receiving agent at Lukulu depot put it when he betrayed his interests, 
‘Whisky, blankets, food of all sorts for white and native troops’.49 Not 
surprisingly there was a certain amount of theft, particularly ‘because the 
paddlers stole the mealie meal’, which they sought to hide by filling up the 
deficit with sand. But, as all goods were weighed before departure and re-
weighed upon delivery, with records of the weights being kept, a stop was soon 
put to this practice.50 
The astounding numbers of people directly employed in the water transport 
through the Bangweulu came to an end at the end of the war, and with that so too 
did the co-operation between the colonial administration and swamp dwellers. 
Writing in 1919 the District Commissioner for Nsumbu reported that, ‘trade at 
the various stores is very slack now that the “War water transport” has stopped’, 
in addition ‘most of the boys returning from the Congo get paid off at Fort 
Rosebery and the greater part of their deferred pay is spent there’.51 Whereas, in 
exchange for cash and food thousands of men had assisted the colonial 
administration in its war effort, people now withdrew from association with the 
administration and returned to making a living through bartering otter skins and 
dried fish, either for cash, or more often for grain and hoes. With misplaced 
optimism the D.C. believed that although ‘they have never been censussed’ and 
did not pay tax, it would be possible with effort ‘this year (1920) to write them 
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on the census’.52 In the following year, Nsumbu Island was abandoned, with the 
administrative offices being withdrawn northwards to Chilubi Island and the 
district as whole subsequently ceased to exist in 1923.53 
The effective withdrawal from the state by the inhabitants of the Bangweulu 
continued, and indeed it was only in the 1950s that the administration gained a 
modicum of control in the swamps. Stationed in the Bangweulu swamps in 
World War II, where he oversaw the export of fish stocks for the Copperbelt 
mines in motor-barges from the swamps along the Luapula River, colonial 
official Vernon Brelsford showed that the inhabitants of the swamps still retained 
their independence, when he wrote in 1945: 
He is suspicious, he still flies into the reeds at the sight of a Boma barge and in spite of the 
ease of money-getting [through fishing and otter trapping] he will not part with tax until it is 
dragged out of him.54 
However, during the course of its operation, the combined carrier and canoe 
route from the railhead at Ndola and the frontline beyond Kasama brought and 
bound together inhabitants from all over Northern Rhodesia. The thousands of 
Lozi men transported by train from Livingstone to Ndola, to carry goods to the 
Luapula, met and mingled with Lunda carriers from Mwinilunga, as well as the 
Batwa canoemen and other Bemba speakers who carried the goods on to the 
frontline. In effect, the many and varied transport routes of the war brought 
together the many and varied people of Northern Rhodesia for the first time in a 
common purpose, as determined and designed by the centralised authority of the 
colonial administration; in effect, it was in this process that the colonial entity of 
Northern Rhodesia was established and given actual form in the lived reality of 
its inhabitants. 
Motor transport 
Against the greatest of odds, thousands of people transported war supplies and 
food to the frontline, thereby enabling British forces to successfully engage with 
German forces in GEA. However, as the thousands of carriers swarmed across 
the countryside, the food resources for carriers became ever more depleted and 
the foraging evermore difficult. Administrator Wallace wrote in early 1916, that 
‘the distance from the railway here to the border is … [600 miles] so that if the 
carriers have to be fed from the point of starting, only one twenty-seventh part of 
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the original loads arrive at the border’.55 Much like swarms of locusts, the 
thousands of carriers swarmed across the landscape in a desperate search for 
food, and thereby devastated and reduced to famine much of Northeastern 
Rhodesia. In later years, Wallace, the erstwhile administrator of Northern 
Rhodesia, wrote that in 1915, in the first year of the war, 
the country had not been quite denuded of its share of food and we were able by carrier 
transport to keep the troops in supplies, but we had to prepare for heavier demands and 
motor transport seemed the only way out.56 
Anxious to be able to continue to wage the war, British authorities sought out 
other forms of transport that in the first instance did not appear to depend on 
extensive amounts of human labour. Thus, when General Northey assumed 
command of British forces operating out of Northern Rhodesia in late 1915, he 
sought to engineer a shift in supply from carriers to motor transport where 
possible: 
I am now arranging for carriers to enable mobile forces to get forward and for the making of 
roads for motor traffic for forward and lateral communication. 57 
Motor vehicles appeared to offer the solution to Northey’s wishes. Instead of a 
string of porters each carrying a maximum of 60 lbs on their shoulders for an 
absolute maximum of 15 miles a day, the Model T easily transported tenfold the 
amount of a porter and for far more than 15 miles a day.58  
In early 1916, when it was becoming apparent that ‘the stores of native foods 
may run short towards the end of the wet season’, a decision was taken ‘to make 
an attempt to use mechanical transport between Kashitu and Abercorn’.59 To this 
end, ‘a motor expert, Captain Duly … and Mr. C.W. Briggs, road engineer’ had 
been despatched to report upon the route and to ‘commence work upon the 
difficult sections’.60 Laurence Wallace, as administrator of Northern Rhodesia, 
remarked that ‘it is certain that our present means of transport are not sufficient 
for us to ensure supplies on the border’, and noted that it had been agreed ‘to 
push stores through from the railway by motor transport and authorised Major 
                                                 
55  NAZ, BS3, (A2/3/3), L.A. Wallace, Administrator, 3/2/16, to Governor of Nyasaland, Zomba. 
Underscore in the original. 
56  NA, CAB 45/14, ‘East Africa Campaign Great War: Accounts of activities on and around the 
Northern Rhodesia Border’. 
57  NA, WO 95/5329, East Africa Brig Gen E. Northey’s War Diary 4 Dec 1915 – 8 Apr 1916 
58  Stephen Rockel wrote to me in 1998 with the following: ‘I like the story told with astonishment by a 
colonial official in Tanganyika about porters and a lorry in the Kilimanjaro region. Some time in the 
late 1920s he recruited unwilling Chagga porters to go on tour with him, only to find that they all 
chipped in to hire a lorry to transport his loads. This made more economic sense to them – they 
could make more money if they stayed behind rather than wandering around the countryside for a 
pittance’. 
59  NAZ, BS3, (A2/3/3), Marshall, Visiting Commissioner, 22/1/16, to Secretary BSAC London. 
60  NAZ, BS3, (A2/3/3), Marshall, Visiting Commissioner, 22/1/16, to Secretary BSAC London. 
104 
 
Masterman to spend up to £10,000 on the purchase of motors’.61 The 
administration was under no illusion as to the costs of the endeavour, but realised 
that with the collapse of agricultural production in the northeast of the territory, 
motor transport could prove to be a partial solution: 
A good road and motor transport will considerably ease the transport troubles and will 
prevent disaster if the crops in the north are much below the average but the cost will be 
much higher than the cost by native carriers when these can be fed on the country through 
which they pass.62 
In the course of 1916 a road was cut and bridges built from the railhead at 
Broken Hill to two points on the border. Up to 17 motorcars were obtained via 
South Africa and converted into lorries able to carry 700 lbs plus a driver and his 
kit. The road was an earthen track, with exception of approximately 80 miles of 
sand where, ‘wheel tracks in the sand were filled with soft stone and the cars ran 
on two slightly sunken ribbons of Macadam thus formed’. 63  
However, even as they were planning for the establishment of the road and the 
motor-transport set-up, the authorities were aware of the fact that the demands 
for food on the border were in excess of what could be transported by the 17 
motor vehicles. Wallace estimated that ‘the amount of native food needed on the 
border is probably not less than three tons per day’, but that the ‘seventeen 
motors cannot be relied on between them to deliver more than one ton per day’.64 
Not surprisingly Wallace concluded, ‘many more motors will be needed if there 
should be a call for large quantities of supplies for troops, or more active 
operations’.65 In addition the cumulative financial costs of the operation could 
only be guessed at, and were clearly daunting for the Administrator: 
I do not think that the working costs can be estimated at less than 70£ per ton … to this the 
whole cost of the road and the motors will have to be added … I wish to emphasise (1) that 
the £10.000 authorised for the purchase of motors is only a portion of the first cost of the 
scheme, (2) that if some offensive be taken in the North or the strength of the forces be 
increased … we may be asked …to considerably increase the expenditure.66 
Anxious to defray costs, yet ensure that sufficient supplies reached the frontline, 
Wallace turned for help to his counterpart, the governor in Nyasaland. Wallace 
explained that the difficulty in maintaining a sufficient supply of food for the 
front was primarily due to the sparse population, which did not grow enough ‘to 
supply food for the stream of carriers passing through with other supplies for the 
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whole of the forces’.67 In addition, mechanical transport, from the railhead to the 
frontline, ‘was not possible at this time of year [rainy season]’. Consequently, 
Wallace admitted to his counterpart, ‘I had hoped that the much shorter route 
between Lake Nyasa and Fife … could be utilised as another line of supply to the 
troops at Fife’.68 Unfortunately for Wallace, his request was turned down when 
the governor of Nyasaland sent him the following rather dramatic telegram: 
You must abandon all hope of assistance from this side, local supplies insufficient for our 
own requirements, we are importing from outside and our means of transport most severely 
strained.69 
With support from Nyasaland being denied, and ever-greater shortages in food as 
the rainy season started coming to an end, further motorcars were ordered in a 
desperate attempt to get sufficient supplies to the frontline. However, even with 
extra motorcars, it was evident to the administration that it would not be possible 
to transport sufficient supplies to the frontline. Writing to the secretary of the 
BSAC, Administrator Wallace wrote: 
I hear from Colonel Masterman that he has asked Mr. Chaplin for authority to buy 10 more 
motor lorries and cars for the road Kashutu to Kasama, this will make a total of 26 cars with 
which he hopes to be able to deliver 2,000 lbs per day at Kasama. I estimated that three tons 
per day were needed and I am now informed that the amount required is nearer five tons per 
day. It is evident that if the motor transport had to be depended upon we should need a very 
large number of cars. The road will be a safeguard against failure but I hope that except for 
urgent stores we shall not have to use it much as the running costs alone cannot be less than 
£70 to £80 per ton.70 
Although it is evident that individual motor vehicles were able to transport more 
than carriers, the issues of cost and climate determined that the British had to 
continue to rely on carriers until the end of the war. That is, when all was said 
and done, using carriers was a cheaper and more effective way of ensuring that 
supplies reached the frontline than depending on motor vehicles. 
The motor vehicles used to transport goods to the frontline, transported no 
more than an estimated 5% of the total, and at costs that were far in excess of 
other forms of transport. Consequently, in a report written in August 1916, 
Administrator Wallace suggested that it would be the first form of transport to be 
discontinued.71 However, the speed with which motorcars could travel was not 
lost upon the administration. Touring the northern border by motorcar in August 
1916, Wallace reflected on the fate of his colleague, Mr Marshall, who had 
preceded him on the same journey on foot: 
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Travelling by motor I was back before him though he had started thirteen weeks before me. 
Altogether I was away three and a half weeks on a journey which under the old conditions 
would have occupied as many months.72 
None the less the costs involved, not only in the maintenance of the motor-
vehicles, but more particularly in maintaining a motorable road were such that 
Wallace suggested that: 
When it is known that there is to be no further urgent need for much transport this motor 
transport is the first that should be abandoned as its cost is extremely high and the percentage 
carried on it of the total transport is very small.73 
Once British forces had begun their full-scale invasion of German East Africa, 
and they had begun utilising food supplies available in GEA, the motor transport 
route in Northern Rhodesia was suspended. Administrator Wallace reported: 
The motor traffic on the road has been suspended, the most useful cars having been sent to 
General Northey in GEA; the rest (principally wrecks) are stored and being repaired at 
Kashitu. 
… 
As there is not much probability of the motor road being used again I have not felt 
justified in keeping a great number of men on its maintenance, …74 
Essentially, in terms of cost efficiency the introduction of the motor vehicle in 
Northern Rhodesia was far from a success, and there was initially nothing to 
indicate the later dominance of the motorcar and lorry in the territory’s transport 
sector. As long as thousands of carriers could be dragooned into carrying goods 
at monetary costs that lay substantially below those of motorised transport, the 
administration would continue to rely on human transport. The motorcar might 
well have been at the very forefront of cutting edge technology, but in terms of 
financial considerations cars were simply too expensive to justify their continued 
use. The continued reliance of the colonial administration on human labour, 
coupled with the specific conditions of war, meant that the administration was 
able to further extend its control over the people that lived in Northern Rhodesia.  
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Hot and bothered 
‘Secret it is intended to send two armed motor boats with 
personnel to Lake Tanganyika by rail from Cape Town to 
Elizabethville thence overland by lake Mwero to Mpweto’.75 
 
In 1915 the British Royal Navy transported two motorboats overland from Cape 
Town to the headwaters of the Congo River and on to Lake Tanganyika 4000 km 
to the North. These boats, part of the ‘Tanganyika Naval Expedition’ led by 
Commander Spicer Simson, destroyed German naval presence on Lake 
Tanganyika and provided the British with a welcome victory in the face of 
stalemated carnage on the Western Front, and humiliating defeat in Gallipoli. 
The Tanganyika Naval Expedition had all the makings of a Boys’ Own 
Adventure,76 and the expedition formed the basis for countless romanticised 
novels and films, the most famous of which being C.S. Forester’s The African 
Queen, which was later transformed into an award winning film starring 
Humphrey Bogart and Katherine Hepburn.77  
By and large contemporary portrayals of the Tanganyika Naval Expedition are 
based on The Phantom Flotilla by Peter Shankland, which served as the prime 
source for the subsequent portrayal of Spicer-Simson and the expedition, of 
which Giles Foden’s rendition in Mimi and Totou Go Forth is the most extreme 
and exotic. These stand in surprising contrast to more contemporary documents 
such as the National Geographic and Northern Rhodesia Journal, which contain 
reminiscences of contemporary participants in the expedition, and all the more so 
in contrast to the extremely efficient lieutenant commander presented in the 
pages of C.S. Forester’s The African Queen.78  
In all of these portrayals, romanticised or otherwise, the role of Africans other 
than as exotic extras has been ignored. Yet, but for these Africans, or more 
specifically African labour, the expedition would never have reached the 
headwaters of the Congo River let alone Lake Tanganyika. In what follows, the 
role is examined of African Labour in the context of the Tanganyika Naval 
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Expedition as it passed overland from the railhead in Fungurume to the 
headwaters of the Congo River on the Lualaba at Bukama. In contrast to much 
that has been written with regard to the expedition, this contribution will not deal 
with the actual naval engagements on Lake Tanganyika. Instead, it will focus on 
the role of African Labour in the context of World War One in Africa. 
World War One did not play out in a sociocultural void in Africa, in which 
people did not exist. Any historical understanding of the war requires that the 
central importance of African portage labour be recognised.79 This chapter, 
interested as it is in the role of Africans and their societies in central Africa at the 
time of the war, is interested in the socially embedded nature of the Tanganyika 
Naval Expedition, its traction engines, boats, and so forth. All of these 
magnificent products of industrial England were only able to move and operate 
in Africa because African societies enabled them to do so. Without African 
labour the boats would never have moved beyond Cape Town. However, the 
question that needs to be borne in mind is: how was African labour mobilised? 
To illustrate and argue the point made above, this sub-chapter provides a short 
description of the Tanganyika Naval Expedition, before moving on to an 
overview of the manner in which labour was recruited for the expedition. The 
sub-chapter emphasises that the expedition did not pass through a terra incognita, 
but that in historical terms the expedition moved through what had been the 
heartlands of the Garenganze polity established by Msiri. Furthermore, the 
expedition, far from operating at the ends of the earth, as it has often been 
portrayed, took place in the context of the Katangese Copperbelt: at that time the 
second most industrialised region of sub-Saharan Africa after the Witwatersrand 
in South Africa. 
Short description of the Tanganyika Naval Expedition 
Following the colonisation of German East Africa, the German authorities had 
established an extensive infrastructure that included direct rail links between the 
Indian Ocean and Lake Tanganyika, as well as steamboats and steamships on 
Lake Tanganyika. With the outbreak of war these vessels were readied for 
military action and put to immediate and deadly use. Within two weeks of the 
opening of hostilities in Europe, a German gunboat, the Hedwig von Wissmann, 
steamed across Lake Tanganyika and, through cannon fire, destroyed the Belgian 
steamer, Alexandre del Commune, the only ship that could have posed a threat to 
the German presence on the lake. The existence of a strong German naval 
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presence on Lake Tanganyika, and the consequent capacity of the Germans to 
rapidly transport and land troops anywhere along the lake’s shores, exposed the 
Belgian Congo and Northern Rhodesia to attacks. 
In April 1915, the admiralty received a letter from a hunter and labour 
recruiter in Northern Rhodesia, named Lee, who suggested a hare-brained plan to 
place British motorboats on Lake Tanganyika to tackle the German navy there. 
As was so often the case, Lee sought to emphasise the importance of his plan by 
drawing to the fore that most terrible of all colonial bogeys, an armed rebellion 
on the part of the ever-restless natives: 
I wish to point out that the trust to be placed in the loyalty of the Awembas in NR is still 
more of a risky and doubtful proposition, and the opinion is generally held by the old hands 
of N. Rhodesia that a general rising of the natives north of the Zambesi may take place at any 
moment unless these natives be duly impressed at the power of the Empire.80 
Although a civil servant scribbled a note on the file cover suggesting that the 
administrator of Northern Rhodesia would be ‘in the best position to advise as to 
the effect of such operations on the native mind’, it is probable that it was not so 
much the impact on the ‘native mind’ that played a role as it was seen as an 
opportunity to ‘tackle Jerry’.81 In the event, as the man on the spot, Lee was 
promoted from being a hunter on the outer reaches of the frontier of the British 
Empire to lieutenant commander in the Royal Navy. 
Plans were drawn up to transport two petrol-driven gunboats overland from 
Cape Town to Lake Tanganyika. In early July 1915, the expedition under the 
command of commander Spicer Simson arrived in Cape Town. Less than two 
weeks later the expedition arrived in Elizabethville in the Belgian Congo and 
detrained at Fungurume, the end of the railway line from Cape Town to the 
Katangese Copperbelt. Prior to the arrival of the expedition in Congo, 
Commander Lee, the man who had suggested the scheme, and Lieutenant Hope 
had been sent on ahead to reconnoitre a route for the expedition from Fungurume 
to Bukama. Apart from falling out with one another, Lee and Hope brought back 
conflicting reports as to the feasibility of the undertaking. Hope, who had 
contracted Italian labour contractors to build a road capable of carrying the 
expedition’s steam traction engines, trailers, and boats, returned reports to Spicer 
Simson, the commander of the expedition, that did not bode well for the 
expedition: 
Monsieur Frashoti … affirms that he would never try to bring a Traction engine over this 
route. He has been thirty years in this Katanga and cut the original carriers road we are 
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following. His advice is to depend on boys and oxen over the worst part, using tractions 
when possible.82  
Spicer Simson dismissed the claims of the Italians, writing in his report to the 
admiralty that Mr Barducci ‘is believed to be a German agent’.83  
Once the two steam traction engines detrained at Fungurume, they proved to be 
incapable of drawing both stores and boats at the same time. In addition, the 
cradles originally designed for the boats began breaking up. Thus the decision 
was taken to transfer the boats onto the goods trailers and to allow for the goods 
to be transported by porters.84 As Frank Magee, who accompanied Lee and 
Spicer Simson noted in his later report on the expedition: 
In the meantime stores were being sent ahead by native carriers, each boy [sic] carrying on 
his head a load weighing about 60 pounds. Provisions, ammunition, and petrol for the motor-
boats were all transported in this fashion, our string of native carriers extending in a single 
file for miles.85 
Through relying on literally hundreds of African porters and labourers, in the end 
the expedition succeeded. As Commander Spicer Simson noted in one of his 
monthly reports to the admiralty in London: 
As to the road itself, Mr. Lee, who suggested this road to their lordships in May last, 
informed them that the road was already in existence, and that it would only require to be 
widened, have some of the sharp curves eased, and that some of the bridges would have to be 
strengthened. 
The statement is misleading for the road, as it existed before my arrival, was nothing 
more than a cleared track not more than 6 feet wide. This track had been built some few 
years before, and as in all tropical countries is bound to occur it was rapidly becoming thick 
bush except for the narrow footpath used by the natives. I am informed that it is at least two 
years since any wheeled traffic passed over it. 
Further, the road was built with a view to economy, and therefore when a large tree was 
met with, or an ant heap, it was left standing and the road taken around it. The bridges which 
existed were only foot bridges, the ox-wagons being able to go up or down a gradient of 1 in 
1 and being able to ford a stream. Not one of the bridges could be utilised and nearly two 
hundred had to be built, some of course being only a few feet long, but others reaching as 
much as 100 feet. There were also many short sharp dips in the road of such formation that 
the boats, with their great length, would have rested across the two rises, thus bridging the 
dip. These dips had therefore to be filled up or a way found round them. In spite of the 
greatest care the sterns of the cradles have on one or two occasions touched the ground, and 
it has been necessary to dig a hollow to allow them to pass.86 
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In the event no less than 1000 labourers were recruited by the expedition for the 
overland route from the railway head at Fungurume to the railway head at 
Sankisia, which serviced the riverboat harbour on the Lualuba at Bukama.87 
Labour recruitment and transport of Spicer Simson 
Commander Lee, the erstwhile hunter who had dreamt up the scheme, made an 
initial contract with Mr Lock, ‘a Transport Contractor, to improve the road, 
supply labour and transport between Nguba and Sankisha’.88 Sub-Lieutenant 
Dudley had meanwhile arranged with Mr Davison, another transport contractor, 
to supply labour and to improve the road from the southern end. In the event, 
Lock eventually took over Davison’s contract, with Lock undertaking the road 
building and Davison ‘the bridging of streams and hollows’.89 The road was 
improved at the rate of about 4 miles (10km) per day.90 
Mr Lock, has apparently, had difficulty in obtaining labour. I gave him orders to put 300 
men on to the southern end of the road on or about 1st August. Up till now not a single man 
has appeared and Mr Davison has supplied me with 115 men with which labour the bad road 
has been built. 
Mr Lock’s contract, which was made by Lieutenant Commander Lees before my arrival, 
appears to me, now that I have got a little local knowledge, to be costing some €50 per diem 
more than is necessary, I shall therefore cancel his contract as soon as I can get into touch 
with him and will endeavour to come to a better arrangement with Mr. Davison, who is 
prepared to put 600 men on to the road at a week’s notice. 91 
The contracts that had originally been made with Lock and Davison were 
rescinded, but given the fact that new contracts became necessary for the portage 
of goods, neither Lock nor Davison lost out, as new contracts for portage were 
drawn up with the two labour recruiters. 92 It has been noted above that the earlier 
advice, based on the reports of two Italian labour contractors and submitted by 
Hope in August 1915, regarding the inappropriate nature of the traction engines 
in favour of porters and oxen, had been dismissed.93 Their comments turned out 
to be correct, and the struggle for the lucrative labour contracts began in earnest. 
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Barducci and Lock both claimed to have been approached and bound by contract 
to supply labour to the expedition. The Italian labour contractors Barducci and 
Frashoti had dealt with Lee prior to his departure from the Congo, and for his 
part Hope had continued these dealings. As Hope noted in his report the dealings 
between Lee and Barducci ‘were somewhat complicated, but took place prior to 
the signing of Lock’s contract in Bukama’.94 Lee received quotes of between 
1.80 and 2.00 francs per labourer per day from Barducci and, from Barducci’s 
sub-contractor Frashoti, 2.50 francs per labourer per day. Lee came to an 
agreement with Frashotti, with labourers starting to work on July 21st. In the 
ensuring conflict Barducci demanded that payment be made for no less than 460 
labourers. In addition Frashotti had recruited 340 labourers.95  
The detailed mile-by-mile day-by-day reports of Spicer Simson illustrate very 
clearly how difficult the passage from Fungurume to Sankisia actually was. More 
than once men and machines were put to the test, and although Simson littered 
his reports with reports on roads that had been re-cut or re-surfaced, in the end it 
was always African labourers who saved the day. Simson’s entry for 23 
September 1915 being one that was not out of the ordinary: 
Road still soft, but improving, and better progress made. Descended the last of the foot hills 
of the Plateau 150 natives carrying water between Kikoma and engines. Heavy thunderstorm 
on Plateau and foot hills in afternoon, but only light rain experienced by the Expedition. 
Camped at kikoma at about 5.30 p.m. at 4.9 miles. Captain Mouritzen of the Congo 
Hydrographic Service arrived from Bukama to consult with me as to the voyage down the 
Lualaba.96 
In the domain of shattered Msiri 
The labour recruited to the expedition laboured in what had been the heartland of 
the Garenganze kingdom of the Nyamwezi warlord Msiri prior to its destruction 
in 1891.97 Centred on the settlement of Bunkeya, which had housed around 
40,000 people in the 1880s, Msiri ‘ruled over a centralized state, roughly the size 
of Great Britain, which extended throughout much of the present Katanga 
province and the northern areas of Northern Rhodesia’.98 Msiri was killed in the 
infamous Stairs expedition of 1891, which had firmly brought Katanga and its 
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copper riches firmly within the ambit of King Leopold’s Congo Free State.99 The 
early exploration of the Congo and the establishment of the Congo Free State, at 
the behest of King Leopold II, by men such as Stanley and culminating in the 
Stairs expedition, predates the Red Rubber boom popularised by Adam 
Hochschild, and led to the disruption and destruction of African societies and the 
conscious re-orientation of the Congo Basin’s trade routes from the Indian to the 
Atlantic Ocean. As S.L. Hinde, a medical doctor who served as a mercenary in 
the Congo Free State, noted in his address to the Royal Geographical society: 
…the trade routes have been completely altered, and the traffic which used to follow the 
well-beaten track from Nyangwe and the Lualaba, across Tanganyika to Ujiji, or round the 
lake to Zanzibar, now goes down the Congo to Stanley Pool and the Atlantic.100  
This is the period of disruption and destruction that many saw, and which Joseph 
Conrad wrote about in his seminal work, Heart of Darkness, and that officers 
who served in Leopold’s mercenary army described in their reports to the Royal 
Geographical Society.101 The destruction of Msiri’s kingdom destabilised the 
region as a whole, disrupting the caravan routes that had not only supplied the 
interior of Africa with consumer products, but which had also provided 
substantial employment for populations in the area either in supplying food and 
service to the caravans, or in actually supplying portage labour. In the aftermath 
of the Stairs expedition, many people gathered at the mission established by the 
Plymouth Brethren Missionaries.102 By 1906, the copper mines of Katanga, 
which had initially attracted Msiri to the area, were being developed by mining 
magnates working within the aegis of the Congo Free State. Industrial mining 
began in earnest in 1908 when the first industrial copper smelter was opened at 
Kambove and began drawing in labour from the region and eventually from far 
beyond. 
Labour recruited in the context of mines and labour recruiters 
Labour was recruited in the context of mines and labour recruiters, a rough-and-
ready world in which hunter Lee, promoted to Commander Lee, took to 
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carousing in the mining town of Kambove.103 Much to Spicer Simson’s irritation, 
by the time the expedition reached the Congolese Copperbelt everybody 
appeared to have detailed knowledge of what was supposed to be a top-secret 
expedition. In the event, Lee’s apparent liking for alcohol and bravura got the 
better of him. In the mining town of Kambove, Lieutenant Commander Lee of 
the Royal Navy got decidedly drunk and ‘dressed a coloured man in his uniform 
and caroused around with him in the streets’.104 In his defence, Lee admitted that 
he had entered ‘one or two of the lowest grog shops in town’, as he was ‘looking 
for a man who has considerable local knowledge’.105 Nonetheless, having 
previously been found in a drunken state in the gardens of the vice governor 
general in Elizabethville, and in the light of further reports from Kambove, 
Spicer Simson let it be known that: 
Lieut. Commr. Lee is not a fit person to hold His Majesty’s Commission, though he has 
undoubtedly used his local knowledge for the advancement of His Majesty’s Service and has 
worked with energy and zeal for the Expedition under my command.106 
Following the dismissal of Lee, the following expedition member to be sacked was 
Lieutenant Hope, who had previously submitted the first damning reports on Lee to Spicer 
Simson.107 By the time Spicer Simson reached the Congo, Hope was found to be in a 
condition ‘bordering on breakdown’.108 Initially Hope had been instructed to ‘take charge of 
the road-building on the North side of the Manika Plateau’.109 The demands of an Italian 
sub-contractor for bottles of whiskey to replace the ones drunk by Hope appears to have been 
the final straw for Spicer Simson, who ordered Hope’s immediate return under arrest to 
Simonstown.110 
In the domain of intense industrialisation 
No less than 1000 men were directly employed as labourers by Davison, Lock, 
Barducci, and Frashotti in porting goods and constructing the road between 
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Fungurume and Sankisia across the Mitumba mountains. This is a considerable 
amount of labour, particularly when one considers the intense demand for labour 
emanating from the Katangese Copperbelt and the demands of war portage in the 
Belgian Congo, German East Africa, and Northern Rhodesia as a whole. This 
labour was recruited in an area that was bereft of labour yet hungered for it.  
Writing in the early 1960s, the historian Gann claimed that the introduction of 
the steam traction engine had led to a reduction in the reliance on African labour 
in Northern Rhodesia: ‘the steam engine in time did away with the need for slave 
porters’.111 However, although this may have been true in so far as transport was 
carried along the railway line, this, as this chapter has demonstrated with the case 
of the Tanganyika Naval Expedition, was a different matter altogether when 
dealing with steam traction engines, which were designed to run beyond the 
railway line. Writing of the rubber factory established on the Chambeshi River in 
1912, Eleanor Coffin noted: ‘It had become a white elephant, due to the war, as it 
took the traction engine, which provided the power, and three trucks, one year to 
get from Broken Hill to the site’.112 Another commentator, dealing with the same 
steam traction engines used in World War One noted: ‘The engine … is now a 
National Memorial and is here at Shiwa Ngandu’.113 Most damning of all was the 
War Office Buxton dispatch which noted, of the traction engines of the 
Tanganyika Naval Expedition, that ‘[w]ashing, and even drinking water, was 
voluntarily given up for use in the boilers of the traction engines in order that the 
progress of the Expedition should not be delayed’ and concluded that it had been 
‘sheer madness to attempt to take traction engines alone over it’.114 
In conclusion, the Tanganyika Naval Expedition was an event that took place 
within the rapidly industrializing context of the Katangese Copperbelt and not, as 
it is so often portrayed, in the context of primitive and exotic darkest Africa. The 
hundreds of porters and labourers who made the expedition possible were the 
forerunners of the industrial proletariat that would later be described by the 
anthropologists of the Rhodes Livingstone Institute. These were men – and 
women – who were directly involved in an industry that was truly global – all 
within a context, in which it is clear that labour and transport were inextricably 
linked and in which the global war initiated by European powers was only 
                                                 
111  Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 101. 
112  Eleanor Coffin, ‘A Dental Officer, W.F. Mackeown, in the 1914-18 War’, The Northern Rhodesia 
Journal, 1964, vol. V, no. 6, p. 599. 
113  Colonel E.M. Wilson, ‘The Kelsey Expedition and the Rubber factory’, The Northern Rhodesia 
Journal, 1964, vol. V, no. 1, p. 549. 
114  From the High Commissioner for South Africa to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, High 
Commissioner's Office, Cape Town, March 10th, 1917.  
http://www.naval-history.net/WW1NavyBritishLGDispatchesArmy1916-17.htm (Accessed 18 
August 2014). 
116 
 
possible in Africa through the direct employment, willing or otherwise, of 
Africans. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed and described how, in an effort to overcome the 
limitations in terms of distance and capacity associated with carrier-borne 
transport whilst attempting to conduct war in central and East Africa, the British 
military deployed waterborne transport, in the form of canoe flotillas, and forms 
of transport that stood at the very forefront of imperial industrial technology, in 
the form of steam-traction engines and petrol-driven motor vehicles. In the event, 
as the chapter has shown, the deployment of these forms of technology depended 
upon large amounts of African labour, and it is debatable whether the technology 
was as efficient, reliable, and useful as popular perception at the time would have 
had one believe. 
In popular perception and in much of the academic discourse emanating from 
the Global North throughout the past two hundred years, the African continent 
and its people have all too often been presented as the epitome of backwardness 
and underdevelopment. Interestingly, in this same period of time Africa was 
consistently the location where the cutting edge of technological developments, 
particularly in the field of armaments and communication, was deployed. The 
Maxim gun, rockets, telegraph, radio, and aeroplane, were all first deployed for 
the purposes of war in Africa. All too often this faith in the capabilities and 
capacities of these products of industrial technology did not live up to 
expectations. In effect, one can argue that this was a fetishisation of industrial 
technology on the part of British military planners. This fetishisation of industrial 
technology, in the face of its patent failure to deliver the envisaged savings in 
terms of labour, is clearly illustrated in this chapter by the British war planners 
who continued to rely on steam-traction engines and petrol-driven motor vehicles 
even when these examples of cutting edge imperial industrial technology could 
only function through the liberal application and extensive use of African labour. 
The continued, indeed, ever-increasing reliance upon African labour through the 
course of the war, although it showed up the myth of technological advantage, 
did have as its corollary that the British colonial administration gained an ever-
increasing level of control over labour and thus the population of Northern 
Rhodesia as the war progressed. 
  
5 
World War One and the  
establishment of colonial rule 
Introduction 
The main consequence of World War One in Northern Rhodesia was the 
establishment of effective colonial control and administration in the territory. 
Elsewhere it has been argued that the colonial state had been established prior to 
World War One, and that its existence was threatened by the consequences of 
that war.1 However, the establishment of structures on paper, as was the case in 
Northern Rhodesia prior to 1914, is not the same as establishing an effective 
administration, let alone actual control on the ground. An over reliance and 
ascription of reality to structures created and solely existing on paper between 
1890 and 1914, has led many to believe and argue that effective colonial rule had 
been established in Northern Rhodesia before 1914. Instead of focussing on 
ephemeral paper structures this book focusses on what happened on the ground 
and argues that the colonial state was truly established in Northern Rhodesia in 
the course of World War One, as a direct consequence of the insatiable demand 
for labour on the part of British armed forces during the war. For the first time in 
the history of the administration of Northern Rhodesia, limitless funding was 
made available to it by the War Office; funding which provided the 
administration with the means to purchase and retain the allegiance of Zambia’s 
chiefs and headmen, and through them the labour power of their subjects. It was 
through the outlay of capital and the promises of further rewards in kind and in 
cash in exchange for labour recruited through chiefs and headmen during World 
War One, that the BSAC administration purchased the support and dubious 
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allegiance of Zambia’s chiefs and headmen, and established effective colonial 
control in the territory. 
However, the mass recruitment of thousands upon thousands of carriers for the 
war effort depleted the countryside of able-bodied people and led to a collapse in 
food production. In addition to the demand for people for labour, the demand for 
food to feed this labour was high from the very beginning of the war. The 
incessant demands for food depleted already over-stretched food reserves, and 
the movement of thousands of ever-hungry carriers across the countryside finally 
completely destroyed all food reserves and devastated the landscape. To survive, 
Africans became dependent upon foodstuffs transported from the railway line, 
acquired in exchange for their labour power as carriers. In effect this set in 
motion a vicious circle in which people had to sell their labour and work in 
exchange for food, as a result of which they were of necessity away from their 
homes and thus unable to prepare the gardens and fields that could have ensured 
their continued self-sufficiency in food production. By 1918, the bulk of people 
living in Northern Rhodesia had become dependent on the colonial 
administration for their very existence. In exchange for labour they were paid in 
food, in kind, and in cash. This exchange of labour for food and reward was 
facilitated through the chiefs and headmen of colonial Zambia, who in this 
manner came to be evermore subject to the authority of an increasingly confident 
administration. 
In a process that developed between 1914 and 1918, the BSAC administration 
gained effective control over the territory that would eventually become known 
as Zambia. During the war, and in exchange for limitless funding made available 
by the War Office, the chiefs and headmen of Northern Rhodesia provided the 
colonial administration with the people and food, which permitted British forces 
to operate and conduct a sustained military campaign in central and east Africa. 
This chapter discusses and describes the manner in which, through the exchange 
of labour and food for rewards in cash and kind, the chiefs and headman of 
Zambia unwittingly allowed, enabled, and facilitated the establishment of 
effective colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia.  
Limitless funds 
With the outbreak of World War One and the prosecution of portions of the war 
in Northern Rhodesia, the BSAC administration for the very first time in its 
existence found itself in a position in which it had access to an almost unlimited 
budget, which it could draw upon to fund its plans. In April 1916, the BSAC 
board in London wrote to inform Administrator Wallace of the various lines of 
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command and authority in the war, but above all that he had a free hand in 
determining spending: 
… military operations are in hands of High Commissioner to whom Brigadier General 
A.H.M. Edwards and Northey [are] responsible and under whose authority they act. 
Consequently expenditure which they state necessary must be met. We must find the money 
in first instance and have no option but to meet the requirements promptly. Thus no necessity 
for you to refer their requirements to the board before complying though you should keep us 
punctually informed. Our cash position will not suffer since His Majesty’s Government 
making advances from time to time to re-imburse us without prejudice to question of 
ultimate liability.2 
Cash-strapped at the best of times, the administrator did not need to be told 
twice. Less than two months later Administrator Wallace, from Livingstone, 
wrote to the secretary of the BSAC, London, and promptly requested more 
funding: 
The cost of this [re-erecting a telegraph line] and the extra cost of accumulating food for the 
next rainy season will make my cash requirements somewhat greater than I originally 
anticipated.3 
As the war proceeded in east and central Africa, ever-greater demands would be 
placed upon the incipient administration, and ever greater would be the 
reimbursement of the administration for its efforts. Nonetheless, the greatest 
costs would be those borne by the people who, in the course of the war, would 
become ever more subject to the authority of the administration. 
The demand for labour 
From the beginning of the war, there was a large and seemingly insatiable 
demand for people and food on the part of British war planners in Northern 
Rhodesia: people for labour in the war effort and food to feed these people. A 
major consequence of the war was that people were away from their homes and 
villages, and thus from their gardens and fields. In the last year of the war, the 
magistrate of Serenje, P.E. Hall, stated that there were about ‘1,000 men from the 
District still at the front’, this in a district which, in the last year in which a tax 
census had been compiled in 1913, had listed a total male population of 4,674.4 
In other words, approximately 1 in 4 men from the Serenje District served as 
carriers in the war effort, yet this was not out of the ordinary. Recruitment for 
labour as carriers and soldiers was carried out throughout Northern Rhodesia, but 
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was particularly heavy in the northeastern district of the territory. It was reported 
from Lusengo village in the Mumbwa District that ‘[o]nly women were seen at 
the village. All men were (entirely?) said to be at work’.5 A full year after the 
war, BSAC probationer G.W.H. Bloomfield reported from the same district that 
nearly all the able bodied population were still absent from the villages he 
visited: 
Very few indeed of the able bodied population were met with at any one of the villages. 
Quite a number had gone to work at Lusaka & Salisbury & owing to the heavy calls for 
carriers about that time the remnant left behind was exceedingly small.6 
In addition to labour recruited within Northern Rhodesia for transport purposes 
within the territory, there were also those recruited as ‘first line transport for 
Mobile Column’ and soldiers. In other words, these are men who left Northern 
Rhodesia and served as soldiers and carriers on the frontline in German East 
Africa. In April of 1916, General Northey signalled his intention to engage ‘1000 
carriers for duration of [the] war’ to be employed as military porters, machine 
gun carriers, and ambulance carriers.7 The military authorities stationed in 
Salisbury stipulated that: 
It is imperative that first line transport carriers should be of good physique and not belong to 
timid races and on no account should their homes be near the Frontier.8 
Apart from being paid the same as police, these men, as first-line carriers, were 
each to receive a blanket as equipment.9 In addition to first-line carriers, requests 
for the recruitment of African soldiers for service in the King’s African Rifles 
(KAR) also had to be considered.10 In June of 1916, Administrator L.A. Wallace 
wrote to the BSAC company offices in London and noted that he had been 
approached by the Governor of Kenya Colony with a request ‘to allow recruiting 
in the Awemba District for the KAR’. Even though there was an already 
exceedingly high demand for carriers, Wallace noted that he had agreed against 
the wishes of the ‘Magistrate there who is heavily pressed to find men for 
transport’. If further recruiting were to take place, Wallace foresaw ‘a great 
difficulty in getting supplies forwarded from Kasama northwards if many men 
are taken away for other purposes’.11 Nonetheless, four months later a further 
request for KAR recruits was submitted by General Northey on behalf of General 
Smuts, who was in overall command of Imperial forces in East Africa.12 
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Touring through northeastern Zambia following the advance of the Imperial 
forces into German East Africa from Northern Rhodesia in May 1916, 
Administrator Wallace expressed his wonderment, given the demand for labour 
and food, at the continued ‘loyalty to the Government’ and suggested that this 
was ‘possibly to some extent [due] to the show of strength in European troops 
which they have for the first time seen’.13 In an almost bemused comment 
Wallace wrote: ‘they have been and are still being hard pressed to give their 
labour as carriers, but they are well paid and are generally willing, more almost 
than could have been expected’.14 
The incessant demand for people as labourers was not limited to northeastern 
Zambia, but also spread to western Zambia. As Richard Goode, secretary to the 
Administrator, wrote in August 1916: 
There is still a very heavy demand for carriers for the transport of supplies for troops on the 
border and in German territory. A thousand men are now urgently required to relieve the 
pressure in the Awemba District and effort is being made to recruit these in the Barotse and 
Kafue districts.15 
The ever present need for labour for war on the part of the administration led to 
the restriction of recruitment for mines in Congo, and mines and farms in 
Southern Rhodesia. The Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) and Robert 
Williams’s mining company were curtailed and eventually prohibited from 
recruiting labour for farmers in Southern Rhodesia and miners in southern Congo 
in mid-1916. Recruiting by R. Williams and RNLB for mines and farmers was 
stopped till 1919.16 
The demand for labour continued unabated following the British invasion of 
German East Africa. In early 1917, Administrator Wallace wrote to the BSAC 
board of directors in London and noted that he had been approached by the 
Governor of Nyasaland with a request for 500-1000 carriers per month for the 
coming six months. Wallace stated that it would only be possible to supply this 
labour from the East Luangwa District, which, although ‘the least sparsely 
populated’, was already supplying food and carriers for war transport to the 
North. Given that the total male population for this district was listed as being 
7200 in the tax census of 1907-08 (the last year listed before the war), the supply 
of up to 6000 men would have been well nigh impossible.17 To be able to fulfil 
the demands for labour for the war effort, Wallace decided that, ‘in order … to 
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obtain these carriers I have had to forbid any recruiting for Southern Rhodesia by 
the RNLB [Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau]’.18 In addition, and this in contrast 
to what had gone on before, the administrator admitted for the first time in 
writing that the continued recruitment would of necessity be of an involuntary 
nature. As he wrote: 
I shall do all that I possibly can to meet the Governor’s request and I think that the 500 to 
1000 carriers he needs per month will be obtained. That such a number could not be 
obtained voluntarily I am quite certain. 19 
Strictly speaking the men recruited as first-line carriers in Northern Rhodesia in 
April 1916 were recruited on the understanding that they ‘were on a six month 
agreement or for the duration of the war, whichever might be less’.20 The civilian 
administration had indeed sent men to relieve those in service, but, as the 
administrator admitted in correspondence with the Board of the BSAC, ‘there 
seems however to have been some unfortunate misunderstanding as to the terms 
of the carrier’s agreements, the military officers considering that the carriers were 
engaged till the end of the campaign and reliefs [sic] therefore were not 
necessary’. 21 Visiting Commissioner Marshall, in a report dealing with the 
40,732 first-line military porters enrolled in Northern Rhodesia for service with 
troops in German East Africa and Portuguese East Africa, wrote: 
Note this class of porter was engaged for a period of six months, but as many were drawn 
from villages far distant from the spot of attestation they were were in most cases absent 
from their homes for 9 or 10 months.22 
Not surprisingly carriers deserted, with terrible consequences for themselves if 
they were recaptured by the military. Wallace noted that ‘after being kept beyond 
the term of their agreements with no prospect of being relieved a number of men 
deserted, … the rest appear to have been paid off, though there are still 677 
unaccounted for’.23 That the war had taken its toll in terms of the manner in 
which labour came to be recruited and attitudes towards those recruited also 
came to be reflected in the language used by the colonial officials. Without the 
slightest malice, Administrator Wallace laconically noted in correspondence with 
his superiors in London in early 1917, following the invasion of German East 
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Africa, that, ‘to replace the carriers paid off, General Northey asked for 2,000 
men in November [1916], these were supplied with 300 more to replace sick, and 
50 per month are being sent to make up for wastage’.24 An unintended 
consequence of the incessant demand for labour meant that people were away 
from their homes and villages, away from their fields and gardens, and thus that 
there was a collapse in food production. 
The collapse in food production 
Writing to his superiors in London in the second half of 1916, Administrator 
Wallace perceptively noted that ‘our demand for labour has had the effect of 
diminishing the area under cultivation’.25 In effect the incessant demand for 
labour had the effect of decreasing the amount of food available that was 
necessary to ensure the efficient functioning of the carrier-borne transport 
system. This was an issue that the administrator was well aware of. Earlier in the 
year the administrator had drawn attention to the impending collapse of food 
supplies and hence carrier-borne transport services in northeastern Zambia, when 
he wrote: 
In the part the supplies of food for native troops and native labourers in the camps and for 
carriers have been obtained by local purchase, by sending grain from all parts of N.E.R. and 
latterly by sending it from N.W.R. It is evident now that if the coming crops on the plateau 
are not above average it will be impossible to continue to deliver from the railway the large 
amount of native food and all the necessary stores, by means of transport which have been 
employed hitherto.26 
In correspondence with the Governor in Nyasaland, in February of 1916, Wallace 
had noted that, ‘at present native food stuffs are obtained from every village on 
the plateau’.27 Yet, this food was becoming more and more scarce, and in the 
absence of thousands of men away on carrier service, the harvest would be 
insufficient. In March of 1916, the administrator wrote to his superiors in 
London: 
General Northey is now on the border and finds that food for the troops is very scarce as 
there has been some delay in the delivery of food from Fort Jameson and the Luangwa 
Valley to the supply station south of Fife. This delay has arisen because of the scarcity of 
food on that route and there has been great difficulty in feeding carriers on the way.28 
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By March of 1916, it was becoming ever more apparent that there was a collapse 
in food production in Northeastern Rhodesia, which in turn meant that carriers 
could not be sufficiently fed and thus that transport to the frontline became very 
difficult. As Wallace reported: 
The difficulty in maintaining a sufficient supply of food for the native troops on our border is 
very great owing to the fact that the country is sparsely populated and the surplus amount of 
food grown is therefore not great; not enough always to supply food for the stream of 
carriers passing through with other supplies for the whole of the forces.29 
Coupled to the collapse in food production brought about by the enormous 
recruitment of carriers, it was evident that much of Northeastern Rhodesia was 
devastated. 
Colonial administrators in Northern Rhodesia were well aware of the 
disruptive impact of the enormous recruitment of labour for war purposes. 
Assistant Native Commissioner, Theodore Williams, described that already 
within the first year of the war in 1915 food resources were becoming scarce, as 
well as noting the disruptive influence of columns of war porters on food 
security: 
As regards Commissariat I had been able to get a few eggs and 3 fowls so far but have had to 
live largely out of tins. This road has been so worn since the war that things are hard to get 
now – though the carriers seem to be able to get a meal all right.30  
On paper, with honest intentions, administrators sought to alleviate the disruption 
in ways that they believed were correct and acceptable. But, as so often, the road 
to disruption, ruin, and revolt was paved with the good intentions of 
administrators. Thus at a meeting with chiefs at Luwingo in September 1915, 
where ‘large frequent and regular supplies of labour’ were demanded, the district 
commissioner ordered that ‘chiefs should so arrange the available labour supply 
in their villages that half the men were away, half remaining behind and devoting 
all their energies to making gardens’.31 In reality, the suggested planning and 
good intentions of the administrators came unstuck in the reality of life in war. 
Theodore Williams, among the more perceptive of the administrators, drew 
attention to the disparity that existed between planning and reality in his weekly 
letters to his parents. In early 1916, Williams, stationed at Mporokoso directly 
north of Luwingu, was ordered to ‘raise instanter 250 picked natives to 
accompany the troops’. Williams did not expect this to be a problem, ‘[b]ut it is 
hard on the natives to be called on so suddenly for so long an absence from their 
homes. Those who go will not be back in time for their greatest domestic event 
treecutting: nor will they have time to make arrangements, as they always have 
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when they engage themselves for six months or a year for work at Elizabethville 
or in S. Rhodesia’.32 
In districts where men and women had been withdrawn for war labour 
purposes, there was no longer sufficient food. In many of the districts through 
which the war carriers passed, there was a shortage of food as the carriers 
swarmed across the countryside like locust swarms desperate for food. Visiting 
Commissioner Marshall, writing to the BSAC in London in January 1916, drew 
attention to the shortage of food in northeastern Zambia, ‘our latest information 
points to the fact that the stores of native foods may run short towards the end of 
the wet season [two months on]’.33 Two months later, as the rainy season came to 
an end, Administrator L.A. Wallace wrote: 
Food has been rendered scarce at Abercorn because so much was sold by the natives [for war 
supply] that many had not sufficient left to carry them on till the new harvest, and 
consequently are now in a starving condition and have to be rationed from our stocks. 34  
Writing to the secretary for the BSAC in London in March 1916 Wallace noted, 
‘Mealies [maize cobs] are not purchasable in Northern Rhodesia now’.35 A 
month later, at the end of the rainy season, Administrator L.A. Wallace wrote: 
There is not enough grown here to supply the Congo market which must to a large extent be 
supplied from the Union, with the result that in order to avoid the heavy railage the congo 
merchants can offer a very high price on the Kafue, and we have to pay the same. There will 
be a close approach to famine in some of the native districts so that I shall have to keep on 
the prohibition against export of native grain.36 
The fears of District officials and the administrator came to fruition; in July 
1916, the administrator wrote a confidential report, entitled Famine, to the BSAC 
offices in London, in which he outlined the outbreak of famine across much of 
Northern Rhodesia and what he planned to do about it: 
In my confidential letter of 18th April I mentioned scarcity of grain because of the failure of 
the crops in many places. In order to relieve this I have prohibited the export of native grown 
grain and I have obtained the High Commissioner’s consent to a short Proclamation (No. 9 
of 1916) empowering me to prohibit the purchase by Europeans of grain from natives in 
districts where food is scarce. Famine or something near it exists every year amongst some 
of the natives in the Zambezi Valley but has never been very acute or wide spread. I have 
seldom had to provide relief except in a very small way and I have never wished the natives 
to get into any habit of belief that the administration would keep them alive if they did not 
take proper precautions or if they sold too much of their grain soon after it was harvested. 
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This year the failure of native crops in many areas between Kalomo and Kafue has been 
much more serious than was at first believed, and natives are in many cases already without 
food so that some measures of relief must be taken. 
As far as possible the natives in the famine areas have been used for war transport and I 
hope to continue to use them but whilst they are away grain will have to be provided for their 
families and will in this case be paid for out of their wages as far as they go. I propose to 
make two or three depots on the Railway where natives can buy grain at cost price but there 
will be many cases where the cash will not be forthcoming for the payment of food taken and 
this will be paid, if it can be arranged, in labour or war transport to some extent or will have 
to remain as a debt payable to the Administration later on. 
The labour Bureau is commencing to recruit in these areas and will undertake to feed the 
families of recruits during their term of service using the reserved pay for the purpose. In this 
way I hope there will be some relief.37 
The report written by Wallace indicates that famine was widespread across 
Northeastern Rhodesia as well as in parts of what is today Southern Province. In 
an earlier report Wallace noted that food had been ‘rendered scarce at Abercorn 
because so much was sold by the natives that many had not sufficient left to carry 
them on till the new harvest’.38 As a consequence these people, who had sold 
their grain to the British as part of the war effort, were ‘now in a starving 
condition and have to be rationed from our stocks’.39 Wallace noted that he 
hoped ‘that the amount of relief needed will not be great’.40 In any case, as the 
administrator’s later report makes abundantly clear, any relief provided would 
have to be paid for, either in cash or through labour and deferred payment. 
Referring to what is today Southern Province, the administrator noted that ‘in the 
Choma and Kalomo areas the relief must be given almost at once’, and that 
although he would ‘endeavour to keep it down to the lowest limit … during the 
month of August I estimate at least 3000 bags of grain will be needed’.41 In 
addition, as later reports would indicate, there were extreme food shortages in 
Central Province as well: supplying grain in support of the war effort was the 
prime reason for an acute shortage in food. In August 1916, whilst inspecting the 
northeastern frontier of the territory under his administration, Wallace drew 
attention to the causes of the food shortage, when he wrote, ‘because they had 
surrendered so much food to us last year they suffered, before their last crops 
were reaped, much hunger and in some places a very close approach to famine’.42 
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A month later reports from Mumbwa district in today’s Central Province 
indicated that ‘food was scarce throughout the division’.43 In addition in the 
absence of food, ‘people [were] living on roots’.44  
Although an attempt at providing relief would be undertaken by the 
administration, this famine relief had to be paid for, as the administrator’s report 
clearly stated. In exchange for food, people were expected to work for the 
administration or to use deferred pay through employment with labour recruiters 
operating in the area. In both instances people became more dependent upon, and 
thus subject to, the colonial administration. This is not to suggest that the colonial 
administrators consciously used the conditions of famine to extend the abstract 
notion of colonial power; they did, however, consciously use the conditions of 
famine to draw people into wage labour, and subsequently into a position of 
dependency within the wage economy. 
Influenza 
Weakened by four years of war, incessant work, and insufficient food, the people 
of Northern Rhodesia were an easy prey for the influenza pandemic when it 
struck the territory in late 1918 early 1919.45 Deserting and discharged carriers 
and porters carried the disease far and wide across the territory, bringing life to a 
standstill and appearing to herald the end of time. Spanish influenza struck 
people irrespective of race or class, and this would have a profound effect on 
African perceptions vis-à-vis their colonisers. The Mwinilunga District Notebook 
provides a succinct account of the pandemic that holds true for all the other 
districts of Northern Rhodesia at the time: 
Influenza. This disease was brought to the district by returning war transport carriers, and 
from December 1918 to May 1919 almost every native went down. The death rate was 
heavy: in five months nearly 500 natives were reported to have died – in addition to this 
many died whose names were not registered, owing to their youth, so their deaths were not 
reported. … The mortality in this corner seems to have been much heavier than in the 
adjacent districts – due doubtless to the fact that the disease arrived here when the natives 
were hungrier than usual.46 
Native Commissioner Theodore Williams, who had started his career as a 
probationer in Mwinilunga before the war, came to be stationed at Solwezi at the 
end of the war and provided a detailed account of the spread of the disease in 
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letters to his mother. Williams described how, whilst being on tour through the 
district, ‘an increasing number of my carriers [came to be] complaining of “head 
& chest” and the possibility that we might have got Spanish flu infection was just 
beginning to dawn on me’.47 Messages sent to Williams from the Boma 
confirmed that the disease had arrived at Solwezi. The party of men that 
accompanied Williams, his cooks, messenger, and carriers became ‘hors de 
Combat. So I made up my mind to it that we had got S.F. [Spanish flu] and that 
the best thing to do was to [go] into quarantine’.48 However, Williams was well 
aware that inadvertently his party had contributed to the spread of the disease, 
and he agonised about the fact that it was he who had spread the disease with his 
party of carriers: 
It is a terrible thought that I myself may be the vehicle of spreading S.F. through all 
Nwkinanzofus villages - … all of which I visited after the first few carriers were 
complaining of what all 25 are complaining of now. For there is no lack of proof of the high 
mortality that S.F. causes among natives – Mutenge’s village gives an instance close at hand! 
The people will simply die like flies and be unsettled for years by it…49 
Williams believed that his carriers had contracted the disease at Mutenge’s 
village, ‘owing to careless observance of orders against allowing W.T. [War 
Transport] repatriates to enter their villages – and a whole lot of them are dead 
already’. 50 In a subsequent letter to his mother, Williams described the relatively 
light impact of the disease in Solwezi District: 
From reports received to date I reckon that the flu will have cost this division (population 
about 10.000) 200 lives, which is a pretty light total considering its ravages elsewhere. Of 
course the scanty population and the ease with which people could escape from spheres of 
infection by simply retiring into the bush, has been their saving, though those who did get it 
at all badly had small chance of recovery. Mwinilunga is having its turn now, we hear. This 
is a rotten letter, but so is Solwezi.51 
There, where people could escape into the bush and avoid contact with others, 
the disease petered out, but in those parts of the country where people were 
clustered together the disease spread like wildfire. Not surprisingly the mining 
town of Broken Hill, as well as the mines in Katanga, were such sites. As 
Williams wrote to his mother: 
This plague is the devil though … We here have been lucky beyond the dreams of gipsies 
(sic) … At Mwinilunga they have had it pretty badly. The serum injection seems to be an 
entire washout – statistics collected at the Congo mines show a higher death rate among 
those who were treated with it than among those who were not – it seems to kill the strongest 
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quite as readily as the weeds and judging by the Doctors and dukes and princes that have 
died of it one would gather that expert attention is of very little value.52  
Broken Hill, lying as it did at the centre of the transport network that had 
developed during the course of the War, was particularly hard hit by the 
epidemic. In addition, the concentration of mineworkers, railway workers, and 
transport carriers added to the increase and spread of the disease. The influence 
of the transport network on the spread of the disease can clearly be seen in the 
distribution of the epidemic; as such the District Notebook for Broken Hill noted 
that the ‘heavy mortality grew lighter as [the] disease spread back from Railway 
line’.53 About 200 people died in the mining and railway complex of Broken 
Hill. In addition a further 447 deaths were reported in the Mwamboshi sub-
district exclusive of ‘Broken Hill town and Mine’.54 Reports from the Mkushi 
sub-district explicitly mention the significance of Broken Hill as a centre from 
which influenza spread: 
Influenza appeared at Mkushi early in November. … Natives fleeing from the scourge when 
it first came to Broken Hill died by the roadside … eight strangers who died on the road 
were buried. The disease was brought straight from the railway by the mailman…55 
Interestingly Broken Hill remained a hotbed for Influenza, presumably on 
account of the railway, mining town, and its compounds. Subsequently the 
territories annual report stated that the ‘continued persistence of this disease 
[influenza] amongst natives at Broken Hill since 1918 and its peculiar 
manifestations there are noteworthy.’56    
The only check on the inexorable growth of the African population of South 
Africa, and presumably thus also for the whole of Southern Africa, in the course 
of the twentieth century was the population crash caused by the influenza 
pandemic.57 Given the enormity of the event, it is hardly surprising that its 
effects were to be felt in more than population statistics alone. In South Africa, 
the epidemic led to ‘renewed ‘sanitation syndrome’ fears by white residents that 
infection was spread by black inhabitants’, and gave further weight to calls for 
legally enforced racial segregation.58 In outlining the development of 
segregationist legislation in South Africa, and the Natives Urban Areas Act in 
particular, the great historian of South Africa, De Kiewiet, noted: ‘the influenza 
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epidemic horribly revealed the disease and misery which was bred and sheltered 
in windowless shacks and congested unsanitary backyards’.59 Similarly, Howard 
Phillips, who wrote extensively on the impact of influenza in South Africa, 
described how the threat of the disease came to be used as an instrument for the 
enforcement of racist legislation.60 
The pandemic directly affected those who survived: ‘orphans sad and 
suffering, with no one to help them out’.61 Describing events in Bechuanaland, 
John Spears noted that epidemics pose ‘the most serious challenges to human 
society’ in that they ‘divide and alienate as well as kill’: 
Against the fear of an unknown, invisible assailant, there is no heroic combat. When fear 
drives friends and even relatives to abandon each other, to flee the infectious breath of loved 
ones then society can simply disintegrate.62 
In a world in which survivors sought to give meaning to their continued 
existence, many came to the same conclusions that the Zulu composer, Reuben 
Caluza, had reached; ‘They forgot their maker, only those who worshipped him 
constantly pulled through’.63  
The experiences of Nontetha Nkwenkwe, a young woman from the Eastern 
Cape of South Africa who was overcome by Spanish flu and received divine 
messages, were mirrored in varying forms across the continent. Upon recovery, 
Nontetha Nkwenkwe began preaching and prophesising: ‘the influenza was just a 
taste of what God was bringing. A judgement day in which everyone would be 
flying in the sky was imminent’.64 Once Nontetha came to the attention of the 
colonial authorities, she and her followers were incarcerated. In jail, Nontetha’s 
prophecies continued and came to be conflated with the message of liberation 
proclaimed by the Universal Negro Improvement Association and the Industrial 
and Commercial Workers Union,65 organisations that were seen as heralding the 
arrival of African-American liberators. As a jailed follower of Nontetha stated, 
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‘we used to dream in the hope that the Americans were coming to release us… 
As oppressed people, we always had hope that we would be released’.66 
Throughout the African continent, the destruction wrought by the epidemic 
forced people to reconsider much that had hitherto seemed hard and fast and 
immutable. In the context of colonial Ghana, gender roles changed as a 
consequence of the epidemic. David Patterson, in describing the epidemic in the 
northern districts of what is today Ghana, cited a colonial official who wrote: 
Lorha is like a deserted village, one sees no one, […] I hear that some Lobis are wondering if 
this is the end of the world.67 
So many women were sick that, contrary to custom, men had to grind grain and 
prepare meals. Foods prepared and chosen by people also changed in the 
aftermath of the epidemic. Ohadike describes how cassava, which had hitherto 
been rejected as a staple food crop, spread and became an accepted staple in 
southern Nigeria following the epidemic.68 The attractiveness of cassava to so 
many people is the fact that it requires comparatively less agricultural labour to 
produce. In periods of stress, where labour may be short, it becomes the crop of 
choice.69 
As noted earlier, the pandemic brought economic life to a standstill, but it did 
more than that alone; it literally ended the productive life of many economic 
activities.70 One such activity was industrial mining, an activity, which by its 
very nature has bequeathed us with substantial archival material. One case that 
has been described in detail is the mining industry in Southern Rhodesia.71 
Previously successful mining operations, such as the Globe and Phoenix gold 
mine in Umvuma, closed down on account of the disease, and were unable to 
reopen in the aftermath of the disease.72 In and of itself, the Globe and Phoenix is 
particularly interesting in the context of colonial racism, economic practice, and 
the transformative effects of the epidemic. Anxious to ensure a healthy work 
                                                 
66  Edgar & Sapire, African Apocalypse, p. 31. 
67  K. David Patterson, ‘The Influenza Epidemic in the Gold Coast’. In: Transactions of the Historical 
Society of Ghana, Vol. XVI (ii), 1995, p. 209, citing: Lorha Diary, 2 December 1918. 
68  D.C. Ohadike, ‘The Influenza Pandemic of 1918-19 and the Spread of Cassava Cultivation on the 
Lower Niger: A Study in Historical Linkages’, The Journal of African History, 22 1981, pp. 379-
391. 
69  Cassava can be planted at virtually any stage in the rainy season, and can be left in the ground for up 
to 18 months after it has matured. For a standard work on cassava, see W.O. Jones, Manioc in Africa 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959). 
70  Although they concentrate on the United States of America, Elizabeth Brainerd and Mark Siegler, 
provide a fine overview of the far-reaching economic effects brought about by the Epidemic. 
Elizabeth Brainerd and Mark Siegler, ‘The Economic Effects of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic’, 
Discussion Paper No. 3791, February 2003, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London. 
71  I. R. Phimister, ‘The “Spanish” Influenza Pandemic of 1918 and its Impact on the Southern 
Rhodesian Mining Industry’. In: The Central African Journal of Medicine, vol. 19, no. 7, July 1973, 
pp. 143-148. 
72  Pers. Comm. October 2006, Dr. H. Gewald, former AngloGold exploration geologist who had been 
stationed in Umvuma in the early 1960s. 
132 
 
force, the management of Globe and Phoenix went to the extent of ‘employ[ing] 
white nurses to take care of black patients’.73 Not surprisingly, Terence Ranger 
has noted that in Southern Rhodesia the influenza epidemic led to a crisis of 
comprehension.74  
Throughout the continent people literally scattered as they sought to evade the 
disease. In doing so, they inadvertently spread the disease ever further. 
Yoshikuni, in dealing with migrant workers in colonial Zimbabwe, cited an 
annual report for 1918, which described ‘the pell-mell flight from many labour 
centres and the natural reluctance to return to what were regarded as centres of 
infection’.75 The rapid, unstoppable, and seemingly haphazard progress of the 
disease led to the most fantastic theories and stories that sought to explain the 
pandemic.76 All over the continent people sought to explain what had happened 
and, in so doing, named the pandemic according to its perceived character.77 
In the northeastern districts of what is today Zambia, the pandemic arrived in 
the context of war and famine.78 German forces under Von Lettow-Vorbeck had 
routed British colonial forces, sacked Kasama, and seemed set to continue 
onwards.79 Mwelwa Musambachime described how, in seeking to comprehend 
events, people in the Mporokoso district attributed the epidemic to the death of 
soldiers and porters in the war.80 Melvin Page writing on Malawians and the First 
World War noted that: 
In the minds of Malawians, the connection between the war and the pandemic of influenza 
was not only immediate, but also causal. A common expression was that the ‘war air’ had 
brought the new and devastating disease, blown in by winds from the front.81 
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Spanish influenza struck people irrespective of race or class, and this had a 
profound effect on European and African perceptions. In the disbelieving and 
shocked words of a British Governor elsewhere in Africa: 
The disease spread with devastating rapidity, disorganizing everything. Everybody was 
attacked almost at once. Of my own household of twenty servants not one escaped; and on 
one day I had to attend to their work myself. It can be easily understood what such a state of 
affairs would mean to others less fortunately situated.82 
Similarly the combination of war, famine, and influenza in Northern Rhodesia 
appeared to put the world on its head, particularly as it served to bring about a 
religiously inspired movement which shook the very foundations of British 
colonial rule in the northeastern districts.83 
Watchtower 
In the immediate aftermath of the German invasion, and whilst the influenza 
epidemic continued to rage throughout the world, a millenarian movement 
developed in Northeastern Zambia that heralded a new order and dismissed the 
authority of the chiefs and the colonial authorities. Perceptive as always, the 
historian L.H. Gann drew attention to the link that existed between the demands 
for labour for the British war effort and the sectarian movement that rocked the 
colonial administration in Northeastern Zambia. As Gann noted, ‘Recruitment 
was done through chiefs who had to supply a specified quota, a task which made 
their position with the tribesmen no easier, and goes some way towards 
explaining the bitter propaganda that was subsequently made in North-Eastern 
Rhodesia by African sectaries against the institution of chieftainship.’84 
Historians Rotberg and Meebelo followed Gann’s intuition and referred to 
official reports dealing with the rise of Watchtower, in particular the words of 
Hanoc Sindano, a Watchtower preacher who was quoted as saying: 
There they are, they who over burden us with loads, and beat us like slaves, but a day will 
come when they will be the slaves. … God only is to be respected and obeyed, nobody else 
on earth has any right to it; no more the European than the native chiefs. The English have 
no right whatsoever in the country, they are committing injustice against the natives in 
pretending to have rights.85 
Along with the anthropologist Karen Fields, Rotberg and Meebelo drew 
extensively on the reports of Fife Acting DC Tanganyika District Charles Draper 
who reported on ‘Watchtower’ and expanded upon ‘a youth who got up and 
commenced to preach in an excited manner’. When companions ‘read out a Bible 
                                                 
82  NA, CO 879/118, War and Colonial Department and Colonial Office: Africa, Confidential Print, 
folio 176. Emphasis added. 
83  Fields, Revival and Rebellion, p. 143. 
84  Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 163. 
85  Rotberg, Rise of Nationalism, p. 135. Meebelo, Reaction to Colonialism, p. 160.  
134 
 
text … he would dilate upon it.’86 Both academics noted that ‘the congregation 
consisted mostly of young women and children’, yet Rotberg, by failing to 
transcribe the remainder of the sentence, ‘most of the village being stricken with 
Spanish Influenza’, effectively obscured the reason as to why the audience was 
constituted as it was. Influenza had felled the bulk of the population, and the 
remainder turned to the metaphysical in search of an answer that would explain 
the condition in which they found themselves. 
Throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, Watchtower and 
associated movements such as Mwana Lesa and Alice Lenshina’s Lumpa 
Church, remained a proverbial bogey that could be dragged out of the cupboard 
of history to explain events whenever and wherever, should the need arise.87 
Thus, when mineworkers went on strike for higher wages in the early 1930s, 
Watchtower was resuscitated in the subsequent commission of enquiry as an 
explanation for strike action: 
The Commission finds that the teachings and literature of the Watch Tower bring civil and 
spiritual authority, especially Native Authority, into contempt; that it is a dangerously 
subversive movement; and that it is an important predisposing cause of the recent 
disturbances.88  
Yet, the reasons for Watchtower were far more prosaic than seemingly 
unintelligible beliefs in the metaphysical. Instead, coming on the back of the 
global influenza pandemic and a bruising four-year war, in which colonial rule 
came to be effectively established in Northern Rhodesia, Watchtower can be seen 
to represent a desperate last ditch attempt by people to retain their independence, 
free from colonial rule.  
It appears that the ideas associated with Watchtower arrived in northeastern 
Northern Rhodesia when at least two of six men, who had been deported from 
Southern Rhodesia for involvement in Watchtower activities in Bulawayo, 
arrived in the Tanganyika District in October 1917. In September 1918, two of 
these men, Sindano and Kanjelo ‘were charged before the magistrate, Abercorn, 
with spreading “Watch Tower” Doctrines’. 89 The men were not convicted at the 
time, as the movement was not considered serious. However, in December 1918, 
that is, in the immediate aftermath of the German invasion that had seen the 
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British administration fleeing in disarray, and in the midst of the influenza 
epidemic, the words of the Watchtower preachers appeared imbued with 
particular validity.  
Watchtower in central Africa was particularly associated with Joseph Booth 
and Kenan Kamwana. Although Booth had been ‘expelled for his attempts to 
incite unrest and sedition amongst the native population’, Kamwana continued 
preaching.90 According to the reports submitted to the British High 
Commissioner in Pretoria in South Africa in 1919, Kamwana was alleged to have 
preached the following doctrine in 1914 before the outbreak of war: 
The time is at hand when God will end the world. The end of the world will be October 
1914. There will be a great war, famine and pestilence. God will reign on earth. There will 
be no white men and no tax and the power will be taken from the Europeans by God, who 
will give power to his people, the Jews. Every nation will have their own king. 91 
Perhaps not surprisingly Kamwana was arrested and tried for his efforts at 
Zomba, and expelled from Nyasaland in 1914, whereafter he joined Booth in 
South Africa before being deported yet again to Mozambique.92 But, more 
importantly than his multitude of expulsions, one can see how his message of 
imminent war, pestilence, and the ending of European rule must have resonated 
with people in Northern Rhodesia as the war progressed and Kamwana’s 
prophecies appeared to be fulfilled.  
In October 1918, German forces under the command of General Lettow von 
Vorbeck had successfully invaded Northern Rhodesia, overrun Kasama, which 
had been hastily abandoned with all its stores, and marched southwards as far as 
the Chambeshi River. By their own account, British forces believed that Von 
Vorbeck, had the war not ended in Europe, could have marched on to the mines 
of southern Congo and on to Angola.93 In late November, as the influenza 
pandemic spread, Lettow von Vorbeck’s forces, ‘11 companies, comprised of 
150 Europeans, 1165 Asikari [sic], an immense column of porters, amongst 
whom were 800 women, … 24 maxims and 14 Lewis guns’, marched into 
Abercorn to formally surrender to British forces. 94 Whilst the German force as a 
whole was disarmed, the European soldiers were permitted to retain their 
firearms, after which they returned to Tanganyika via Kasanga. Acting District 
Commissioner C.R.B. Draper concluded his report on the surrender of Von 
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Lettow-Vorbeck with the following comments, ‘Natives have quite settled down 
again … a good deal of looting must have occurred in S. part of the District, and 
it may be necessary later to extend some relief against famine’.95 Aside from a 
remark dealing with the outbreak of Spanish flu at Kasanga, there was no 
indication that British authorities had any idea as to what was about to occur.  
Less than a month later events appeared to spiral out of control, as Draper, the 
man who had so confidently asserted that the ‘Natives have quite settled down 
again’ came to be directly involved in clashes with Watchtower. In a report 
compiled shortly after the incidents, Draper asserted that he had sought to assist 
‘chiefs and headman who were not in favour of the movement’ by attempting to 
arrest ‘fanatical “prophets” and converts’. However, he was prevented from 
doing so by ‘mostly young men of the “military porter class”’, who arrived 
‘singing hymns lustily and at intervals shouting prayers and exhortations’. 96 
Unable to affect his arrest, Draper put in an urgent request that a ‘Company of 
Northern Rhodesia Police, with experienced officers and reliable Non-
commissioned Officers’ be sent to him as soon as possible. 97 Two weeks later, 
Draper put in a further request, as he was ‘convinced that one platoon of police 
was insufficient’ and that he ‘considered at least 100 men necessary with 
European officers and maxim, at any rate for display’. 98 Whereas twenty years 
earlier a request for a maxim gun on the part of Collector John M. Bell, who 
anticipated a ‘troublesome time with the Awemba this dry season’99, had been 
turned down, now a full platoon with Lewis gun (which was as much a machine 
gun as a Maxim gun) were despatched to Draper.100  
In the event, the uprising was not to be, and approximately 100 Watchtower 
supporters were eventually arrested and marched under armed guard to Kasama. 
Far from the German invasion heralding the end of British rule and the end of 
time, it heralded instead the definite establishment of colonial rule in Northern 
Rhodesia. With Germany defeated, and with an enormous army in the field, the 
colonial administration of Northern Rhodesia could pretty much do what it liked. 
In contrast to the first twenty years of colonial administration in Northern 
Rhodesia, the administration in 1918 had the means, the will, and the power to 
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enforce its will across the territory. Richard Goode, who would later become the 
governor of Northern Rhodesia, wrote to the British high commissioner in 
Pretoria in early 1919: 
We are relieved that Draper managed to arrest the W.T. gentlemen without a row and hope 
the movement will soon die out. It might have spread very quickly and if it had reached Ft. 
Jameson district I think there would have been trouble.101 
In the aftermath of Germany´s defeat in Europe, the principal preachers and 
adherents of Watchtower were rounded up and transported in chains for trial in 
Kasama.102 
Conclusion 
Writing to his mother from Solwezi in early 1919, Theodor Williams described 
in detail the victory celebrations that were being prepared to reward the people of 
Northern Rhodesia for their participation in World War One. In itself, Williams’s 
letter is particularly interesting in that, although it indicates very clearly that the 
war had a tremendous impact upon the country as a whole, it was particularly the 
northeastern regions of the territory that had been hard-hit: 
… today I have dished out 700 lbs of corn with the messenger and warden wives to brew 
beer with: it will be a terrific orgy. Not that these people deserve anything – war transport 
work has been immensely popular on its own account and the assistance headmen give us in 
providing men is chiefly ideal. The demand has not been greater than volunteers could fill. It 
is over in NER that natives have done really nobly: there they have not had a month’s rest 
since 1915: if they were not actually humping loads they were being driven to their gardens 
to raise more food. If these Kaonde and Lunda had been asked to do quarter that they would 
have revolted, or gone to the Layo! Still as HQs [headquarters] have allowed us the money 
and as we have always had out of the natives all we wanted we will cut the credit and let the 
cash go! And make our loyal subjects as blind as we must need be to their unworthiness.103 
At the same time, as Williams prepared to drive his subjects to drink, on the other 
side of the country the District Commissioner in Mpika described the transport of 
Watchtower prisoners in chains southwards and the return of the motorcars that 
had been used in the war effort.104 In effect, without realising it at the time, the 
DC Mpika was describing, not only the end of World War One but also the end 
of the independence of people in Zambia and the establishment of British 
colonial rule. Watchtower prisoners, primarily young men who had been 
subjected to four years of hard labour as carriers and porters in the war, were led 
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southwards in shackles, whilst the motorcars that were meant to have alleviated 
the carrier shortages also returned to the south, leaving a country defeated and 
devastated by war, but subject to effective colonial control and rule. 
  
Conclusion 
Formally on paper and in terms of international law, the territories that now make 
up the Republic of Zambia became part and parcel of the British Empire in 1891. 
However, formal jurisdiction did not equate with effective on-the-ground control 
and administration of the territory. This book has examined the manner in which 
between 1891 and 1920 effective British colonial control and administration 
came to be extended across colonial Zambia. Central to this process was the 
specific and unique relationship that existed between labour and transport in 
Central Africa at the time. This book has argued that World War One, with its 
incessant demand for transport labour, was fundamental to the process through 
which British colonial control and administration came to be extended across 
colonial Zambia. The limitless funds made available during World War One by 
the War Office in London to the BSAC in Northern Rhodesia, enabled the 
colonial administration to co-opt and procure the support and services of 
Zambian chiefs and headmen. In a symbiotic relationship that developed during 
the course of the war, Zambian chiefs and headmen, who supplied transport 
labour in exchange for funding, support and privileges, became evermore 
dependent upon the colonial administration, and the colonial administration was 
able to extend its authority and mandate across all of colonial Zambia. 
Chapter One examined the nature of colonial administration in Northern 
Rhodesia, and indicated that prior to 1914 British authority remained confined to 
a few select administrative centres, but did not extend beyond these. Specifically 
the chapter examined the failed attempt by the colonial administration to carry 
through and enforce agricultural reforms and legislation aimed at preventing the 
chopping down of trees and the establishment of villages beyond the jurisdiction 
of the colonial administration. Thus, although in 1906 a colonial official wrote 
that, ‘the carefully thought out rules for Vitemene cutting and restrictions, were 
communicated to the chiefs and all approved of by them’, the truth of the matter 
was that within three years the administrative plans had come to nought, and the 
administration was incapable of enforcing its wishes.1 That is, on paper Northern 
Rhodesia fell under the administration of officials of the BSAC, in reality these 
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officials were severely limited as to what they could do on the ground. On the 
issue of chopping trees for gardens, the chiefs and headmen chose to completely 
ignore the colonial administration, and side with their subjects. However, the 
chapter indicates that there was an emergent alliance between the BSAC and 
certain chiefs and headmen on issues of mutual importance and shared interest. 
Specifically, it was in the legislation’s appeal for the concentration of people in 
villages around chiefs and headmen that the BSAC and the chiefs and headmen 
found one another. In a context in which ‘wealth in people’ was of crucial 
importance, African leaders, recognised as chiefs or headmen by the BSAC, 
strengthened their position by siding with the BSAC and enforcing its legislation 
with regard to the ending of mitanda and newly established independent villages. 
Chapter Two examined the new economic order that came about in Central 
Africa following the military defeat of a string of polities in the territories 
surrounding contemporary Zambia. Specifically the chapter described the new 
economic opportunities that arose for Central Africans, primarily as transport 
labourers, independent of the control of their chiefs and headmen, as mines and 
railways came to be established. The chapter indicated that the violent and brutal 
establishment of colonial rule in the territories surrounding Northern Rhodesia in 
the 1880s and 1890s effectively cut off the inhabitants of the territory from the 
carrier-borne long-distance trade. Chiefs and headmen who had long overseen 
the trade and thereby bound followers to themselves through the allocation and 
redistribution of trade goods, lost their authority and were powerless to prevent 
their erstwhile followers from moving elsewhere. In the early 1900s, as the 
copper mines of Katanga in southern Congo came to be developed, and an 
infrastructure, consisting of telegraph lines, railways, crushers, smelters, and 
towns constructed to facilitate these mines, thousands upon thousands of people 
were able to find employment as workers, carriers, and porters. Interestingly, 
although a railway line was constructed to facilitate the mines, this did not have 
any further impact on transport elsewhere in the country beyond the railway line. 
The absence of any alternative form of transport ensured that carrier transport 
remained of central importance till the mass introduction of motor vehicles that 
could operate independently of the railway line in the 1920s. Until then, carriers 
remained of central importance and in a context in which labour was scarce could 
demand and depend on a fair wage. 
Chapter Three examined the manner in which during World War One the 
colonial administration supported and rewarded African chiefs and headmen, in 
exchange for labour and food, and thereby extended its control over Northern 
Rhodesia. The chapter illustrated how anxious for carriers and food supplies, yet 
thinly spread across the territory, BSAC administrators needed to work through 
the chiefs and headmen, and were dependent on their support. In turn, in 
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exchange for carriers and food supplies, the BSAC administrators promised and 
undertook steps to support and increase the authority and influence of the chiefs 
and headmen of Zambia. A decade and a half prior to the formal introduction of 
indirect rule, BSAC administrators, operating under the pressures of wartime 
conditions, began attempting to administer the territory and its African 
population through Zambia’s chiefs and headmen. In this ‘marriage of 
convenience’ African chiefs and headmen were able to extend and expand their 
influence and authority through the acquisition of all manner of material and 
immaterial provisions from the BSAC administration in exchange for labour and 
food supplies. Yet there was a flipside to this, in that the colonial administration 
did not loose sight of its goal to extend and expand its authority across the 
territory.  Consistently, the administration ensured that its labour recruitment, and 
the subsequent enhancement of the status of chiefs and headmen, was in keeping 
with its ultimate aims and objectives: to establish and consolidate its control over 
the territory.  
For four years during World War One, labour was recruited all across 
Northern Rhodesia, from Mwinilunga to Chipata, from Mumbwe to Serenje, and 
in all of these places across Zambia the BSAC was able to extend its influence. 
In a process that covered four years, Zambia’s chiefs and headmen supported and 
assisted the British war effort through the supply of labour and food stuffs; in 
exchange the chiefs were rewarded in a number of ways, as outlined above, 
ranging from financial incentive through to the supply of messengers and 
policemen that were used in enforcing the will of the chiefs on their subjects. 
Through their alliance with the colonial authorities, chiefs and headmen were 
once again able to centralise their power, for the first time since the ending of the 
long-distance trade in the 1890s. However, although the chiefs were able to 
extend their control over their subjects, at the same time, the colonial state, by 
supporting and working through the chiefs, extended its control over the chiefs 
and their people across all of Zambia. 
Chapter Four examined the variety of schemes and technological innovations 
introduced and implemented by the British colonial and military authorities in an 
effort to overcome the limitations in terms of distance and capacity associated 
with carrier-borne transport. The chapter showed that far from reducing their 
dependence upon African labour, their schemes and innovations necessitated 
evermore labour, and thus the necessity of evermore cooperation with and 
dependence upon Zambian chiefs and headmen. Whilst attempting to conduct 
war in central and East Africa, the British military deployed waterborne 
transport, in the form of canoe flotillas, and forms of transport that stood at the 
very forefront of imperial industrial technology in the form of steam-traction 
engines and petrol-driven motor vehicles. In the event, as the chapter indicated, 
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the deployment of these forms of technology depended upon large amounts of 
African labour, and it is debatable whether the technology was as efficient, 
reliable, and useful as popular perception at the time would have had one believe. 
In popular perception and in much of the academic discourse emanating from 
the Global North throughout the past two hundred years, the African continent 
and its people have all too often been presented as the epitome of backwardness 
and underdevelopment. Interestingly, in this same period of time Africa was 
consistently the location where the cutting edge of technological developments, 
particularly in the field of armaments and communication, were deployed. The 
Maxim gun, rockets, telegraph, radio, and aeroplane were all first deployed for 
the purposes of war in Africa. All too often this faith in the capabilities and 
capacities of these products of industrial technology did not live up to 
expectations. In effect, one can argue that this was a fetishisation of industrial 
technology on the part of military planners. This fetishisation of industrial 
technology, in the face of its patent failure to deliver the envisaged savings in 
terms of labour, is clearly illustrated in Chapter Four by the British war planners 
who continued to rely on steam-traction engines and petrol-driven motor vehicles 
even when these examples of cutting edge imperial industrial technology could 
only function through the liberal application and extensive use of African labour. 
The continued, indeed ever-increasing reliance, upon African labour through the 
course of the war, although it showed up the myth of technological advantage, 
did have as its corollary that the British colonial administration gained an ever-
increasing level of control over labour and thus the population of Northern 
Rhodesia as the war progressed. 
Chapter Five examined the manner in which through the limitless demand for 
labour, engendered by World War One, and the willingness of British colonial 
and military authorities to pay for this labour, the British were able to extend 
their authority across Northern Rhodesia. The chapter indicated that the 
enormous demand for labour and food led to a collapse in food production across 
much of the territory. In exchange for food evermore people were drawn into 
working as carriers for the British war effort, which led to a further deterioration 
of local food production and increasing dependence upon the colonial 
administration. This dire situation was exacerbated by the outbreak of the 
Spanish influenza pandemic which reached Northern Rhodesia in the dying 
months of World War One. Influenza, coupled with incessant labour demands 
and famine, disrupted African society and created a context within which 
Christian inspired millenarian movements could come to be established. The 
syncretic teachings of Watchtower adherents appeared to herald the end of the 
world and the promise of salvation for the righteous. Unfortunately for the people 
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of Northern Rhodesia this was not to be as British colonial rule came to be 
entrenched. 
In early 1919 the District Commissioner for Mpika described the transport of 
Watchtower prisoners in chains southwards and the return of the motorcars that 
had been used in the war effort. In effect, without realising it at the time, the DC 
Mpika was describing, not only the end of World War One, but also the end of 
the independence of people in Zambia and the establishment of British colonial 
rule. Watchtower prisoners, primarily young men who had been subjected to four 
years of hard labour as carriers and porters in the war, were led southwards in 
shackles, whilst the motorcars that were meant to have alleviated the carrier 
shortages also returned to the south, leaving a country defeated and devastated by 
war, but subject to effective colonial control and rule. 
In contrast to the work of Yorke, who argued that the colonial state was 
threatened and nearly collapsed during the course of the war, this book has 
argued, instead, that it was precisely on account of the war, and in particular the 
limitless funding made available to the BSAC by the War Office during the 
course of the war, that the BSAC was able to establish an effective 
administration in Northern Rhodesia. This book argues that although the 
territories that would make up Zambia had officially become British in 1891, this 
did not equate to an on-the-ground presence of colonial authority capable of 
affecting the daily lives of people, let alone determining their destinies. The 
establishment of effective colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia only came about on 
account of the unique conditions that developed in World War One, conditions 
which necessitated the massive application of human labour, which could only be 
effectively obtained through purchase, which in effect bound Chiefs and 
Headmen to the incipient colonial administration. World War One did not 
weaken the colonial administration in Northern Rhodesia, instead it provided the 
BSAC with an opportunity to extend and impress its authority across the 
territory. 
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